

EVROPAEVM

The Europaeum was founded in 1992 as an association of European universities, with a mission to:

- promote excellence in academic links in research and teaching collaboration between the Europaeum partners;
- act as an open academic network linking the Europaeum partners and other bodies in the pursuit of study;
- serve as a resource for the general support and promotion of European studies;
- function independently in the search for new ideas;
- provide opportunities for the joint pursuit of new pan-European initiatives;
- serve as a high level ‘think-tank’ exploring new ideas and new roles for universities in the new Learning Age;
- provide a ‘pool of talent’ to carry out research and inquiry into problems and questions confronting Europe today and tomorrow;
- help train and educate future leaders for a new Europe.

The Europaeum consists of nine leading European university institutions: University of Oxford; Leiden University; University of Bologna; University Bonn; University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; the Graduate Institute of International Studies; Geneva; Charles University, Prague; Complutense University, Madrid, and University of Helsinki.

The *Europaeum Lectures* are part of a range of consortium activities which also include collaborative, research projects, conferences, annual student summer schools, joint teaching programmes, staff mobility initiatives, and linked scholarship schemes.

Details of Europaeum activities are given in the *Annexes* at the back of this pamphlet.

A EUROPAEUM LECTURE

DELIVERED AT

UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN

ON

18TH NOVEMBER, 2003

Challenges for
German Foreign
Policy at the
beginning of the 21st
Century

PROFESSOR CHRISTIAN HACKE

ORGANISED IN ASSOCIATION WITH
THE CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
CAMPUS DEN HAAG, LEIDEN
UNIVERSITY, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 5-7,
2511 CV DEN HAAG

Professor Christian Hacke



Christian Hacke, born 1943, received a Ph.D. from the Free University Berlin, in 1974. He was elected professor for Political Science at the University of the Army Forces in Hamburg from 1980 to 2000. Since then he has held Chair of Political Science and Contemporary History at Bonn University, where he teaches International Relations with a special focus on American and German foreign policy, and the history and theory of International Relations. Professor Hacke has published several books, mostly on US and German foreign policy. He contributes frequently to German newspapers and magazines such as *Die Zeit* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Contents

The Europaeum Mission	<i>i</i>
A note on Professor Christian Hacke	<i>iii</i>
Challenges for German Foreign Policy at the beginning of the 21st Century.....	1
Rejoinder by Dr Hartmut Mayer.....	27
Annex A : The Europaeum Record.....	36
Annex B : The Europaeum Members.....	40
Annex C : The Europaeum Lectures	45

Published by the Europaeum, Oxford, 2004

© 2004 Europaeum / Christian Hacke

Registered Charity No: 1105477

CHALLENGES FOR GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Maybe you are familiar with this ancient Chinese curse: May you live in interesting times! Well, we very much live in such times today. Since the end of the Cold War more than a decade ago, the international landscape has been constantly shifting, disappointing the prophets of a new era of globalized, perpetual peace. Indeed, some scholars, such as Anatol Lieven, argue quite correctly that the Cold War ended no sooner than September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. were catalytic in the sense that they provided for a new, encompassing framework in international relations: George W. Bush's "war on terror." People argue back and forth about the merits and dangers of this strategy, but one thing is certain: the dynamism of today's American foreign policy puts all other states under pressure. Every country needs to define its foreign policy, and, more often than not, also its domestic policy in relation to the United States, the "lonely superpower," as Samuel Huntington put it.

As a front state in the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany has done so since it was founded. German foreign policy has always rested on two pillars: First, the *Westbindung*, the firm alliance with the West, most notably the US. Second, the reconciliation and cooperation with other European states, leading to the European Economic Cooperation, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, and, finally, European integration.

Today, however, at the beginning of the 21st Century, there is a dangerous tension between the two pillars. In fact, the trend in world politics as well as Germany's own policy seem to tear this foundation of German foreign policy apart. And that shall be the topic of my talk today: I will describe this tension and explain how it came about; building on that, I'll attempt to outline a solution for Germany's current foreign policy dilemma.

In doing so, however, we need to take a look back at the diplomatic crisis preceding the war in Iraq this year. As you know, it was in that conflict that the strain in the transatlantic alliance, as well as the divide within Europe, became most obvious. At the same time, it was in that conflict that Germany's Schröder/Fischer government made a number of crucial decisions which amounted to a departure from traditional German Cold War and even post-Cold War foreign policy.

Then, in the second part of my speech, I will look at some of the underlying factors which shape Germany's foreign policy today. As we will see, the lack of a clear understanding of the national interest is at the heart of the somewhat fleeting character of Germany's policy. I will discuss why that is the case and why a definition of the German national interest would help avoid at least some of the mistakes and uncertainties of the past.

A country's foreign policy is formed by many factors: bureaucracies, political parties, input from intellectuals, the media, and so forth. But at the end of the day, the leaders decide and act. Sometimes the factor "personality" is underrated in the study of international relations. This is a consequential mistake since leaders are mere human beings as well. They have individual strengths and weaknesses, experiences, and convictions, taken together, these features play a vital role in formulating foreign policy. Therefore, in assessing the foreign policy of the Schröder/Fischer administration, it is important to be aware of their particular character traits, because they will add a crucial

element to the often erratic German diplomacy of late, especially with regard to German-American relations.

Both chancellor Gerhard Schröder and foreign minister Joschka Fischer are part of a fundamentally different generation than previous German leaders. Schröder was born in 1944, Fischer in 1948, neither has a personal memory of World War II and the American liberation like Helmut Kohl and others have. Instead, both Schröder and Fischer were politicized in the 1960s when they joined the liberal left in their fight for a socio-cultural revolution. In that sense, they are representatives of the truly “modern Germany.”

The “generation of 1968’ers” relation to the US has always been difficult and complex. On the one hand, they were heavily influenced by American culture, music and literature in particular, which helped them to form an identity contrasting with their parent-generation’s. On the other hand, they were critical of “American” consumer culture and staunch opponents of American foreign policy in general, the Vietnam War was their galvanizing political experience, not World War II.

Although Schröder was not part of the intellectual left, he was an admirer of Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh. Already as a chairman of the youth organization of the German Social Democrats, he was critical of US foreign policy, the Reagan administration’s in particular, and transatlantic institutions such as NATO. At the same time, his knowledge about America derives largely from clichés and stereotypes: he’s strangely proud of not being “bookish” and visited the US for the first time as late as 1981, for a month. Upon his return he remarked: “The amount of individual liberty and the spaciousness of the landscape is impressive, but poverty there is appalling.” Before becoming Chancellor, he was not interested in foreign policy at all; this is why he now not only lacks the instinct and experience but also the knowledge and enthusiasm necessary to master the job.

Fischer is a different and, in every sense, more extreme case. A violent leftist streetfighter in his youth, he autodidactically acquired an impressive knowledge about history, literature, and politics. Much more so than Schröder, he is aware of Germany's peculiar role in world politics and the mechanics of international affairs, and the consequences of that for today's foreign policy. However, his whole career is a process of abandoning earlier convictions. After assuming office as a foreign minister, he hastened to point out the continuous character of German foreign policy: Employing a uniquely moralizing rhetoric, Fischer took the same positions as his more conservative and "bourgeois" predecessors on almost all central foreign policy issues, while vigorously denying this. He made a habit out of portraying more conservative, middle-of-the-road approaches to foreign policy, which actually hardly differed from his own at all, as extreme right-wing lunacies, which would basically seek a different kind of Germany: up in arms, self-confident to the brink of arrogance, and acting outside the European framework. This kind of hyperbolic dystopia and lack of realism is characteristic for a politician who is in constant need of creating, or rather, inventing enemies to make his own position look more morally righteous and responsible.

In the German Iraq policy, these features played out most prominently. Of course, there were a number of reasons against the war in Iraq. The German administration, as well as many others around the world, thought it was wrong to attack Iraq as long as other situations, such as the one in Afghanistan, were not properly defused. Furthermore, the lack of an American vision for a post-war order in the Middle East seemed worrying. The same held true for the enormous economic costs of such a war, which might even have led to a worldwide economic crisis. As we can see today, where Iraq is rapidly deteriorating into chaos while the occupation and restructuring of the country strains the US budget, many of these concerns were fully justified.

However, the Schröder administration proved unable to voice these concerns in a professional and effective diplomatic manner. Instead, they committed a series of mistakes, miscalculations, and diplomatic blunders, or as I like to call them: the Seven Deadly Sins:

- i) Turning away from multilateralism;
- ii) Blending domestic politics and foreign policy;
- iii) Misjudging the threat;
- iv) Endangering the transatlantic relationship;
- v) Miscalculating the own leverage;
- vi) Lacking diplomatic skills;
- vii) Producing contradictions.

Please allow me to elaborate on these points because they are essential in understanding the dilemma of Germany's foreign policy today.

(i) Turning away from multilateralism

When Schröder declared the “German Way,” he turned away from one of the most cherished traditions of German foreign policy: the cooperation with friends and allies. By refusing to participate in any military action against Iraq, regardless of what the UN inspectors might find, he undermined the authority of the UN and offended Germany's closest friends, because there had been no prior consultations, neither with the Europeans, nor with the Americans. This is particularly ignorant, since at that point no one had even *asked* for any kind of participation from Germany. The leaders in Berlin constantly blamed Washington for acting unilaterally, adhering to double standards, and being diplomatically insensitive, while in fact it was the German government itself that acted like that.

(ii) Blending domestic politics and foreign policy

The reason why Schröder acted like that was simple: it was election time,

and he was trailing behind in the polls. He suggested that war in Iraq was an immediate issue, thus exploiting fears of the German population and cynically bending the facts of the actual diplomatic situation in the summer of 2002. The campaign ploy worked, but only for a high price, as Germany's international partners felt betrayed and angry about Schröder's emotionalized, self-righteous handling of a delicate issue. In pursuing power and his personal advantage, he single-handedly destroyed much of the trust in Germany's reliability which his predecessors had built over decades of hard work and wise policy-making.

(iii) Misjudging the threat

In a most ludicrous inversion of the real situation, the Schröder administration more and more suggested that the real threat to peace was George W. Bush, not Saddam Hussein. They completely ignored the overwhelming evidence of Saddam's terror regime and his desire to build and quite possibly make use of weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they attacked Bush and many of his advisers as "war-mongering cowboys and oil barons." Such anti-American reflexes were systematically displayed, used, and encouraged by Schröder and many of his leading supporters, obviously a direct result of their dubious ideological background and lack of knowledge and sensitivity. In this, one can find an eerie analogy to their quite favorable view of the communist regime in the GDR in the 1970s and 1980s.

(iv) Endangering the transatlantic relationship

The partnership and even friendship with America was at the heart of German foreign policy for the last fifty years. For historical reasons as well as for reasons of civilizational affinity and German national interest, this is the only way to go. This, however, does not mean that German leaders always have to be in agreement with their American counterparts, as the Vietnam War and other disagreements show. But German criticism could, and should, only be voiced behind closed doors

and in a humble manner. With their insensitive and undiplomatic criticism of the American stance on Iraq, the Schröder administration consciously departed from this way. In doing so, they destroyed one of the guiding principles of German foreign policy and torpedoed Germany's role in Europe and the world, which is heavily dependent on German reliability and American benevolence.

(v) Miscalculating the own leverage

The German stance on Iraq is based on a miscalculation of Berlin's political leverage. No single country can be victorious in a (diplomatic) stand-off with the US; it's the basic logic of power politics. Accordingly, if Schröder and Fischer wanted their call for peace to be successful, they would have had to seek closer cooperation with other European, Asian, and Arabic nations. It is a result of their lack of realism and their moral high-handedness that they failed to do so and went it alone instead. They believed that their simple "moral," pacifist argument would find a somewhat "natural" resonance among the international community. This, however, is not how international politics work, a fact later obscured by France's Jacques Chirac who was smart enough to gladly instrumentalize Schröder's policy to foster his own strategy of a "gaullic" Europe, a European counterweight to US power, led by the "Grande Nation." It is troubling that Schröder and Fischer had no sense of how dubious and offensive their moralizing tone might feel for other leaders, especially when it was the *Germans* exercising it.

(vi) Lacking diplomatic skills

Apparently, Schröder and Fischer are unable to differentiate between style and substance in international affairs. If the Iraq crisis had been only a disagreement on substance, there would have been no need for such a falling-out. But instead of voicing their criticism in an appropriate fashion, Schröder and his people violated the grand rule of diplomacy among partners: don't make it personal, and don't make

it public. Instead, they portrayed the Americans as war-mongering hicks. The minister of justice's, a professor of law (!), comparison of George W. Bush and Adolf Hitler was only one sad highlight in a long line of catastrophic remarks.

The worst, and completely unconsidered consequence of such a "diplomacy", was that it further undermined the UN. Both England and France, despite occasional deep disagreements with the US on substance, kept working within the security council, adhering to a professional style of international policy-making. The results were solid; just think of Straw's idea of a UN ultimatum against Iraq in September 2002, which let the inspectors return to the country, or De Villepin's later call for an extension of the inspections, which, quite elegantly, worked for peace by putting pressure on Iraq as well as on the US. Both of these examples could and should have been German successes, but German diplomacy was counter-productive, high-handed, disgracefully disorganised, and ineffective.

(vii) Producing contradictions

In sum, these diplomatic blunders add up to a devastating list of political contradictions. The Schröder administration is proud of its work for peace, but at the same time, Schröder's total opposition weakened the forceful position of the UN against Iraq, the only true chance of preventing war. Similarly, Germany is a loud advocate of the UN, while in fact it was undermining the strength of this institution. Also, the German government stressed the importance of prolonged UN inspections in Iraq, but disregarded their possible results by formulating a firm (and hardly tenable) position at too early a point in time.

On another level, Germany does not tire of calling for a common European defense and foreign policy. In times of crisis, however,

Schröder did not even seek council with the other Europeans. And, most telling for the muddled perception of historical roles and mechanisms that is characteristic for this generation of German leaders, Schröder and Fischer claimed the overriding, historically rooted importance of the transatlantic partnership, but simultaneously accused the US of a war-mongering mentality and displayed an imagined moral superiority that was nothing short of arrogant.

These are the mistakes of the past, water under the bridge, as the saying goes. What is the situation now, what is the current dilemma? The situation in Iraq is very complicated, yet well-known. We see it on TV every night. The state of the country is devastating; not only is there only slim progress in rebuilding civil structures but terror is on the rise, there have been more American casualties since President Bush declared the end of the war than during war-time. How the US and the international community should react to this formidable challenge would be the topic of another speech.

However, one thing must be clear; although many European nations and their governments were against the war and felt humiliated by the unilateral American decision, an American defeat in Iraq cannot be in the interest of Western democracies. The consequences would be much too grave. From increased instability in the whole greater Middle East and an insurgence of Islamist fundamentalism to a possible neo-isolationism in the US, all probable scenarios are disastrous for the security and economic welfare of us Europeans.

Still, the situation in Europe is of even more immediate concern to Germany than the situation in Iraq. The close alliance with France against the Anglo-American Iraq diplomacy in particular has come back to haunt the Schröder administration. The Chancellor deliberately relinquished the concept of the two equal pillars in German foreign policy and shifted most emphasis to the second, the European pillar. Unfortunately, this did not even happen because of a

thoughtful strategy, but resulted from campaign improvisation. Hence, it was easy for the French to take Germany in tow, following their own interests. At the high point of the Iraq conflict, Schröder's Germany, in a futile attempt of acting like a major power, was not even on equal footing with France.

Many strategic questions derive from that. How can Germany free itself from this bear-hug without insulting the French? After all, good relations between France and Germany are an integral part of further European integration, cooperation, and economic development. How can Britain be re-integrated in the European family? And, most importantly, how will Europe define itself after this recent diplomatic disaster? How can European integration proceed if it is directed against the United States? And what is the final goal of integration, what is, let's put it grandly, the European identity?

Better sooner than later, Europeans need to make a big decision and stick with it. They have to choose between two competing views for Europe's future. On the one hand, there is the vision of an "Atlantic Europe;" on the other hand, there is the vision of a "Neo-Carolingian Europe."

The "Atlantic Europe" builds on the Anglo-Saxon "special relationship" and the idea of an Atlantic civilization of common values and ideas as well as of a shared history. It is forcefully expanding to the East, led by Great Britain, Spain, and Poland, who explicitly welcome America's stabilizing dominance on a regional and global level. Because of the Bush administration's style and America's increasing superiority, however, this transatlantic alliance has a more and more unipolar character. Today, Germany has no longer an important role in this "Atlantic Europe", except maybe the role of the troublemaker.

The "Neo-Carolingian Europe" envisions a Europe led by France, supported by Germany and Russia. This is a French dream come true: A unified Europe, where Paris alone calls the shots, establishing itself

as a counterweight to American world supremacy. However, there is an important difference to the classic balance-of-power logic: This Europe would still benefit from American protection in matters of security, as illustrated by the Balkan wars, for instance. Not surprisingly, this model meets harsh criticism in Washington and Central and Eastern Europe, but also in some parts of Western Europe.

The contrast between these two visions for Europe's future became painfully obvious during the Iraq crisis. Hence, Donald Rumsfeld's gleeful remark about a conflict between "Old Europe" and "New Europe" is not so far from the truth. In fact, these competing visions signify a twin schism of the West: between the US and Western Europe as well as within Europe itself. If the men responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11 intended to divide the West, they have succeeded.

Particularly in Germany, there has been a deep-rooted misunderstanding of the pro-American policy of most Central and Eastern European states. Those countries did not side with the US because the Americans pressured them or because they offered them some short-time benefits. They sided with the US (and Spain, Italy, and Great Britain) as a result of a sober calculation of their respective national interests: They correctly distinguished their economic interests, which suggest a close cooperation with the EU, from their security needs which suggest a close cooperation with NATO and the US. They have not forgotten that they owe their liberty in large part to US security policy. They have not forgotten that their current security is due to American efforts to enlarge NATO. They have not forgotten a lingering fear of Russia. American power is their only security insurance.

There is, however, another reason why most of the Central and Eastern European states acted like they did. It was not only a decision *for* the United States, but also a decision *against* a Neo-Carolingian Europe. They are wary of the European Union advocated by France, Germany, and others. While they are happy

about the economic cooperation and the support from Western Europe, they are sceptical about the political union. Many people in the young democracies see the EU developing into a socialist monstrem, suppressing individual freedom by creating a giant bureaucratic, centralist super-state. After decades of communist rule, this is, quite understandably, the last thing they desire.

This means that the two visions, the Atlantic and the Neo-Carolingian, clash without any room for compromise. Hence, the conclusion by some optimistic observers in Germany, such as Jürgen Habermas, that the Iraq crisis was a catalyst for further advances in European integration, is illusory. Even if all the member states could muster up the will for political reform, the fundamental disagreement would continue. Accordingly, Europe's "new independence" which Paris and Berlin postulate is not based on facts but rather on wishful thinking. The cherished and often cited "European family" is increasingly dysfunctional, with every member acting on its own, often erratically. It is a family that would embarrass even Ozzy Osbourne.

Criticism of America's foreign policy does not make an independent European foreign and security policy. Instead, an EU of 25 member states will be less and less able to agree upon a unified foreign and security policy. This is particularly true since in Western and Eastern Europe alike, there is increasing uneasiness about a peculiar logic of integration that just opposes the US without developing original perspectives or policy options. Integration does not come from spite alone.

In past decades, the process of European integration was moving ahead without the need for a unifying enemy. Now, however, French and Germans seem to paint the US as an antagonist in order to solidify a European identity while simultaneously camouflaging the democracy deficit at the heart of the European project. For it is not democratic participation or a common cultural and historical identity which drives European integration, but merely the abstract and bureaucratic desire

to have a unified administration of a common territory. Thus, the pro-American position of the “Vilnius 10” and the “Letter of the Eight” were mainly intended as challenges to the governments of France and Germany. Considering the less than elegant response of Chirac to the Eastern European states, one must feel a certain sympathy with their cause.

Indeed, Paris and Berlin give the impression they want to punish and humiliate pro-American Europeans from London and Madrid to Rome and Warsaw. They accuse the Bush administration of employing a divisive policy while in fact, it is France and Germany themselves who make use of that policy. The suggestion, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg could form the core of a European army, is a case in point. Italy already proclaimed it was working on political alternatives with Spain, Great Britain, and other states.

Chancellor Schröder declared the proposal was another step in forming a European-American partnership “at the same eye level.” Alas, it would be the very first step that would require many more. Europe cannot attain military equity with the US, it would be too costly and politically unfeasible. Period. Instead, Germany should finally begin to forcefully support American ideas for NATO reform and chip in some impulses of its own.

But honestly, who can believe Schröder’s declaration that he wants to strengthen the European pillar of NATO when at the same time, he is talking about a “process of emancipation?” This “emancipation” means a harsh renunciation of decades of tried and tested structures of the transatlantic alliance and common institutions. In contrast to all former German governments, the Schröder/Fischer administration does not understand transatlantic partnership and European integration as a double-track approach, but as mutually excluding alternatives. Instead of promoting the transatlantic partnership, Schröder and Fischer work for a transatlantic separation.

However, Europe is not a conflicting alternative to the transatlantic partnership, but remains an integral part of it. There is no way of uniting Europe against the US. He who tries to unite Europe against the US will split it, that is one of the lessons from the Iraq crisis. Furthermore, the Europeans will be unable to achieve a lasting stabilization of Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe without or against the United States, just as they failed at pacifying the Balkans in the 1990s. And because of its geostrategic position in the heart of Europe, the accession of Germany's eastern neighbours to the EU and NATO is in Germany's economic and security interest.

Nonetheless, it is vital to uphold a close working relationship with France. Without French cooperation on budget and primarily agricultural subsidies reform, further European integration will be stalled and impossible to finance. Still, the Franco-German tandem can only play a vital part in this process if their cooperation works differently than during the Iraq crisis, that is, with more sensitivity towards the interests of the other European countries, in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, and with full acknowledgement of the transatlantic alliance.

Coming back to the "big choice" between an Atlantic Europe and a Neo-Carolingian Europe, this allows for only one conclusion: A future Europe must be an Atlantic one, deeply rooted in the common Atlantic civilization of Europe and the United States. Beyond the disagreements of day-to-day politics and diverging perceptions of particular issues, this common ground remains and needs to be cultivated. As Spain's José María Aznar recently put it: "I know that there is a debate about a European and an Atlantic Europe. I believe there is only one Europe, the Atlantic Europe. Nobody can understand European history without the Atlantic context. The Europe we have known since World War II is an Atlantic Europe. And the Europe of the future will be such a Europe as well, or there will be no Europe at all."

The consequences of this analysis for German foreign policy are easy to grasp. Traditionally, Germany played the role of a dual mediator. German leaders mediated between European and American interests, but also between French and British interests. In the future, there might also be a need for a mediator between Western and Eastern European interests. No country is better equipped to master this task than the Federal Republic, history, geography, and political and economic weight all come together. However, the most important assets for such a mediator are reliability and the trust of others. By siding so clearly with France, the Schröder administration gambled away both.

It is paramount that Germany regains the lost trust and moves back to the centre, seeking balanced relations to the US, France, and other European powers. Germany's return to the role of the mediator is necessary to foster and deepen European integration and to rebuild the transatlantic alliance. Others expect Germany to get back on track but, more importantly, it is in Germany's own best interest. As an economic giant, depending massively on export trade, Germany will profit the most from a relaxation of tensions in the West and a strengthening of its community. Also politically, it would suit German leaders to return to this role, the "partnership in leadership" which President George Bush offered Germany upon the end of the Cold War, is still an aim worthwhile.

In order to once again become the premier mediator, Germany needs to demonstrate goodwill and political prowess and reliability, particularly in regard to the United States. On several occasions, the Schröder/Fischer administration demonstrated that they are capable of such responsible policies. The German participation in Kosovo and the war on terrorism are cases in point. In Macedonia and as commanders of the ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan, the German *Bundeswehr* is doing a terrific job, noted and praised by the international community. Today, there are more German soldiers fighting the war on terrorism than any other, except for American troops.

The deployment of German forces abroad for the first time since the founding of the Federal Republic was a political breakthrough, mastered by Chancellor Schröder and his foreign minister. Schröder, this must be said, repeatedly did not receive enough credit from American leaders for his truly courageous stands on military and security issues. Still, it is typical of German foreign policy that these decisions were *not* made based on a clear understanding and formulation of German interests. They were made based on a pronounced moral obligation to do so. That was particularly obvious concerning the situation in Kosovo, when Fischer and others claimed the lesson from German history was not so much “no more war” but rather “no more Auschwitz.”

The moralizing character of German foreign policy explains why the German engagement with issues of security policy is so fickle and arbitrary. Why, for instance, does Germany engage in Congo but not, say, in Somalia? Why is German security to be defended in Afghanistan as German minister of defense, Peter Struck, claimed, but not in Iraq? What criteria will guide German participation in NATO’s upcoming rapid reaction force? The list of questions and oddities goes on and on, but it all comes down to one observation: There is no clear-cut, overarching, encompassing concept to German foreign policy as a whole. Germany needs a re-definition of its national interest in today’s confused international landscape.

Let me present ten theses about the nature of the German national interest and its political viability at the beginning of the 21st Century. In talking about the national interest, we need to be mindful of the three central questions shaping a nation’s interest as well as its foreign policy in general:

- (i) What is possible in the framework of foreign policy?
- (ii) What meets domestic consent?
- (iii) What is feasible with regard to coalition politics?

First: The rejection of political interests, nationalism, and power politics has become a standard of German foreign policy. The thought behind this kind of rhetorical manoeuvring is honourable and, given the German past, understandable; but it is counter-productive. From the point of view of Germany's international partners, and its direct neighbours in particular, the altruistic formulas of German leaders must create suspicion of certain hidden interests which those leaders might not dare to acknowledge, because a state without interests does simply not exist, and a state as powerful as the reunited Germany must define these interests for the sake of international stability. Only clearly defined interests make reliable partners; the history of Europe is a dark history of what happens when neighbours are not sure of each other's intentions.

Furthermore, there can be no sustained public support for foreign policy in Germany without an ongoing debate about the basic principles and interests. Without an agreed-upon formal equivalent to a "National Security Strategy," foreign policy processes will remain cumbersome daily battles. We see that today with every renewed decision in parliament about the work of the *Bundeswehr* abroad; this kind of Sisyphean policy-making drains political energy, creativity, and effectiveness. Especially during election time, foreign policy becomes unwieldy if it cannot be explained within a broader context of national interests.

Thus, it is high time that German leaders overcome their reluctance and accept the idea of national interests. It is better for our international partners, and it is better for us at home. As I said, the reluctance is understandable at first glance, over decades, post-war Germany's prime foreign policy rationale was to keep it down and make everybody happy. Trade, economic renewal and unprecedented welfare for the German population were the leitmotifs of German policy. Because of Germany's special status as a not fully independent, divided, and shamed country that was the first line of defense against the Eastern bloc, this

was sufficient for the time being. Above all, it worked well. However, today's international scenery and today's German status are completely different. Apparently, it is even more difficult to change the German mindset than it is to change the political realities. After all, Germans trained themselves to regard power politics and national interests as part of a sinister time they have wanted to leave behind. This leads me to my second thesis.

Second: A country's "national interest" is *not* a category of militarism and dangerously extreme self-confidence. National interests and nationalism, in the sense of a proclaimed superiority over others, have nothing in common. To speak of "Germany's national interest" does not mean to revive the criminal habits of the German past. It does not even allude to them. Whatever Emperor Wilhelm II and Hitler might have been, they certainly were no politicians who based their decisions on the German national interest. Because to do that, to define and to serve the national interest, means to act moderately, to check oneself, and to fashion rational policies. The term and the concept of "national interests" refers to objectivity, matter-of-factness, and the ability to compromise. National interests are the motivating force behind a state's action, across and beyond religious, ideological, and moral differences and opposites.

Thus, speaking from a scholar's point of view, the national interest is the proper and decisive category in judging the foreign policy of a state within the international system. It guarantees the highest degree of objectivity and it allows the sober comparison of different administrations as well as of different states. What Lord Henry Palmerston said more than 150 years ago is still true today: "Nations know neither constant allies nor constant enemies, but only eternal interests."

Third: One thing at least, though, has changed since the days of Lord Palmerston: the world has become more interdependent. Or, as a student of mine put it with an uncanny ability to reveal today's

tautological truth: “The world has become more global.” I will not explore the many consequences of globalization at this point, the revolution in information and communication technology, the new power of the financial markets, the dramatically increased danger of proliferation and world-wide terrorism, and so forth. But there are two simple observations that are important for Germany’s modern foreign policy. First, we need to acknowledge, more than ever, that German foreign policy influences the fate of other countries just as their foreign policy affects Germany. Second, because of the increased interdependence, especially within the EU and especially concerning economic issues, there is a tendency to react to all challenges within a multilateral context.

As with every simplification, I see a danger in that. The high art of diplomacy is to achieve national goals while retaining a high degree of flexibility. However, the developments of September 11, the war on terrorism, and the war in Iraq make it more and more difficult to define a truly “national” interest. Yes, many interests need to be defined within a common context, but others do remain purely national. Most importantly, it is plain wrong to idealize multilateralism, cooperation, and integration as if these were processes which were not influenced by individual powers and respective, diverging national interests. The question is not which national interests are to be *dissolved* in common interests. The question is which national interests can be *related* to an overarching, common interest without endangering the security, welfare, and democracy of the individual nation.

We can relate this to the specific situation of Germany. This means, that the German tendency to hide behind the back of the EU in matters of foreign policy is highly questionable. It is not sufficient to refer to the multilateral framework whenever a political decision is to be made. Although it is very much in the German interest to strengthen European structures and institutions, every decision needs to be made

according to national standards and considerations. Ironically, this is the only way of keeping the multilateral structures efficient and stable, because this is what they are built for. We don't have a European superstructure that assigns a common foreign policy to the member states, it works the other way around. And if you ask the French, or any other non-German people, for that matter, you will hear that this is exactly the way they like it.

Fourth: In the traditional tension between interests and morals, German foreign policy, in contrast to, say, the French, has always cultivated a particular moral pretension. Foreign policy is primarily understood as a moral obligation. However, a foreign policy that is designed according to moral criteria, whose prime aim is to ease the suffering in the world, is in over its head. Those leaders expect too much of their policy, it can never live up to its pretence. For if morals are the only driving force of political action, there are no more nuances, no more differentiation, neither concerning issues, nor concerning geographic realities. Morals are, by definition, beyond limit.

The ethics of conviction demand political action in accordance with basic principles and beliefs. This kind of policy quickly leads to a moralizing, fundamentalist approach that will, rather sooner than later, founder on the harsh realities of international politics. Thus, the ethics of responsibility should be the guiding principle. They demand a political action that values the outcome higher than the respect for the fundamental conviction. In that sense, Germany should more often be able to strike a balance between interests and morals. They do not have to necessarily exclude each other. To the contrary, a masterful foreign policy combines both of them.

Fifth: German leaders need to realize that the new wars of the 21st century, from instability within failed states to the war on international terrorism, are a worldwide political reality. For Germany as well, the

only way to vanquish these new threats is to take an even stronger part in the risks of international security policy and peacekeeping, just as other countries do. In that regard, there is another fundamental lesson of the failed diplomacy prior to the Iraq war: who wants to prevent war, has to be prepared to wage it.

Exactly because of the latest unilateral developments in world politics, due to the often reckless power politics of the US, Germany needs to increase its own efforts in security policy. Compared to the 1990s, the decade Charles Krauthammer calls “our holiday from history,” foreign policy and security policy move closer together again. This is why Germany as well needs to acknowledge that every state has specific security interests that exceed those of the common security alliance and which it needs to define and which it is allowed, and is expected, to enforce.

Sixth: In order to enforce security, well-trained, well-organized, and well-funded armed forces are indispensable. They are more than merely a military instrument, they are an instrument of foreign policy. The more efficient and the more up to task the armed forces within the alliances of EU and NATO, the greater the political leverage of the respective state when it comes to decisions within the alliance. The formula is simple: input determines influence.

No state has to participate in all military missions, but you need to be at least theoretically able to participate if your voice shall be heard. This is why the deployment of German soldiers abroad requires clear and reasonable framework of political interest; engagement is no substitute for political vision.

Today, German soldiers are in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Kosovo, Uzbekistan, Bosnia, Macedonia, and on the Horn of Africa, altogether about 10,000 soldiers are in alternating deployment. Yet, in the long run, German armed forces, in their present condition, are not capable of carrying out such operations. The discrepancy between pretences and

reality, between limited capacities and enlarged responsibilities remains significant despite initial attempts to reform. Shortages of financial resources, insufficient transportation capacities as well as structural and personnel problems create major difficulties for the troops. For instance, German armed forces would be unable to conduct a crisis evacuation from Afghanistan if it were to become necessary, they simply do not have enough transportation units.

On the political level, German security policy is shaped mainly by minimalism, indifference, and the compelling budgetary constraints, shortcomings which cannot be sufficiently counterbalanced by professional enthusiasm and improvisation on the military level. The best indication for this neglect is the fact that, despite the aims set out in the “Petersberg tasks,” the federal government continues to slash the military budget.

To be sure, this reservation in military and security matters reflects the attitude of the majority of the German people. Germany has a very active peace movement, as the popular reaction to the Iraq crisis demonstrated. After the bitter experiences of two world wars, the German people have embraced the ideology of pacifism. Of course, this is, in general, a positive development. Every military and security policy needs a strong system of checks and balances, watched over and controlled by the sovereign, the people. However, just as with the ethics of conviction, a mere pacifism does not hold water. Pacifists believe that terrorists, tyrants, and dictators can be contained and deterred by sweet words alone. Well, if you buy *that* . . . I have some wristwatches, come see me after the lecture!

Seriously, I say it again, and it’s worth repeating: whoever wants to prevent war has to be prepared to wage it. In dealing with violent and criminal leaders, no diplomacy will be effective if it is not backed by military power and the willingness to make use of it. Theodore Roosevelt’s advice is still valid today: “Speak softly and carry a big

stick.” In international relations, this is a rather old truth. And yet, as we have seen in the upheaval that accompanied the Iraq crisis, people tend to forget it, especially when they feel no direct threat to their own lives. It is an oft-neglected responsibility of governments to explain these correlations to the public.

Seventh: As I have explained earlier, German foreign policy needs a firm orientation towards the United States. It was Schröder’s crucial mistake to not explain the complicated diplomatic correlations but to choose the easy way out by mobilizing against the allegedly war-mongering US. However, in the long run, this strategy is to the disadvantage of German interests. Even in alliance with France, the Federal Republic has neither the soft nor the hard power resources that would be required to force the very determined US to change course. To say it bluntly: Germany is not powerful enough to follow Schröder’s “German Way.” Besides, even if it was powerful enough, “German Ways” have led down dangerous paths before; we might do better in self-confident alliance with others.

Apparently, Berlin has forgotten that Germany needs American support much more than the US needs German support. At any rate, a policy that is directed against American hegemony will not help to enforce German interests. It will have the opposite effect. It is important to note, though, that this does not mean that we have to agree with everything the US says and does, we want to be partners, not “Bush’s poodle.” As we know from experience, and as the current situation in Iraq stresses yet again, this is what the Americans hope for as well. It is in their interest to have a strong, stable, and independent Europe at their side. And if American leaders from time to time tend to forget that, it is our responsibility to remind them. But we have to do so in a smooth, friendly, and discreet manner. When we are ready to share the burden, we also need to be prepared to share the responsibility.

Eighth: Germany needs to regain its role of a mediator between

European and American, but also between conflicting European interests. I will not elaborate on this, because I've done so before, when I was analyzing the future shape of Europe. Nonetheless, this is a major point that needed to be included in this, as well as every other, consideration of Germany's national interest.

Ninth: Despite the interpretations by several observers, such as Wilfried von Bredow or Gregor Schöllgen, the "new German foreign policy" since the Red-Green coalition came to power in 1998 does not signify a change in strategy, a well-considered re-calibration of foreign policy in the face of new challenges and constellations. To the contrary, Schröder stands for an arbitrary, moral-driven ad-hoc policy that lacks a coherent conceptual context. In foreign policy, he has displayed an astounding lack of political creativity and vision.

During the last several months, German officials and pundits seemed to be intoxicated by the new strong-arm rhetoric of the administration: "German Way," "policy of enlightened interest," "German foreign policy is made in Berlin, nowhere else," and so forth. The factual results, however, look bleak. Rhetoric is an important part of foreign policy and diplomacy, but it is no substitute for policy. Germans need to considerably scale down the rhetoric and start working on the issues. My impression from the recent weeks is that this has finally been understood in Berlin. Nonetheless, the first step still has to be taken: the definition of the national interest.

Unfortunately, there is not much progress to concede. Let me illustrate that with a story my friend and colleague Herfried Münkler told me. Once, he was in a meeting with the policy planning group of the German foreign ministry. They had a good talk and asked him a lot of questions. In the end, one of the officials offered: "Mr. Münkler, is there anything you would like to ask *us*?" "Well, yes," he answered.

"What is the German national interest?" In response, the look on their faces, he told me, must have been as if he had emptied a garbage can on their desk.

This goes to show you that “German interests” still sounds awkward, even threatening to German policy-makers. To them, it has this ring of egotism and confrontation, of everything the Federal Republic wanted to leave behind. The journalist Jochen Buchsteiner wrote: “When a German politician uses the term ‘national interest,’ it sounds like a Puritan talking about ‘brutal libido’.” Well, they better get used to it.

Tenth: In all this talk about interests, the emerging constellations of the international landscape, etc. one need not forget a very basic rule: foreign policy begins at home. As you all know, Germany is wrestling with a number of domestic problems, particularly the lamentable state of the economy. Especially in this age of globalization and massive economic competition, the Schröder administration needs to do everything to reestablish the waning economic foundation of the Federal Republic. The appalling budget deficit, for instance, brought with it a corset of factual and legal compulsions and other constraints that let German entrepreneurship and technological inventiveness atrophy. This paralyzes imagination and creative power, also in the realm of foreign policy.

In the past, the economic dynamism of the Federal Republic furnished an outstanding performance and thus paved the way for decades of advancement for Germany itself as well as for the European Community. Today, as the tailend in economic growth, Germany risks not only its own progress and its role in the world, but also the future of Europe. Because in the face of Germany’s ailing economy, the financially demanding problems of regional policies, of the agricultural budget, and of European enlargement are increasingly difficult to handle. And as stated before, there is no modern security policy without solid funding either. We all need to work together so that today’s Germany will not become the harbinger of Europe’s fate. Because the lack of economic reform and security political self-assertion leads to only one result, one single word: decline.

That will do for my ten theses, or better, considerations, observations. Please allow me to quickly summarize what I find most important. Germany will only assert itself if it formulates its national interests not only with regard to the European, but also with at least equal regard to the American pillar. Only the balance between the Atlantic civilization, European integration, and the German nation will provide the chance for a modern concept of foreign policy that will enforce German interests in the world. To do so, German policy-makers need to overcome their reluctance to use the term “national interest” and, more importantly, act accordingly.

For the first time in history, Germany is deeply embedded in the West, as a part of a great Atlantic civilization. Its role in that civilization is that of a civil society, a giant in trade, a civil power engaging in dialogue, détente, and conflict prevention. These values must be preserved and promoted; they continue to be the basis of every formulation of the German interest. This will be of the essence in mastering the real challenge at hand: steering the Atlantic civilization through the rough waters of a dramatically altered international landscape. This is the task not only for today’s leaders, but also for tomorrow’s.



REJOINDER

The following rejoinder was delivered by Dr Hartmut Mayer, Fellow and Lecturer in Politics, St. Peter's College, University of Oxford:

Thank you for inviting me to Leiden University to respond to Professor Hacke's lecture on the new challenges facing German Foreign Policy. Professor Hacke has given a brilliant lecture and has presented me with an impossible task. His lecture is an extremely difficult act to follow, in particular in just five minutes. First, I would like to congratulate him on his splendid talk.

How should I respond? Although Professor Hacke claims to be controversial, I find myself agreeing with most of the issues he raised. Nevertheless, I have identified a few points which I would like to comment on. Let me begin with some minor points first:

(I) Generation 1968:

Let me start on a slightly personal view: The "Generation 1968" has been blamed for far too many developments in Germany. Whenever there seems to be a problem, in society, education, culture, foreign policy, people immediately point to the protest generation of the late 1960s. People exaggerate the myth of 1968, in particular in the media. Individuals are portrayed as either 68ers or anti-68ers and almost everything seems to be judged through that prism. Considering myself to be the only true 68er, as I was born in 1968, I can assure you that one does not have to be a traditional "68er" or an "anti-68er" to disagree with the policies of the current Bush administration.

My more serious point is that purely generational explanations are insufficient for an understanding of current German foreign policy. It

might even be misleading. There is always a generational element which shape leaders judgement, but one has to differentiate much further. There is no time to do so in detail today, but I would at least question the assumption of a deeply rooted anti-Americanism in the Schröder administration. In fact, there is an admiration for the American civil rights and anti-Vietnam movement. What characterises the government first and foremost is a huge dissatisfaction with the Bush administration.

(2) Schröder and Fischer

Furthermore, one has to distinguish between Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Professor Hacke has done so, but let me stress how different the two politicians are. While they appeared to follow similar lines in the German-American dispute over Iraq, Fischer was clearly concerned about the open confrontation and the unbalanced course of action. From what we know, Fischer and the German Foreign Office tried to mediate and influence American policy on Iraq rather than rejecting it outright. In fact we had three different views in the German government on how to respond to the challenge: one expressed by the Chancellor, one by the Foreign Office and one by the defence ministry. The chancellor's view prevailed at the time.

Schroeder is essentially a gambler whose foreign policy decisions are mainly motivated by domestic politics and perceived electoral gains. There is no longer strategy behind his decisions. Fischer understands the larger trends in German foreign policy better and he has a much better sense of historical obligations and traditional foreign policy roles.

(3) The provincialism of the German political elite

Professor Hacke criticised the Schröder/Fischer generation for departing from the post-war necessity of transatlantic partnership. Many analysts see a lack of historical understanding in this generation

of political leaders. It is indeed the first generation with no significant experience of World War II. However, there is a larger problem for German foreign policy. Compared to elites in other countries, the political class in Germany is still very provincial. Political leaders are essentially recruited through the *Laänder*. One has to be rooted in local and regional party organisations to rise to national prominence. Most politicians simply lack the international experience necessary to operate in the globalising world. Chancellors and Foreign Ministers have to learn it in the job and they usually do, but it would be much more preferable and beneficial if an understanding of foreign policy would be more natural for the German political elites. The older generation, Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and even Kohl had this understanding. In that respect, even the generation of 1968 might have an advantage over the younger politicians who now enter parliament. I am quite pessimistic about this, and I do not see any serious willingness to open the political parties or German parliaments for outsiders, be it for people with a variety of international experiences or business leaders. The German political class is likely to remain very provincial.

(4) Comments on the “deadly sins”.

Let me briefly comment on the “deadly sins” identified by Professor Hacke:

(i) Turning away from multilateralism

I agree that this is not in the German interest, and referring to a “German way” was foolish. I am not here to defend the Schröder government, but turning away from multilateralism was partly a response to US policy. The American communication with its allies left much to be desired. The decision to go war with Iraq regardless was taken very early and Washington left no real room for discussion with its traditional allies. To some extent, I sympathise with those who blame

the unilateral tendencies of the Bush administration for causing similar departures from multilateralism in Berlin.

(ii) Blending domestic politics and foreign policy

I agree that the nature and timing of Schröder's Iraq policy was mainly motivated by domestic concerns. However, blending domestic and foreign policy is neither a new phenomenon nor necessarily a sin. In fact, the days when domestic and foreign policy could be separated neatly have long passed. The new challenge for politicians is to find more intelligent ways of making foreign policy decisions transparent and more understandable for domestic audiences.

(iii) Misjudging the threat

There is an element of truth to it when Professor Hacke points out that the government's main threat perception focused on George Bush rather than on Saddam Hussein. However, nobody in the government really misjudged the nature of the Iraqi dictatorship. And if we want to talk about judgement, there was certainly better judgement in Berlin and Paris than in Washington on the possible post-war scenarios in Iraq and potential consequences for the stability of the Middle East.

(iv) Endangering the transatlantic relationship

I fully agree with Professor Hacke on this point.

(v) Miscalculating the own leverage

I completely agree.

(vi) Lacking diplomatic skills

I completely agree. Germany is still not equal to Britain and France in international affairs. It has difficulties accepting this, raising its profile and finding its role. I also agree that Germans lacked diplomatic skills when it was most needed. It should have been Germany to foster dialogue between Washington and Paris.

(vii) Producing contradictions

I believe that this was the biggest sin. The diplomatic blunders and the lack of a coherent strategy are symptomatic for the amateurish and ad-hoc foreign policy of the Schröder government. However, in a very cynical way it gives me hope: Schröder seems to have manoeuvred Germany into an exclusive dependency on France at the moment. This will not last for long. Schröder is capable of quick U-turns and he will soon steer a course away from Paris. What is really needed, however, is a fundamental debate on the future direction of German foreign policy which can once again be reliable and win wider agreement at home and abroad.

Let me now raise some larger issues for our discussion.

(a) Transatlantic Relations

We are currently debating a crisis situation in transatlantic relations. Some of the conclusions drawn by Professor Hacke and myself are too much influenced by the Iraq issue. I would like to stress that Iraq was exceptional and by no means a new norm. This applies to American, French, British, Dutch as well as German diplomacy. Crises have their own momentum and it would be misleading to generalise.

(b) European Foreign Policy

Every European country needs a serious debate on the adjustment of its future foreign policy. It will have to include a recognition of the fundamental changes in world affairs:

- The post-cold war era and the question of what replaces bipolarity;
- The post 9/11 world and the question on how to respond to new security challenges;
- The post Iraq context and the question of the sustainability of the

existing transatlantic ties and institutions;

- Globalisation and the question on how to establish a system of global governance to address the challenges of global economic, social, cultural and environmental problems;
- The “European Project”, i.e. the future governance and capability of the enlarged European Union in a global world.

Having studied the foreign policy debate of the main European countries I have concluded that Germany has had a much deeper debate than most other European countries.

(c) German Foreign Policy

The first debate on a new German foreign policy emerged in the early 1990s. As a reaction to German unification there was a lively debate on the simple question “What now?”. Various schools of thought appeared. They were categorised by the German political scientist, Professor Gunther Hellmann, as: “Normalisation-Nationalists”, “Eurosceptics”, “Pragmatic multilateralists”, “Europhiles” and “Internationalists”. We do not have the time to discuss these in detail, but it gives you an idea how rich the debate in the early 1990s was. The challenges for German foreign policy were clearly defined:

- International acceptance of German unification;
- Preserving and protecting the achievements of European Integration;
- Stabilisation and integration of Eastern Europe;
- A larger contribution to common Western goods and concerns;
- A contribution to the new global order;
- Crisis prevention;
- Economic globalisation.

Measured against this list of challenges, German foreign policy has been largely successful throughout the 1990s. Both the Kohl and Schröder governments succeeded in binding the unified Germany into the existing institutional structures while enhancing its role in global affairs. The difficult decision to allow greater military engagement in out of area tasks is only one example. The record of the 1990s make me more optimistic that Germany, after a second major debate on its future foreign policy, will resume to a realistic, sensible and successful international role.

(d) *Atlantic Europe v Neo-Carolingian Europe*

Professor Hacke mentioned two conflicting visions: an Atlantic Europe or a Neo-Carolingian Europe. We had similar discussions on conflicting options in the first major debate on German foreign policy. Conceptual clarity is a great academic virtue, but in politics one has to live with ambivalence and pragmatism. There is no doubt that we need both, a strong transatlantic alliance and a strong Europe. The rivalry between these two pillars is exaggerated, in particular in France. However, even in Paris there are now serious discussions on what went wrong and on how to overcome the transatlantic rift and the “Old Europe, New Europe” divide. For some time, I fear, we will have to live with no clear vision. Instead we will have to accept shifting coalitions in Europe, issue-specific cooperation and forms of “Multilevel Bilateralism”. German foreign policy will have to react to developments in France, Britain, the US and in Eastern Europe. The lack of a serious debate on the real future of Europe in all European countries, and if I may say so, most annoyingly in Britain, limits the boundaries of the German debate as well. We are still in a transition period. However, the widely recognised fact that a strong Europe and a strong transatlantic community should not become rival projects gives me hope for optimism about the future direction of German foreign policy.

(e) German National Interest

Let me finally try to define what I perceive to be the new German national interest. The old Bonn Republic was committed to steer a middle course between Washington (Transatlantic Security), Paris (European Integration) and Moscow (Detente and Ostpolitik). Bonn could not afford to choose one course at the expense of the other. Its main foreign policy practice was “multilateralism”. While it used to be a taboo to formulate a national interest for the Bonn Republic, it is now a necessity for the Berlin Republic. However, the substantive changes are far less significant than what many analysts try to make us believe.

A definition of a German national interest would have to include at least the following:

- A recognition that German responsibility in world affairs has grown over the last decade and that substantial resources will have to be made available to fulfil these responsibilities;
- An acceptance that the new Germany will remain a middle power with a special historical responsibility. This still includes a rejection of unilateral action;
- A commitment to the membership in multilateral institutions, most importantly the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the OSCE;
- An obligation to nurture and sustain a strong partnership with the United States but adjust to the longer-term changes in transatlantic relation;
- An obligation to strengthen and establish strategic partnerships with Russia, China, India and Japan;
- An obligation to further institutionalise and enhance the capacity of a globally responsible and active European Union;

- The obligation to promote international law and to strengthen civilian values and norms in international affairs;
- A contribution to the reform of the United Nations institutions and the establishment of a better system of global governance;
- All in all, the German national interest would be best served through a sustained contribution to a strong EU as an active partner of the US and the UN in global governance and conflict prevention;
- In some respect, the new national interest is quite similar to the old one even if the international environment has changed significantly.

The Europaeum Record

I. Academic Conferences

- 1993 Oxford** *Are European Elites Losing Touch with their Peoples?*
- 1994 Oxford** *Europe and America after the Cold War: the End of the West*
- 1995 Bonn** *Integration of East Central Europe into the European Union*
- 1996 Geneva** *Defining the Projecting Europe's Identity: Issues and Trade-Offs*
- 1997 Paris I** *Europe and Money*
- 1998 Leiden** *Human rights, the plight of immigrants and European immigration policy*
- 2000 Bonn** *The Implications of the new Knowledge and Technology*
- 2001 Oxford** *Democracy and the Internet: New Rules for New Times*
- 2001 Berlin** *European Universities Project: Borderless Education: Bridging Europe*
- 2002 Paris** *European Universities Project: New Times : New Responsibilities*
- 2003 Oxford** *Whose Europe? National Models and the European Constitution*
- 2003 Bonn** *European Universities Project: New Partnerships : Opportunities and Risks*

II. Student Summer Schools

- 1994 Leiden** *Concepts of Europe*
- 1995 Bologna** *The Problem of Political Leadership and the Ethnic Nation*
- 1996 Bologna** *The Civic Nation and the Ethnic Nation*
- 1998 Budapest** *Risk Policy Analysis*
- 1998 Oxford** *Human Rights*
- 1999 Paris I** *NATO and European Defence*
- 2000 Bologna** *European Policy and Enlargement*
- 2000 Oxford** *Church as Politeia*
- 2001 Oxford** *Human Rights and the movement of People in Europe*
- 2002 Oxford** *The Economics of European Integration*
- 2003 Prague** *Old and New Ideas of European Federalism*

III. Teaching, Courses and Study Programmes

- 1992 - Oxford** *European Community Law* involving joint teaching and study, and student exchanges, linking Oxford, Leiden and Sienna.
- 1999 - Paris** *Economics of European Integration* module open to Europaeum undergraduates and graduates.
- 1999 - 2001 Bologna** *Political Cultures and European Political Systems* MA programme, linking Bologna to Oxford and Leiden.
- 2000 Geneva** *International Refugee Law* joint teaching programme, linking Geneva and Oxford.
- 2004 - Leiden** Leadership Programme in *European Business, Cultures, and Institutions*, linking Leiden and Oxford.
- 2004 - Leiden** MA in *European History and Civilisation* linking Leiden, Paris I and Oxford.

- Cross-Europe academic networks function in Economics, History, Politics and Theology, helping to promote collaborative teaching and mobility of graduate research students. Other initiatives link scholars in Classics, History of Science and International Relations and Diplomacy.

- The Europaeum played the key role in the creation at Oxford of the *Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society*, the *Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law*, the European Humanities Research Centre, plus a number of fellowships, including the *Chair in European Thought* and, most recently, the *Bertelsmann Europaeum Visiting Professorship in 20th Century Jewish History and Politics*. The Europaeum is also supporting many other projects such as the Leiden University diplomacy training programme.

IV. Scholarship Programmes

- *The Roy Jenkins Memorial Fund* scholarships brings students chosen from the nine Europaeum partner universities. The awards are for £10,000 per annum, tenable for up to two years, and enable *Jenkins Scholars* to study for a Masters degree in the Humanities or Social Sciences (or a senior BA degree). The first *Jenkins Scholars* will be chosen in 2004 to begin their courses in the year 2004-5.

- The *Oxford-Geneva Bursary Scheme* provides annual bursaries for student exchanges between Oxford and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, together with other collaborative activities including joint teaching and Europaeum Lectures.
- The *Scatcherd European Scholarships* scheme, founded at Oxford, as part of the Europaeum initiative in 1997, offers fully funded places at Oxford for European graduates, including all Europaeum partner institutions; and also places for Oxford graduates at leading European Universities, including Europaeum partner universities.
- The *Europaeum Scholarships in Jewish Studies* have provided up to six places each year for Europaeum graduate students to spend a year in Oxford studying for the Diploma in Jewish Studies at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies between 1995 and 2001. Discussions continue to create a new scheme to accompany the upgrading of the Jewish Studies programme to an MA course.
- *Henry R Kravis Scholarships* allowed students from Central or Eastern Europe read an M.Phil in European Politics and Society or the M.Juris in European and Comparative Law at Oxford; and *Thyssen Scholarships* supported study of the M.Phil in European Politics and Society at Oxford. Both schemes have now expired.

V. Joint Research and Support Projects

- The Europaeum Project on the *Future of European Universities*, supported by DaimlerChrysler Services A G, a three-year investigation into the impact of new technology and the Knowledge Revolution was initiated in 2001. International conferences on *Borderless Education: Bridging Europe* (Berlin 2001); *New Times : New Responsibilities* (Paris 2002); and *New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks* (Bonn 2003) have been held.
- The *Europaeum Research Project Groups* scheme encourages collaborative research across the association. The following groups have been backed so far: The Churches and the Family; European Monetary Integration; The Kosovo Stability Pact; International Intervention; European identity; Unilateral Action; Regulation of E-commerce; Liberalism in 20th Century Europe; Transmission and Understanding in the Sciences; and Cultural Difference in Europe.
- Past international *Europaeum Research Projects* have been on *Party System Changes* (1997) and *The origins and aftermath of the Kosovo crisis* (2000).
- *A Research Directory* of interests of staff involved in European Studies in partner institutions is accessible via the Europaeum internet site to build and encourage academic collaboration.

VI. Mobility Schemes

- The *Europaeum New Initiatives Scheme* provides seed funding for innovative and imaginative forms of academic collaboration within, but not exclusive to, the Europaeum academic community.
- The *Europaeum Visiting Professors Scheme* supports the movement of academics from one partner institution to another. By 2004, 12 Europaeum Visiting Professors had been created and supported linking Europaeum Universities.
- *Europaeum Mobility Schemes* aim to support individual academics and students from member institutions participating in selected European events and activities, including conferences, seminars and summer schools. In recent years, key Europaeum scholars have been supported at conferences on *The Future of the Third Way*; *Russia and Europe*; and *Telecommunications Policies for the Future*.
- More than 20 projects have been supported including Staff Exchanges on e-commerce; a Theology summer lecture series; Anglo-Czech Historians Project; Classicists Colloquiums; Model European Student debates; EU Policy Transfer Seminar; and inquiries into the Church and the Family; and Transmission of Science ideas in Europe.

The Europaeum Partners & Representatives

OXFORD

The University of Oxford, comprising 39 Colleges and 6 Private Halls, dates its foundation officially to 1249, though teaching at Oxford is known to date back to 1096, the first overseas scholar having arrived in 1190.

Vice-Chancellor: Sir Colin Lucas

Academic Committee: Professor Michael Freedon (Politics)
Professor Mark Freedland (Law)

Management Committee: Mrs Beverly Potts
International Office
University of Oxford
Wellington Square
OXFORD OX1 2JD
Email: Beverly.Potts@admin.ox.ac.uk

LEIDEN

Universiteit Leiden founded in 1575 by the States of Holland, as a reward for the town's brave resistance against the Spanish, at the behest of William of Orange.

Rector: Professor Douwe D Breimer

Academic Committee: Professor Henk Dekker (Politics)
Professor Wim van den Doel (History)

Management Committee: Dr Joost Van Asten
Director of International Relations
University Office
Universiteit Leiden
Rapenburg 67, Postbus 9500
NL-2300 RA LEIDEN
Email: jja.vanasten@bb.leidenuniv.nl

BOLOGNA

Università degli studi di Bologna officially constituted in 1158 by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, though independent teaching dates back to 1088.

Rector: Professor Pier Ugo Calzolari

Academic Committee: Professor Tiziano Bonazzi (History)
Professor Carlo Guarnieri (Politics)

Management Committee: Dr Giovanna Filippini
Settore Relazioni Internazionali
Università degli studi di Bologna
Via Zamboni 33
I-40125 BOLOGNA
Email: gfilippini@ammc.unibo.it

BONN

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn founded in 1818 by Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm III, preceded by an Academy established in 1777.

Rektor: Professor Mathias Winiger

Academic Committee: Professor Dr Wolfram Kinzig (Theology)
Professor Dr Uwe Holtz (Politics)

Management Committee: Dr. Hartmut Ihne
Director, ZEF/ZEI
Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Str. 3
D-53113 BONN
Email: ihne.cicero@uni-bonn.de

GENEVA

The Graduate Institute of International Studies founded in 1927, associated to, but not part of, the University of Geneva.

Director: Philippe Burrin

Academic Committee: Professor Gopalan Balachandran (History)
Professor Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Law)

Management Committee: Dr Daniel Warner
Deputy to the Director
Graduate Institute of International Studies
132, Rue de Lausanne
P.O. Box 36
CH-1211 GENEVE 21
Email: warner@hei.unige.ch

PARIS

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne founded in the 12th Century, and formally constituted by Papal Bull in 1215, was briefly suppressed during the French Revolution (1793 - 1808), and reconstituted in 1890.

Rector: Professor Pierre-Yves Henin

Academic Committee: Professor Robert Frank (History)
Professor Annie Cot (Economics)

Management Committee: Professor Robert Frank
Institut Pierre Renouvin
1, rue Victor Cousin
F-75005 PARIS
Email: frank@univ-paris1.fr

PRAGUE

Charles University, Prague, founded in 1348, was divided into Czech and German institutions by the Vienna government in 1882. These operated in parallel until 1939, when the Czech institution was closed by Nazi occupation. After 1945, the German institution was abolished and the Czech Charles University revived.

Rector: Professor Ivan Wilhelm

Academic Committee: Professor Luboš Tichý (Law)
Professor František Turnovec (Economics)

Management Committee: Ms Ivana Halašková
Director, International Relations Office
Univerzita Karlova V Praze
Ovocný trh 3/5
116 36 PRAHA 1
Email: Ivana.Halaskova@ruk.cuni.cz

MADRID

The Complutense University of Madrid, one of the oldest and largest in the world, was founded in 1293, originally in Alcalá de Henares, moving to Madrid in 1836. It has about 100,000 students, including 3,500 international students.

Rector: Professor Carlos Berzosa

Academic Committee: Professor Rosario Otegui (Social Anthropology)
Professor Javier Montero (Mathematics)

Management Committee: Mr Fernando de Hipólito
International Relations
Pabellón de Gobierno
Isaac Peral s/n
28040 MADRID
Email: hipolito@rect.ucm.es

HELSINKI

Helsinki University was established in Turku in 1640, but was transferred to Helsinki in 1828. The University is multilingual, providing teaching in Finnish, Swedish and English, with operations at 20 localities throughout Finland.

Rector: Dr Ilkka Niiniluoto

Academic Committee: Dr Teija Tiililainen (Political Science)
Vacancy

Management Committee: Mr Markus Laitinen
Head of International Affairs
PO Box 33
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
Finland
Email: markus.laitinen@helsinki.fi

Europaem Lectures

Europaem Lectures have been a part of the consortium work since its foundation, examining key issues confronting Europe today. Since 2002, those marked with * have been published.

Those marked with + are available on our website.

- **October 2000, Prague**
Dr David Robertson, Oxford University, on *A Common Constitutional Law for Europe: Questions of National Autonomy versus Universal Rights* * +
- **November 2000, Oxford**
Dr John Temple-Lang, European Commission, on *The Commission and the European Parliament – an uncertain relationship* * +
- **February 2001, Geneva**
Professor Ian Brownlie CBE QC, formerly of Oxford University, on *International Law and the use of force by states* * +
- **May 2001, Oxford**
Professor Philippe Burrin, Geneva University, on *Strands on Nazi Anti-semitism* * +
- **June 2001, Paris**
Professor Raymond Barre, formerly French Premier, the Sorbonne (Paris I) on *Quelle Europe pour demain?*
- **December 2001, Berlin**
Professor Peter Scott, Kingston University, (formerly Edition Times, Higher Education Supplement) on *The European University - What is its Future?* +
- **April 2002, Geneva**
Lord Professor (Ralf) Dahrendorf, formerly Oxford University, on *Global Security Interlinked, Poverty, Security and Development* * +
- **April 2002, Bonn**
Professor Michael Meyer-Blanck, Bonn University, on *Tradition - Integration - Qualification: Some Reflections on Religious Education in European Schools*
- **June 2002, Bologna**
Professor Tiziano Bonazzi, Bologna University, on *Europa, Zeus and Minos: or the labyrinth of Euro-American relations*
- **November 2002, Oxford**
Professor Charles Wyplosz, Geneva University, on *Fiscal Discipline in the Monetary Union: Rules or Institutions?* * +
- **November 2002, Oxford**
Professor Robert Frank, Paris I University, on *France and the United Kingdom in the Construction of Europe.*
- **April 2003, Geneva**
Sir Marrack Goulding, Oxford University, formerly United Nations, on *The United Nations and Peace since the Cold War: success, failure or neither?* * +
- **June 2003, Leiden**
Professor Sir Adam Roberts, Oxford University, on *International Law and the Use of Military Force : The United Nations, the United States and Iraq.* * +

To order further copies of these pamphlets which have been published, please contact the Europaem Secretariat (see address on the back cover). A small charge may be made.

