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Islamophobia: *a Non-Concept*

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He is interested in Indian political thought as well as that of modern Islam. Devji's broader concerns have to do with ethics and violence in a globalized world.

Contents

A note on Faisal Devji.....	2
Islamophobia: A <i>Non</i> -Concept.....	5
Endnotes:.....	16
Annex A : The Europaeum Record.....	17
Annex B : The Europaeum Partners.....	21
Annex C : The Europaeum Lectures.....	23

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Islamophobia: a *Non-Concept*

Scholarly, journalistic and policy work on Muslims in Europe only comes to constitute a genre from the 1980s, much after the great waves of migration that established such populations in countries like Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany after the Second World War, in a context defined by de-colonization and the opening of European labour markets. Starting with the study of these migrant communities, the literature on Muslims in Europe has moved on to locate them within a longer history of interactions between Christians, Muslims and Jews on the continent, sometimes stretching as far back as Charlemagne, Arab Spain and the Crusades, but more often beginning with the movement of Muslim diplomats, merchants and adventurers in the eighteenth century.¹ Picking up pace after the emergence of al-Qaeda as a global movement in 2001, much of this work is apologetic in nature, trying to address the problems posed by Muslim radicalism as well as ‘Islamophobia’ by showing in great detail the long and complex relations that have existed historically between Christianity and Islam in Europe.

The extensive literature on Muslims in Europe, which in its academic mode emerges out of every discipline in the humanities and social sciences, has no doubt opened up new ways of conceiving the continent’s history and perhaps even that of the globe. Yet in other respects its focus is so anachronistic as to be dishonest. For although the individuals and groups described in this literature might well be Muslim, there is no reason to assume that the role they played in Europe, whether in their own eyes or

those of their neighbours, had invariably to be defined by Islam. Surely the absence of Muslims as subjects of academic and other interest in Europe, at least before the 1980s, demonstrates that whatever the blindness of observers in those times, such a population did not in fact exist politically or culturally at the continental and even national level. By making the false assumption of Muslim continuity a great deal of the scholarship on such populations is not only unable to see discontinuities in the history of European immigration, but is consequently also capable of systematically underplaying the commonality of migrant experience across religious lines. Is it at all possible to speak of a Muslim population in Europe before the end of the Cold War, given that its religious practices tended to be confined within the discrete bonds of language and locality?

The Cold War was as important an event for Muslim immigrants as it was for the European countries in which they settled. For it was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union that Islam came to assume a role of its own on the continent. Before inquiring into the implications of this emergence, however, I want to point out that the Cold War represented such a disjuncture in Europe's history that very few of the ways in which Muslims had been considered during the imperial past of nations like Britain, France or Holland assumed any importance when they migrated to these countries. So in the United Kingdom, which became the chief destination of Muslims from South Asia, the categorization of people in religious terms, so familiar from colonial times, was abandoned in favour of racial, regional and national classifications that frequently clubbed Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, or Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis

together under rubrics like ‘Asian’. Similarly the narrative of pan-Islamism quite lost its importance in this period, despite its former prominence, and only reappeared as an ally of the West during the Cold War’s last battle in Afghanistan. In other words while it was clear that some migrants to Britain happened to be Muslim, a population dominated by Pakistanis from the Punjab or Kashmir on the one hand and Bangladeshis from Sylhet on the other, their religious identification never assumed sufficient political or cultural importance to pre-empt these migrants’ ethnicity or place of origin. Of this the most illustrative example is undoubtedly the slur ‘Paki’, used in the very recent past to define neither religion nor nationality but race.

How then did a section of South Asian migrants in Britain and increasingly the European continent come to be defined as Muslims? It has become a cliché to note that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States transformed world politics, and among other things gave rise to novel security procedures that profiled some Muslims in the West while targeting a number of their coreligionists in military operations elsewhere. Yet I want to argue that such laws and procedures only consolidated existing narratives about Muhammad’s followers in Europe and America rather than creating new lines of political reasoning there, thus providing us with one example of how unoriginal the response to global forms of militancy has been on the intellectual front. I do not however mean by this that policymakers and the general public in Western countries simply reached for a common stock of assumptions or prejudices to deal with their Muslim neighbours in the aftermath of 9/11, but want rather to suggest that despite the rhetoric of novelty in

which they are routinely mired, these events were in fact located within a quite different history defined by the end of the Cold War.

I want to argue here that Islam and its adherents have neither come to constitute new historical actors after the terrorist attacks in America, nor indeed to serve merely as the victims of stereotyping and discrimination in Europe. Instead I will contend that apart from its particular implications upon the lives of Muslims resident there, the War on Terror has had little conceptual effect, not least because it has been absorbed by another historical problem, that of rethinking Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Prior to this event, capitalism and communism constituted the globe's only actors, state-based ideologies that had divided its hemispheres into eastern and western halves that had little to do with the orientations by which former empires had defined themselves. Islam has not only emerged as a putative global agent in the wake of the Cold War, but in doing so has put into question the political status of a newly-federated Europe as well. But this means that the more Muslims are invoked in controversies on the continent, the less are such debates about them and more about Europe itself.²

Interesting about the European Union is that it represents a new kind of global polity, one that is extraordinary in that while being something more than a free-trade zone or alliance of nation states, lacks the kind of sovereignty that has been the hallmark of all political forms in modern times. Its citizens, after all, still owe allegiance to particular nation states and are asked to give their lives fighting in their individual armies. Europe, in

other words, indubitably exists as a polity of a very novel kind, and thus often functions awkwardly in traditional geopolitical settings, as its much remarked upon inability to act decisively in the international arena demonstrates.³ And so it is in some ways like Islam as a global actor, one that also lacks sovereignty and even institutional foundations, occupying a curious position between political existence and non-existence. Indeed it is precisely because sovereignty appears to have been put into question in the new Europe that the latter can be redefined as one civilization threatened by another. For the old-fashioned sovereignty absent from the Union's institutions has been re-appropriated by its people to be deployed against an Islam that is similarly defined in terms of values and civilization.⁴

This might also be why the threat of Muslim colonization is seen to affect Europe primarily and not the United States, despite the latter's growing Muslim population and unrivalled status as a target of Islamic militancy. Indeed Americans inclined towards 'Islamophobia' can do nothing more than identify vicariously with Europe's past glories and present problems in a way that denies their country its famously exceptional status. It is also instructive to note that none of the many competing visions of American decline take Islam to be an important factor in their narratives. For on the domestic front it is still Mexican and other 'illegal immigrants' who are seen as threatening the American way of life by their numbers, while in Europe these days immigration is largely defined as a Muslim problem. And on the international front it is China and to a lesser degree India that are acknowledged as the chief competitors of the United States, at least in economic terms, with Iran, North Korea, and even Al-

Qaeda simply posing it a number of dangerous but manageable security threats.

Europe has always been united in the form of an empire, whether a religious one, as was the case with the Holy Roman Empire, secular, as with the Napoleonic conquests, or racist as with the Nazis. Indeed it was during its last incarnation as a fascist empire that Europe was conceived as being threatened by immigration and the hybrid values that resulted from it, of which the Jews represented the chief internal example.⁵ Not the purity of the outsider, then, but rather his amalgamation with European civilization posed a great threat to the latter, and it is therefore interesting to note that the guardians of European values today are also concerned with the hybrid mixing of cultures, which is why their favourite terms of opprobrium tend to evoke this non-racial miscegenation. Of these the three most popular among writers accused of 'Islamophobia' like Bat Yeor (a pseudonym for the polemicist Gisele Littman) are undoubtedly Eurabia, a name for the continent under Muslim domination, dhimmitude, a description of those who accept the subordinate status of a 'dhimmi' or non-Muslim in classical Islamic legal theory and Islamofascism, an ideological category that links Islamic militancy in particular to the history of Europe.⁶

Islam in the global arena

As a political rather than merely demographic entity, Muslims in Europe tend to be viewed not simply as a minority but rather as part of a global constituency. Whatever it owes to earlier worries about pan-Islamism in the days of Europe's empires,

this manner of considering the continent's Muslims has to do as much with the creation of the European Union, and therefore the necessity of thinking about politics in a way that is not confined within national boundaries. In this sense debates having to do with Islam, as indeed over other issues seen as being primarily European in character, represent anxieties about the coming to light of new political arenas beyond the nation state. And so Muslims are seen as posing a problem of the same kind as a single currency or laws made in Brussels, though their greater visibility may also render these latter concerns more tolerable as part of 'our' common European civilization under threat from global Islam.

Of course Muslims in Europe are not the passive observers of their transformation into a global threat but have driven this process from the very beginning. So the first manifestation of their emergence as a political constituency of an extra-territorial kind was arguably with the controversy over the British writer Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*, published just as the Cold War ended in 1989.⁷ Starting in an unprecedented manner with protests against the author's portrayal of Muhammad among immigrant communities in the north of England, the controversy spread to their places of origin in Pakistan and India, finally becoming the first among several global demonstrations of Muslim solidarity by way of the television and press coverage it received. It is interesting to note that subsequent manifestations of such global mobilization, for example the protests over Danish cartoons of the Prophet in 2005, or the Pope's comments about him in 2006, have also originated among immigrant communities in Europe and all been provoked by insults alleged to have been delivered Muhammad.

If anything this history of protest tells us how new traditions of Muslim solidarity are formed, and makes it clear that their global character is somehow tied up with that of Europe. Indeed it even seems as if Muslim solidarity can only be manifested in European terms, since no matter how well publicized they might be, similar insults to the Prophet in other parts of the world, not least in Muslim countries, have never achieved global notoriety, however effusive the protests they provoke at the local or national level. Such, for instance, was the case of the Bangladeshi writer Tasleema Nasreen, whose journalism of many years suddenly became controversial in the aftermath of Rushdie's infamy, even though the attempt by Islamic parties in Bangladesh to achieve global celebrity by attacking her did not meet with much success. However the global nature of these controversies resides not in their geographical dispersal so much as in the fact that they appeal ostensibly to non-political causes like insults to the Prophet that are held to affect Muslims universally and without distinction. Whether or not such insults are viewed as illustrations of a wider political antagonism between the Muslim world and the West, in other words, their global character is defined morally, by using the language of respect denied, rather than in legal or geopolitical terms.⁸

Unlike protests over the treatment of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya or Kashmir, those engaged by insults to the Prophet do not single out a particular place or population that others are meant to identify with, but in affecting them all universally move solidarity itself from an international to a global dimension. And though at every level these protests certainly involve political concerns of a more conventional sort, their strictly religious

phraseology and global constituency does nothing more than put into question the inherited categories of European politics. And from the time of the Rushdie controversy it became clear that these categories ranged from the nation state itself to those of race, class and region, which had been the political building blocks of post-war Europe. After all Muslim immigrants in the days before the publication of Rushdie's novel were dealt with by European governments in terms of race or class, nationality or neighbourhood, and not primarily by religion. For even the great debates over Middle Eastern events like the Islamic Revolution in Iran were engaged with along the geopolitical lines of Cold War tradition.

The Triumph of Liberal Europe

Erupting into a new global arena that came to light with the end of the Cold War, movements of Islamic solidarity transformed the vocabulary of conventional politics. Just as the Soviet collapse resulted in class warfare being downgraded from an international language to a local dialect of politics, so too did the rise of global forms of Muslim protest have as their consequence the dismantling of race as a political category in Europe. So in Britain, for example, we have seen the collapse of attempts to build a 'Black' political alliance, while more discrete classifications like 'Asian' are also being questioned, with the focus of government as much as media moving to the different religious communities that constitute them. This emphasis on religious groups as a society's basic political actors possesses, of course, a long colonial history, and such definitions are therefore as familiar to Muslim immigrants from places like South Asia as

they are to the British state. But in fact disputes over forms of Muslim visibility like veils or minarets in some parts of Europe might indicate attempts to cling on to some sort of racial script, much as the visibility of poverty, drug-use, teenage pregnancy and crime is used to mark other minority populations without any biological theory of race having to be invoked.

Naturally in arguing that race is being dismantled in Europe I am not suggesting that racism or race consciousness has disappeared from the continent, only that immigrant communities there have been rearranged into a new hierarchy with Muslims occupying its summit of visibility.⁹ Moreover since Islam cannot be racially defined and is seen as a global threat partly because it names a bewildering array of ethnic groups including European converts, even when they are the objects of racial prejudice Muslims end up fragmenting race itself as a political category. And this despite the fact that in Europe followers of the Prophet continue to associate with one another and worship along ethnic and linguistic lines. Only the young and educated, those who are fully integrated into European societies and who communicate in their official languages, are capable of forming ethnically diverse associations of Muslims. And it is precisely from this population that ‘militants’ and ‘moderates’ emerge, both groups united by the fact that their ideas of Islam are as likely to come from Western sources, in Western languages and by way of close interaction with the West, than they are to derive from some traditional model of religious education.

But of course the clearest example of the way in which the language of global Islam has triumphed over that of race has

to do with the fact that many if not most of Europe's racist parties have redefined their narratives to target Muslims rather than Blacks or Jews as the chief threat to civilized society in the West. Indeed this is so much the case that groups like the English Defence League have welcomed Sikh, Afro-Caribbean and other populations as fellow travellers in the project to defend the world against Islam. By pushing aside the vocabulary of biological determinism, this transformation of racial reasoning ends up evoking not some threatened European purity so much as defending the fairly commonplace 'Western' values of freedom, tolerance and even diversity against Muslim 'totalitarianism'. And in taking on such values racist groups are not only coming into the European mainstream by slowly casting off their biological concerns, but also demonstrating that their new passions possess an entirely legitimate provenance. After all it is not coincidental these are the very values that were for so long upheld by capitalist democracies against communism, and therefore represent the Cold War's legacy to these new conflicts of religion or civilization that appear to have succeeded it. Isn't this why one of the most common 'Islamophobic' claims is that Islam is not a religion but an ideology?

Observers at the time noted the specificity of anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe in the wake of the Rushdie controversy, and soon a neologism was coined for it with the word Islamophobia. This term, whose reference to the language of pathology possesses a paradoxically racist lineage, may illustrate the anxiety of its users to re-ground race as a political category in changing times. And indeed those who deploy it tend to describe Islamophobia as a form of racism, as in the influential report

on the phenomenon by the Runnymede Trust in 1997.¹⁰ By tying discrimination against Muslims to the received language of race relations, however, this approach is unable to recognize Islamophobia's role in the breakdown of race as a political category. In fact racism in Europe seems increasingly to be abandoning its old biological formulae in favour of liberal shibboleths, to the degree that there is often very little rhetorical distance between the two ideological forms. It is as if the victory of liberalism over its Marxist antagonist with the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of all other forms of ideological autonomy as well. But whether racist parties are disingenuous in referring to such liberal verities, or if in doing so they simply reveal the otherwise hidden potential of these principles, the ostensible hegemony exercised by liberalism in its capitalist and democratic aspect needs to be questioned if we are to address the new language of discrimination to which it gives a name.

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Notes

1 See, for instance, F. Dacetto and Y. Conrad, *Musulmans en Europe Occidentale: Bibliographie Commentée* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996)

2 For a description of this argument, see Matti Bunzl, *Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007).

3 For a polemical statement of this problem, see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage, 2004)

4 The great narrative of a post-Cold War conflict of civilizations, of course, is Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

5 For an example see Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008)

6 See, for example, *Bat Yeor, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005)

7 Salman Rushdie, *The Satanic Verses* (New York: Viking, 1989)

8 For a discussion of this theme, see Faisal Devji, "The Mountain Comes to Muhammad: Global Islam in Provincial Europe", in Chris Rumford (ed.) *The Sage Handbook of European Studies* (London: Sage Publications, 2009)

9 See, for example, *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia* (Vienna: EUMC, 2006)

10 See the Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997)

The Europaeum Record

I. Mobility Schemes

- The *Europaeum New Initiatives Scheme* provides seed funding for innovative and imaginative forms of academic collaboration within the Europaeum academic community.
- The *Europaeum Visiting Professors Scheme* supports the movement of professors from one partner institution to another, for periods of up to two weeks for the purposes of lecturing, study, research and project development.
- *Europaeum Mobility Schemes* support individual academics and selected graduate students from member institutions participating in selected European events and activities, including conferences, seminars and summer schools.

II. Main Annual Academic Conferences

1993 OXFORD	<i>Are European Elites Losing Touch with their Peoples?</i>
1994 OXFORD	<i>Europe and America after the Cold War: the End of the West</i>
1995 BONN	<i>Integration of East Central Europe into the European Union</i>
1996 GENEVA	<i>Defining the Projecting Europe's Identity: Issues and Trade-Offs</i>
1997 PARIS 1	<i>Europe and Money</i>
1998 LEIDEN	<i>Human rights, the plight of immigrants and European immigration policy</i>
2000 BONN	<i>The Implications of the new Knowledge and Technology</i>
2001 OXFORD	<i>Democracy and the Internet: New Rules for New Times</i>
2001 BERLIN	<i>European Universities Project: Borderless Education: Bridging Europe</i>
2002 PARIS 1	<i>European Universities Project: New Times, New Responsibilities</i>
2003 OXFORD	<i>Whose Europe? National Models and the European Constitution</i>
2003 BONN	<i>European Universities Project: New Partnerships, Opportunities and Risks</i>
2004 LEIDEN	<i>Moving the Frontiers of Europe: Turkey, Risk or Opportunity</i>
2005 OXFORD	<i>US-Europe: Americanisation and Europeanisation: Rivals or Synonyms</i>
2006 OXFORD	<i>Diaspora/Homeland relations: Transnationalism and the Reconstruction of Identities in Europe</i>
2007 WASHINGTON	<i>Does the 'West' still exist? - America and Europe towards 2020</i>
2008 OXFORD	<i>Dilemmas of Digitalization</i>
2009 OXFORD	<i>Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond</i>
2010 OXFORD	<i>Federalisms - East and West - India, Europe and North America</i>
2011 SANTANDER	<i>Futures for Europe: 2030?</i>

Annex A

2012 LISBON	<i>Open Societies, Open Economies and Citizenship</i>
2012 OXFORD	<i>Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Europe</i>
2013 PARIS	<i>European Society and Social Solidarity</i>
2013 LISBON	<i>Governance, Leadership and Democracy</i>
2013 DELHI	<i>Federalisms and Localisms</i>
2014 KRAKOW	<i>Internationalisation of Higher Education</i>

III. Graduate week-long Summer Schools

1994 LEIDEN	<i>Concepts of Europe</i>
1995 BOLOGNA	<i>The Problem of Political Leadership and the Ethnic Nation</i>
1996 BOLOGNA	<i>The Civic Nation and the Ethnic Nation</i>
1998 BUDAPEST	<i>Risk Policy Analysis</i>
1998 OXFORD	<i>Human Rights</i>
1999 PARIS 1	<i>NATO and European Defence</i>
2000 BOLOGNA	<i>European Policy and Enlargement</i>
2000 OXFORD	<i>Church as Politeia</i>
2001 OXFORD	<i>Human Rights and the movement of People in Europe</i>
2002 OXFORD	<i>The Economics of European Integration</i>
2003 PRAGUE	<i>Old and New Ideas of European Federalism</i>
2004 LEIDEN	<i>Islam and Europe: Building Bridges</i>
2005 GENEVA	<i>Multilateral Governance: Effective Ways Forward?</i>
2006 KRAKOW	<i>Bridging the Divide: US-Europe Relations after 9/11</i>
2007 HELSINKI	<i>Borders of Europe - where do they end?</i>
2008 BONN	<i>Sacred Buildings in European Cities</i>
2009 PARIS 1	<i>Ethics and Policy-making</i>
2010 BOLOGNA	<i>The Media, Europe & Democracy</i>
2011 SANTANDER	<i>The Future of Europe: Which Way Towards 2030?</i>
2012 OXFORD	<i>Conflict Resolution in Europe</i>
2013 BARCELONA	<i>Rights and Citizens in Europe</i>
2014 MADRID	<i>Women in Europe: The Unfinished Revolution?</i>

IV. Teaching Courses and Study Programmes

2012-	Havel MA in <i>European Politics & Society</i> (Prague, Paris 1, Leiden)
2009-	Lisbon Annual Graduate Student Debates
2008-	Brussels Annual Policy-Making Seminars
2004-	MA in <i>European History and Civilisation</i> (Leiden, Paris I & Oxford)
2006-08	<i>European Business, Cultures, & Institutions symposia</i> (Leiden & Oxford)
2002-04	<i>International Refugee Law</i> (Geneva and Oxford)

2001-2003	MA <i>Political Cultures & European Political Systems</i> (Bologna, Oxford & Leiden)
2001-2003	<i>Economics of European Integration</i> (Paris - BA module option)
1996-2000	<i>European Community Law</i> (Oxford, Leiden and Sienna)

The Europaeum played the key role in the creation at Oxford of the *Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law*, the *European Humanities Research Centre*, the *Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society*, plus a number of fellowships, including the *Chair in European Thought* and, the *Bertelsmann Europaeum Visiting Professorship in 20th Century Jewish History and Politics*.

V. Linked Scholarship Programmes

2004-	The <i>Jenkins Scholarship Scheme</i> - Four Europaeum students to Oxford and two outgoing Oxford students per annum.
1997-	The <i>Oxford-Geneva Bursary Scheme</i> - Annual bursaries for student exchanges between Oxford and the HEI.
2008-11	The <i>El Pomar-Europaeum Transatlantic Junior Fellowship</i> - One Europaeum student to USA research fellowship.
1997-	The <i>Scatcherd European Scholarships</i> - Fully funded places at Oxford for European graduates, and for Oxford graduates at European Universities.
1995-2001	<i>The Europaeum Scholarships in Jewish Studies</i>
1990s	<i>Henry R Kravis Scholarships</i> - Allowed students read an M.Phil or M.Juris in at Oxford.

VI. Main Research Projects

- *The Europaeum Research Project Groups* scheme encourages collaborative research across the association, supporting groups looking at such themes such as *Party System Changes; Churches and the Family; European Economic Integration; The Kosovo Stability Pact; European Identity; Regulation of E-commerce; Liberalism in 20th Century Europe; Transmission and Understanding in the Sciences; and Cultural Difference in Europe, Political Concepts in Europe, Race in European Universities*.
- *The Future of European Universities Project 2001-5*, supported by Daimler-Chrysler Services A G, was a three-year investigation into the impact of new technology and the Knowledge Revolution with international expert conferences on *Borderless Education: Bridging Europe* (Berlin 2001); *New Times : New Responsibilities* (Paris 2002); and *New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks* (Bonn 2003).
- *Islam-in-Europe Programme 2004-* supporting workshops and other events around this key theme, culminating in an international lecture series and conference.

Annex A

- ***Culture, Humanities, and Technology in Europe 2004-13*** supporting workshops and other events around this key theme, culminating in an international conference.
- ***The US-Europe TransAtlantic Dialogue Programme 2005-*** supporting workshops and other events around this key theme, culminating in an international workshop and conference.

VI. Recent Graduate Workshops

2007 BRUSSELS	<i>Policy-Making Inside Europe</i> [held annually at the European Parliament and NATO HQ thereafter]
2008 PARIS 1	<i>Roots of Modern Europe</i>
2008 PRAGUE	<i>European Migration in the 21st Century</i>
2009 BONN	<i>Thinking about Progress</i>
2009 KRAKOW	<i>Experience and Perceptions of Migration across Europe</i>
2009 LISBON	<i>Ideas of Europe: Ideas for Europe?</i>
2009 OXFORD	<i>Europeanisation: Historical Approaches</i>
2010 BOLOGNA	<i>Sacred 'Spaces' in Modern European Cities ?</i>
2010 LEIDEN	<i>Political Parties, Migration and Public Rhetoric in Europe</i>
2010 PARIS 1	<i>Risks from Climate Change: Lessons in Global Diplomacy</i>
2011 BONN	<i>Globalisation and Cooperation</i>
2011 LEIDEN	<i>Europe and its "Giants" of Leadership: Past, Present and Future?</i>
2011 OXFORD	<i>Europeanisation and the Roots of Modern Europe</i>
2012 PARIS 1	<i>The Arab Spring: One Year On</i>
2012 PRAGUE	<i>Rio +20: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe</i>
2012 OXFORD	<i>Rousseau and Republican Traditions in Europe</i>
2012 BOLOGNA	<i>Atlanticism</i>
2013 OXFORD	<i>Global History</i>
2013 PRAGUE	<i>Democracy in Times of Crisis</i>
2013 AMSTERDAM	<i>Climate Change, Waters & Cities</i>
2014 OXFORD	<i>Citizens, Economists, Emperors, Clerics: The Making Europe?</i>

VII. Classics Colloquia

2001 OXFORD	<i>Travel and Tourism in Ancient Times</i>
2002 OXFORD	<i>Recent Papyrus findings</i>
2003 OXFORD	<i>Approaches to Herodotus and Tacitus's Annals</i>
2005 LEIDEN	<i>Tears in the Ancient World</i>
2006 MADRID	<i>The Orient, Greece and Rome</i>
2007 OXFORD	<i>Myth, Culture, Society - in memory of Jean-Pierre Vernant</i>
2008 BOLOGNA	<i>Metamorphosis – between Science and Literature</i>
2009 PRAGUE	<i>Teaching, Teachers & Students</i>
2010 KRAKÓW	<i>Death & Afterlife</i>
2011 HELSINKI	<i>Strangers and Friends</i>
2012 OXFORD	<i>Leadership in the Old World</i>

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
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Europaeum Lectures

Europaeum Lectures have been a part of the consortium work since its foundation, examining key issues confronting Europe today. A selection is shown in this list.

- **February 2014, Oxford**
Professor Jussi Hanhimäki on *Re-Evaluating the Legacy of Henry Kissinger: Statesman or Stuntman?*
- **September 2013, Prague**
Professor Sir Adam Roberts, on *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: From the Prague Spring to the Arab Spring*
- **May 2012, Oxford**
Professor Peter Pulzer, on *Democracy: Whatever Happened to the People?*
- **November 2011, Oxford**
Professor Keith Krause, on *The End of War: Political Violence in the 20th Century*
- **November 2010, Prague**
Professor Robert Fox, on *Science and the travails of Modernity in Fin-desiècle France*
- **May 2009, Geneva**
Professor Margaret MacMillan, on *90 Years on - lessons for peacemakers from 1918?*
- **March 2008, Geneva**
Professor Vaughan Lowe, on *The Double Helix of Terrorism and Tyranny: can civil liberties survive the war on terror?*
- **October 2007, Krakow**
Professor David Marquand, on *The Challenges for Democracy in Europe*
- **November 2006, Oxford**
Professor Wladyslaw Strozewski, on *Human Being and Values*
- **June 2005, Helsinki**
Professor David Robertson, on *What now? Europe after the recent referenda*
- **November 2004, Leiden**
Dr Godfrey Hodgson, on *The Other American Presidential Election: Choosing a President and Psychoanalyzing a Nation.*
- **April 2003, Geneva**
Sir Marrack Goulding, on *The United Nations and Peace since the Cold War: success, failure or neither?*
- **November 2002, Oxford**
Professor Charles Wyplosz, on *Fiscal Discipline in the Monetary Union: Rules or Institutions?*
- **June 2001, Paris**
Professor Raymond Barre, on *Quelle Europe pour demain?*
- **November 2000, Oxford**
Dr John Temple-Lang, on *The Commission and the European Parliament - an uncertain relationship*