BRIDGING DIVIDES

Mary Robinson on Universities and Aid
Ralf Dahrendorf on Terrorism and Poverty
Adam Roberts on the US, UN and Iraq

Michael Freeden on Liberalism
Wim van der Doel on the US v Europe
Christian Hacke on Germany’s Role
The EVROPAEVM Mission

The Europaeum was founded in 1992 as an association of European universities, with a mission to:

- promote excellence in research and teaching collaboration between the Europaeum partners;
- act as an open academic network, linking the Europaeum partners and other universities and bodies in the pursuit of study;
- serve as a resource for the general support and promotion of European studies;
- function independently in the search for new ideas;
- provide opportunities for the joint pursuit of new pan-European initiatives;
- serve as a high level ‘think-tank’ exploring new ideas and new roles for universities in the new Learning Age;
- provide a ‘pool of talent’ to carry out research and inquiry into problems and questions confronting Europe today and tomorrow;
- help train and educate future leaders of a new Europe.

For full information see: www.europaeum.org

LATE NEWS - HELSINKI JOINS EUROPÆUUM

The University of Helsinki is about to join the Europaeum, becoming the ninth full member of the association, founded 10 years ago to promote academic collaboration and European studies. The University was established in Turku in 1640, but was transferred to Helsinki in 1828. There are 37,685 degree students of which 1,218 are foreign students. The University is bilingual, providing teaching in Finnish, Swedish and English. The University has strong international connections. It has some 80 co-operation agreements with universities on different continents. The University researchers are in great demand as experts in international scientific communities, meetings and publications. Besides Helsinki, the University has operations at 20 localities throughout Finland.
In 2002, the Europaeum agreed to on promoting a TransAtlantic Dialogue focus over the coming few years – and not just because of 9/11. The need, of course, seems even more prescient today, post the Iraq War. David Marquand kicked off the debate with a trenchant article on the President Bush’s global ambitions in our last issue. Now we take the debate forward with forceful and fresh opinions in articles from Wim van den Doel on the dialogue itself (see pages 10-11), Christian Hacke on Germany’s special mediating role between EU and US (see page 9), and Adam Roberts unravelling the divisive rationale behind going to War against Iraq (see pages 26-28).

Publications, quality publications, we are continually told, are a sign of success. Then we have had a good six moths since our last Review, as we note in several places in this issue. First, we have had E-commerce Law, which arose out of Leiden-Oxford staff exchanges and a productive research workshop (see page 34). Then came Whose Europe?, a collection from a major international conference held in Oxford last year on the continuing debate over a future European Constitution (see pages 24-25). Next, We published four more our distinguished Europaeum Lecture series (see page 33), and finally the Future of European Universities Project reports are up on our website (see pages 16-17).

Surely, an equally valid measure of success comes from what students themselves say. Jasmine Champenoise speaks from the heart (page 35) on how a Europaeum bursary helped change her horizons, while Marie Charpentier gives the student report card on our FEU Project (see pages 18-19). Students are also still giving positive feedback to our high octane public debates – now a successful feature for Europaeum events – at our summer school (see page 29) and in Prague last year we also ran a debate on the proposition Does the World need America as its Tough Guy in the 21st Century? Initially, there was seemed only a few professors and no student speakers sure enough to support the proposition – by the end the motion was defeated after a lively and entertaining debate by 21-7. We are, of course, back full circle to our theme of dialogue. This one will run and run.

Finally, I must draw attention to our message sent to Complutense University, Madrid following the bombing outrage in March (see page 3).
Here the Universidad Complutense, one of Europe’s oldest universities, which joined the Europaeum club last year as the Iberian representative, is profiled.

The Complutense University of Madrid is one of the oldest universities in the world, founded in 1293, by King Sanch IV of Castilla as the “Studium Generale” in a little town on the bank of the river Henares, on the bank of the river Henares called Complutum by the Romans and Alkala-en-el-Uhar (nowadays Alcalá de Henares) by the Arabs. This makes it, of course, older even than Spain itself.

In 1499, at the instigation of Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo, Pope Alexander VI gave the University its papal authorisation and the Roman name of its place of origin, Universitas Complutensis. By 1510 there were five faculties: Arts and Philosophy, Theology, Law, Letters and Medicine and Miguel de Cervantes, author of Don Quixote wounded hero from the battle of Leparato, benefitted from the developing intellectual atmosphere of the university. Then, in 1836, during the reign of Queen Isabel II, UCM was transferred to the capital Madrid.

During Franco’s 36-year rule, many academics went into exile or were sent into exile – a very significant group went to Mexico where they had a highly significant intellectual impact and their places were filled by those more ideologically in tune with the Franco regime. The regime took a big say in all senior academic appointments right up to the rector. These were difficult times for the UCM, though this did allow a period of stability.

Then there were clashes in 1956, and again in the 1960s when three professors, García Aranguren, Henrique Tierno Galvan, and Garcia Calvo, were fired for promoting students freedom protests which lasted until Franco’s death in 1975. Then all three were reinstated in triumph, and each went on to play a prominent role in the development of the new democratic republic.

Today, the two campuses of the Universidad, located in the Moncloa and Somosaguas, extend over 36,000 acres including large gardens, with some 117 campus buildings including faculties, schools, institutes, professional medical schools, centres, residence halls, hospitals, offices, sports facilities for more than 60 clubs, and computer suites. The library contains well over 2 million volumes, and the computer centre has more than 200 computers available. The university buildings really took off from the 1970s, which also coincided with a demographic surge in the numbers of Spanish students, recalls one leading Science professor.

The campuses, really mini-cities, are set in broad, attractive open spaces separating lecture rooms and residence hall – all linked to downtown Madrid by buses and two subway lines, which provides access to all the attractions of Europe’s highest city, 646 meters above sea level, and the oldest quarters, between Paseo del Prado (where the city’s great art galleries are based) and the Palacio Real, the working-class district of Lavapiés, filled with restaurants, bars, and cafes.

UCM alumni: Cervantes, Juan Carlos I and Marias

Main university campus building at Madrid
joins the Europaeum

A wide range of degrees and courses are available to students, including 70 formal degrees from the faculties of Humanities, Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Health Sciences and Social Sciences. Particular academic strengths today include the sciences, law, philology, geography, history (including archaeology), philosophy and fine arts. Quality research remains a priority at UCM and this is reflected by its participation in various external and government projects such as the National R & D Plan, Community of Madrid, Health Research Funds.

Among recent famous alumnae are Juan Carlos I, the King of Spain who famously stood against the army coup plotters after Franco died; strongly illustrating the university’s commitment to the principles of freedom; Adolfo Suárez, the first democratically elected president after the Franco regime, Pedro Lain Entralgo, the well known humanist and scientist; José Ortega y Gasset, one of Spain’s foremost philosophers; Manuel Azaña, the second and last President of the Second Spanish Republic; and José Rizal, the national hero of the Philippines.

The intellectual impact of UCM on Spanish life and culture has been enormous, and it can hold its own with all the other great Spanish universities in Barcelona, Santiago, Salamanca and Santiago. Recent renowned intellectuals include philosopher Fernando Sabater, film director Alejandro Amenabar; the General Secretary of the Western European Union, Javier Solana Madariaga, and the writer, Javier Marias. Santiago Ramoné-Cajal won the Nobel Prize in medicine.

The university collections include antique stores from its extensive history, including those of the San Carlos College of Medicine, and the inventory of the wealth of the Novitiate from 1857, contemporary Spanish painting of the Simarro Foundation, with works by Sorolla, Beruete, Madrazo and Emilio Sala, among others.

UCM rightly regards itself as an international university with links and agreement to a great many foreign universities, allowing research and teaching staff exchanges. Participation within the Europaeum association will extend this. Professor Rosario Otegui, Vice-rector for International Relations at UCM, who sits on the association’s academic committee said: “We are proud of our new links with this high quality Europe-wide association. We really look forward to playing our part in taking the various academic collaborations forward over the coming years.”

Following the bombing outrage in Madrid in March this message was sent to the Rector of Complutense University, Madrid, Professor Carlos Berzosa, from the Chairman of the Europaeum Council, Sir Colin Lucas, on behalf of the association as we went to print: “On behalf of all Europaeum partner universities, I would like to extend our deep and sincere condolences at this very difficult time, and to express our deepest sympathy to all those caught in this senseless violence.”

“The bombings in Madrid were an unjustifiable assault on Spain and on European freedom and democracy, and can only be condemned as an appalling act of terror.” “Our thoughts are very much with you at this time.”
The Europaeum was conceived in the early 1990s in a climate when Britain was seen to be out of step with much of the rest of Europe. It was very much the brainchild of two highly ‘European Britishers,’ George Weidenfeld, indefatigable, visionary, friend of past and present European leaders, publisher extraordinary; and Sir Ronnie Grierson, former head of GEC in its halcyon days, a pioneering European businessman.

They found sympathetic ears at Oxford, among them Lord (Roy) Jenkins, Lord (Ralf) Dahrendorf, Professor Peter Pulzer, and Sir Richard Southwood, and set out to build a consortium of leading European universities to promote thinking across Europe which recognized both that ideas do not have frontiers, and that tomorrow’s leaders needed to understand the new Europe, today.

So the Europaeum was born, formally at a lavish dinner with friends from across the spectrum and across Europe at Lancaster House, hosted by Lord (Douglas) Hurd, then Foreign Secretary in 1992.

With Roy Jenkins much to the fore, there was a hugely successful fund-raising drive in the early 1990s, which in Oxford spawned two new research units, an Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, European Studies posts; a range of scholarships; and several linked Visiting Chairs.

In all, Roy Jenkins committed European, played his full part, chairing key meetings, encouraging and garnering support, and building bridges. In 1996, in recognition of this and his past work for Europe – he was invited to Bologna to receive an honorary doctorate. He was very proud of this award, recalling in his acceptance speech the many past European initiatives he had undertaken in Italy generally and in Bologna particularly.

Indeed, it was in Florence in 1977 that Roy Jenkins arguably made his most significant contribution as President of the European Commission. Here he revisited the idea of European monetary union, and urged his European colleagues to focus once more on these goals and to think in terms of a single European currency. It is this speech which is credited with re-starting the process which led ultimately to the Single European Market and the Euro.

He had even agreed to deliver a major retrospective lecture for the Europaeum looking at 25 years of achievement since that famous Florence speech. Sadly, he passed away just before this was due to take place in Prague, at Charles University.

Among the leading Bologna professors acting as hosts for his honorary doctorate was one Romano Prodi, and the following morning at a Europaeum Roundtable discussion organized by Professor Paolo Pombeni the two distinguished academic-politicians debated the meanings of Europe and Europeaness and what it takes to make a ‘good European’. Roy Jenkins lamented the fact that most were good citizens of one or other European nation who then grafted on a wider sense of Europe in Brussels and elsewhere. Yet what was needed was to instill in young scholars and pro-

The purpose of the Roy Jenkins Memorial Fund is to create scholarships to bring students from the countries of the European Union to study at Oxford University. Given Roy Jenkins lifelong devotion to the institutions of the European Communities and the delight that he took in his last years in serving as Chancellor of Oxford, this is widely seen as a most suitable memorial.

The awards, which will be of the value of £10,000 per annum, tenable for up to two years, will enable Jenkins Scholars to study at Oxford for a senior BA degree or for a Masters degree in the Humanities or Social Sciences, the disciplines closest to Roy Jenkins own political and literary achievements.

Jenkins Scholars will be chosen from the Universities which are partnered with Oxford in the consortium know as Europaeum. There are currently nine universities in the Europaeum: Oxford, Paris, Bologna, Madrid, Leiden, Bonn, Berlin, Prague and Helsinki. One other university is about to join. In each year, three of these universities will be invited to submit one candidate and an alternate, chosen by the
professionals, a sense of Europe as they developed intellectually. In this, he was, of course, echoing, the vision behind the Europaeum itself.

Today, the Europaeum can look back on more than a decade of exciting and often innovative academic collaboration with eight full university members and two more set to join shortly (up to a desired target of 10). It has added to the sum of knowledge and ideas in the ‘new Europe’, expressed through its regular conferences and research workshops, a lively lecture series, student debates, energetic annual summer schools, a blossoming visiting professors programme, graduate links, student bursaries, and, most recently, joint teaching initiatives, not to mention scores of academic links spawned simply via the network.

Today, it operates as a not-for-profit company with a full international Council, an academic policy committee, a management committee, Europaeum Review, three grant schemes, a website and its own office run by a Secretary-General. Over the past three years, a wide-ranging international research project examined the future of European higher education in the Knowledge Society, backed by DaimlerChrysler Services. An important survey on ICT was carried out across the association, and the range of disciplines encompassed now also includes Modern History, History of Science, Classics, Theology, and Languages alongside Law, Politics, Economics, International Relations, Sociology and Philosophy.

Now there is to be a further boost - the new Jenkins Scholars are about to lead the Europaeum into a new era of positive links. Indeed fundraising has already reached a sufficient level that it is hoped that the first Jenkins Scholars, two to Oxford from partner institutions and the first outgoing Oxford Jenkins Scholar to a Europaeum university, can be selected for the 2004-5 academic year.

Ideas, universities, Europe, young scholars, Internationalism – these were what linked Roy Jenkins and the Europaeum.

Memorial Scholarships

Candidates will have reached, in their own university, a standard equivalent to an Oxford BA, admission to Oxford will be by the normal procedure. Once admitted to the course and college of their choice, candidates will have their scholarship confirmed automatically. Should the preferred candidate of a particular partner university not secure entrance to Oxford, the scholarships will be awarded, on achieving entrance, to the selected alternate.

It is expected that the first generation of scholars could will be chosen in 2004 to begin their courses in Oxford in the year 2005-6. Each year from 2004 onwards three Jenkins scholarships will be offered, so that when the scheme is fully operational there will always be six Jenkins Scholars in residence.

The organising committee believes they are ready to initiate the scheme now that a sum of £300,000 has been pledged. It is hoped, however, to raise in the course of the present appeal at least £1m in order to secure the future of the scholarship for the next 20 years.

You can support the new scheme by inviting others, or donating yourself, using the pledge form which can be downloaded from the Europaeum website www.europaeum.org. For more information, contact Sir Antony, St John’s College, Kenny Street, Oxford Tel: (+44) 01865 764174
How liberalism survived

Liberalism is predominant today, despite the many challenges of the last 100 years. MICHAEL FREEDEN recalls lively discussion exploring the background at a research workshop backed by the Europaeum

Are we all liberals now, at least in the Western world (itself more of a conceptual than a geographical category)? Some academics have been pronouncing liberalism’s new-found immortality, often combining that claim with some vague end-of-ideology prognosis. Last April, an international group of political theorists and historians, sponsored by the Europaeum and under the auspices of the Centre for Political Ideologies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University, and the Department of Politics, History and Institutions at the University of Bologna, set out to investigate the condition and alleged ubiquity of liberalism.

In a two-day workshop at Mansfield College, Oxford, entitled ‘Appropriations, Misappropriations and Adaptations of Liberalism in Twentieth-century Europe’, attended by some twenty five scholars from France, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA, as well as the UK, they raised a specific series of questions. How is liberalism variably understood and disseminated in different European countries? Is there such as thing as a singular liberalism, or do many liberalisms huddle under that label? Do diverse ideological positions attempt to get a free ride on liberalism’s reputation by cynically borrowing its terms of reference and its political language? What accounts for its remarkable survival power and what future does it have?

Almost immediately two problems emerged. First, some disagreement arose about the positioning of current liberalisms on an ideological spectrum. Some continental scholars located liberalism at the legal/individualist point of that spectrum, regarding it mainly as concerned with preserving constitutional defences and individual rights. For other participants, liberalism had evolved into a welfare-oriented ideology that accepted a modicum of state regulation and promoted social improvement through communal intervention. How serious was that juridical/social divide? Second, British scholars seemed to have a more extensive idea of what counted as liberal, while continental scholars were uneasy with the suggestion of their British colleagues that French and German liberalisms, for example, existed also under different names, such as solidarism or even social democracy.

One explanation for that difference in opinion may lie in the fact that in the UK there has always been considerable political space between the conservative and labour/socialist persuasions within which liberalism has developed and expanded; whereas in the more crowded continental ideological climates liberalism was restricted to narrower containers. Another explanation could note that the libertarian element was more pronounced in liberal traditions that had to confront totalitarian forces than in the British case, where many liberal components could be found across the political divides.

That is by no means to imply that the workshop was confrontational. Quite the contrary, it was a congenial, relaxed and inspiring occasion, and confirmed what we already knew, that small gatherings in which all participants sit around a table and discuss intensely and informally matters of common interest often work better than more formal conferences, particularly if they can get something decent to eat and drink in between—though we could not match the previous experiences many of us had had of Italian cuisine!

In his introductory talk, Michael Freeden set the scene by referring to three routes to discovering liberalism. The one was to see it as a historical narrative about the evolution of a belief system, in given contexts, concerning the liberation of individuals and groups from oppression. The second was to see it as a political ideology, a particular pattern of political concepts and a set of clusters of arguments and discourses that uniquely share family resemblances. The third was to deploy it as a philosophical modelling device in which universal ground rules for a just and ethical society are drawn up, one that permits a fair and equal pursuit of the chosen life-plan of every person.

Whichever way liberalism was investigated, one could not forget that liberals were not just reasonable, but passionate about their forms of reason, and dedicated to political and social reform, not just to the protection of individual property and space. Liberalism was thus both intellectually and politically a dynamic rather than a static set of beliefs and it could not be expected always to appear in the same garb, even within one culture.
Jörn Leonhard compared the exhaustion of the German liberal tradition between the world wars with its weakness in France, and contrasted those to the emergence of the reformist and socially aware new liberalism in Britain. The German liberal tradition understated the industrial challenges to liberalism, seeing it rather as preoccupied with class—specifically, the bourgeoisie—and with nation. That was certainly the case with Max Weber, who was concerned above all with the balance between liberty and power, a problem to which British liberalism was largely oblivious. A strong statist element emerged through such nationalism, rather than by means of social liberalism. In France, too, a large part of the liberal tradition was channelled into economic liberalism, while solidarism failed to make a political impact on liberal radicalism. In all these cases, however, political success was very limited.

In his commentary, Steven Lukes alerted us to some basic problems of identifying the liberal tradition, in terms of semantics, ideology and concepts, the practices it endorsed and the political support that Liberal parties offered. Could there be one story of all these liberalisms?

Peter Ghosh offered a detailed historical analysis of liberalism’s appeal to rationality through the Rechtsstaat and through Weber’s thought. Before 1914, liberals had put a premium on intellect and on the universities, and had offered a clear structure to counter forces of irrationalism and fragmentation. For Weber, specifically, reason was not normative but a historical concept; hence liberalism did not need to be challenged at the normative level.

In another comparative paper, Richard Bellamy asked whether the liberals were victims of their own success. Liberalism was under attack after 1914, because of doubts about the market and the failure of liberal democracy and the values it espoused. Progressive liberalism in the UK and the US has been coming to terms with the social situatedness of the individual, but liberals were still unclear about the role of the state, particularly when totalitarian regimes were dramatically illustrating the unprecedented malicious power wielded by it. Many liberals, however, flirted with efficiency and with a directive elitism, not least Keynes. In Italy, Croce was grappling with a historicist view of liberalism as a ‘metapolitical’ theory somewhat removed from policy-making. Liberalism was damaged by the divide between its ideal and empirical modes. Many progressive liberal ideas returned in a right-wing guise.

Intriguing issues emerged in discussion. Was liberalism a minority culture that nevertheless had become mysteriously hegemonic? To what extent was a liberal vocabulary employed for tactical purposes? What were the limits of liberal tolerance of illiberalism? And was it not the case that the presence of components of a liberal ideology could be necessary, but not sufficient, to earn the theory the name ‘liberalism’? The existence of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ in an ideology could still cause misrecognition.

The Italian contingent brought their own concerns. Fulvio Cammarano examined the transformation of late 19th century Italian liberalism, torn between the desire to propagate a liberal culture and the requirements of a weak state structure that needed bolstering. The emphasis on strengthening the governmental and bureaucratic apparatuses came at the expense of liberal social reform. The fear of the masses encouraged pusillanimity within liberalism and the shying away from social issues.

Paolo Pombeni focused on post-1945 Italy. Unsurprisingly, the questions of civil rights and constitution-building become the main preoccupation, and these liberal notions were assimilated more or less unconsciously into both Catholic and socialist politics. On another level, left-Catholicism promoted a ‘liberal’ view of citizens as increasing their personal welfare through consumption. Old constitutional models that protected fundamental rights were appealed to. Communal aspects of political organization were, however, seen as contrary to the liberal viewpoint, in striking contrast with the British case (and, it may be added, with what many Italian theorists had argued). In standing by the republic, continental liberalism revealed itself to be concerned with defending the state. Nicholas Roussellier offered a broad treatment of French liberalism between 1918 and 1958. That liberalism found a shelter for its values—autonomy, impartiality, pluralism, and a sense of the public interest—in the service of the state. Its deep constitutionalism was, however, threatened by mass politics and other political parties and its values were consequently seriously eroded, not to mention the tendency to blame liberalism for the
faults of interwar democracy. Now, again, liberalism is making a partial political comeback through the re-emergence of judicial politics and decentralization.

Jan Müller, who co-organized the workshop, examined cold war liberalism through the eyes of Karl Popper, Raymond Aron and Isaiah Berlin. They evinced an irrational commitment to rationalism and saw liberalism—as ideology and as mentality—as a way of avoiding the violence that pervaded Europe. Liberalism’s predilection for reason was dualist: it both courted control over human circumstances and tried to avoid control over individuals. This was no liberalism of vitality or energy, though, but one of measured accountability and purposiveness.

Lastly Henk de Velde drew attention to the demise of liberalism as a powerful political movement. On the continent, its strength had always been in its juridical constitutionalism and in its advocacy of individual freedom. The Dutch case demonstrated that liberalism thrived as long as it was possible to separate state and civil society, while other parties were more successful in mobilizing their members for the challenges of mass politics. Dutch liberalism developed a sober, rationalist and laissez-faire image, somewhat conservative and commercial, and individualism acquired negative connotations.

The workshop was considerably enlivened by those who commented incisively on papers: Marc Stears, Raffaella Baritono, Cecile Laborde, and Elizabeth Frazer, and a number of graduate students. The sessions ended with a roundtable, and a promise of more to come. In part two of the workshop, planned for next year in central Europe, we will continue to explore issues such as the reaction of liberalism to the onslaught of anti-liberal and illiberal ideologies in the twentieth century; and to what extent non-liberal ideologies have genuinely assimilated liberal arguments.

The Europaeum has agreed to support a second, follow-up, workshop under its research group support scheme, planned for spring 2005.
Germany and the Atlantic Europe

German foreign policy needs to change again, argues CHRISTIAN HACKE. It must go back to its key role as mediator.

The close alliance with France against the Anglo-American Iraq diplomacy has come back to haunt German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Traditionally, German foreign policy rested on two equal pillars. One is the firm alliance with the United States, the other European integration. The Chancellor deliberately relinquished this concept in favor of shifting emphasis to the second, the European pillar. Unfortunately, this did not even happen because of a thoughtful strategy, but resulted from campaign improvisation. Hence, it was easy for the French to take Germany in tow, pursuing their own interests.

Better sooner than later, Germans as well as Europeans in general need to make a big decision—and stick with it. They have to choose between two competing scenarios of Europe’s future. On the one hand, there is the vision of an “Atlantic Europe”; on the other hand, there is the vision of a “Neo-Carolingian Europe.”

The “Atlantic Europe” builds on the Anglo-Saxon “special relationship” and the idea of an Atlantic civilization of common values and common history. It is forcefully expanding to the East, led by Great Britain, Spain, and Poland, who explicitly welcome America’s stabilizing dominance on a regional and global level. Because of the Bush administration’s style and America’s increasing superiority, however, this transatlantic alliance has a more and more unipolar character. Today, Germany no longer has an important role in this “Atlantic Europe”—except maybe the role of the troublemaker.

The “Neo-Carolingian Europe” envisions a Europe led by France, supported by Germany and Russia. This is a French dream come true: A unified Europe, where Paris alone calls the shots, establishing itself as a counterweight to American world supremacy. However, there is an important difference to classic balance-of-power logic: as a free rider, this Europe would still benefit from American protection in matters of security and global stability. Not surprisingly, this model meets harsh criticism in Washington and Central and Eastern Europe, but also in some parts of Western Europe.

The contrast between these two visions for Europe’s future became painfully obvious during the Iraq crisis. Hence, Donald Rumsfeld’s gleeful remark about a conflict between “Old Europe” and “New Europe” is not so far from the truth. In fact, these competing visions signify a twin schism of the West: between the US and Western Europe as well as within Europe itself. If the men responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11 intended to divide the West, they have succeeded.

The two visions clash without any room for compromise. Hence, some optimistic observers’—such as Jürgen Habermas—conclusion the Iraq crisis was a catalyst for further that advances in European integration, is illusory. Even if all the member states could muster up the will for political reform, the fundamental disagreement would continue. Accordingly, Europe’s “new independence”, which Paris and Berlin postulate, is not based on facts but rather on wishful thinking. The cherished and often cited “European family” is increasingly dysfunctional, with every member acting on its own, often erratically. It is a family that would embarrass even Ozzy Osbourne.

In past decades, the process of European integration was moving ahead without the need for a unifying enemy. Now, however, French and Germans seem to paint the US as an antagonist in order to solidify a European identity while simultaneously camouflaging the democracy deficit at the heart of the European project. But as the “Vilnius 10” and the “Letter of the Eight” prove, criticism of America’s foreign policy does not make an independent European foreign and security policy. Integration does not come from spite alone.

Europe is no alternative to the transatlantic partnership, but remains an integral part of it. He who tries to unite Europe against the US will divide it—that is one of the lessons from the Iraq crisis. Furthermore, the Europeans will be unable to achieve a lasting stabilization of Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe without or against the United States—just as they failed at pacifying the Balkans in the 1990s. And because of its geostrategic position in the heart of Europe, the accession of Germany’s eastern neighbors to the EU and NATO is in Germany’s economic and security interest.

This allows for only one conclusion: a future Europe must be an Atlantic one, deeply rooted in the common Atlantic Civilization of Europe and the United States. Beyond the disagreements of day-to-day politics and diverging perceptions of particular issues, this common ground remains and needs to be cultivated.

The consequences for German policy are easy to grasp. Germany used to play the role of a dual mediator. German leaders mediated between European and American interests, but also between French and British interests. In the future, there might also be a need for a mediator between Western and Eastern European interests. No country is better equipped to master this task than the Federal Republic—history, geography, and political and economic weight all come together. However, the most important assets for such a mediator are reliability and the trust of others. By siding so clearly with France, the Schröder administration gambled away both. It is paramount that Germany regains the lost trust and moves back to the center, seeking balanced relations to the US, France, and other European powers.

This is a summary of the European Lecture delivered by Professor Hacke of Bonn University at Leiden last November. It is available in full on the web site.
Europe and America have more that unites them than divides them, argues WIM VAN DER DOEL.

At the brink of the US-led War against Iraq, two European scholars Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, published an article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, hailing the anti-war demonstrations in several European capital as the true European renaissance.

Habermas and Derrida urged us not to forget two dates, “The day on which the newspapers communicated to their dumbfounded readers the oath of loyalty to Bush that the Spanish Prime Minister had extended to the pro-war European governments behind the backs of their EU colleagues. The day of February 15, 2003, when the demonstrating masses in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris, reacted to this coup.”

According to Habermas and Derrida, Europa has different values to those of the United States. For them, Europeans share the believe in the neutrality of authority, embodied in the separation of church and state; a trust in politics rather than the capitalist market; an ethos of solidarity in the fight for social justice; high esteem for international law and the rights of the individual’ and support for the leading ‘organizational’ role of the state.

Many Europeans will agree with Habermas and Derrida. They will also agree with the eighteen-century ideas of the American founding father and first Secretary of the U.S. Treasury department, Alexander Hamilton. In one of the Federalist papers he called Europe ‘the Mistress of the World’, and he wanted the European powers to be more humble in world affairs. ‘Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States [...] concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world.’

If one inter-changes the words ‘European’ and ‘American’ and if one replaces ‘Americans’ with ‘Europeans’ and ‘the thirteen states’ with ‘the European Union’, then one gets a clear and correct definition of the ideas of many Europeans and many European political leaders. If from the 18th century anti-Europeanism defined the American world view, in the 21st century modern anti-Americanism seems to be the force creating a European identity - at least according to Habermas and Derrida.

Habermas and Derrida were not alone in proclaiming a deepening rift between Europe and the United States. Dominique Moisi, directeur adjoint of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, writes about growing differences between both sides of the Atlantic. Americans worry about rogue states and WMD, while Europeans debate food safety and the ecological future of the world.

A new Europe is emerging, symbolized more by the successful Airbus industry than the Brussels bureaucracy. ‘In a world of multiple identities and multiple cultures, Europeans are increasingly aware of their “European-ness”, according to Moisi. ‘And one way for them to define their identity is to distinguish themselves from the US.’

According to the British historian, Anthony Smith, the idea of a European identity is pure fiction without a collective identity. ‘In the European context, the only way in which a truly united Europe could emerge is through the slow formation of common European memories, traditions, values, myths’, he wrote in 1995. And these common memories, value and myths simply did not exist in the modern Europe: ‘there are no overarching shared memories, myths and symbols which can unite Europeans, apart from the unusable ideas of medieval Christendom or imperialism.’

Another British historian, Tony Judt, also wrote in 1995 that the only thing Europeans shared was ‘a sense of their divisions. [...] Drawing distinctions among and between themselves has been one of the defining obsessions of the inhabitants of the continent’, wrote Judt in his essay on Europe called A Grand Illusion?.. Within Western Europe there were enormous differences between North and South and within Europe as a whole, a deep rift between East and West: ‘The countries west of the Elbe and Leitha rivers have for a long time been Europe, whereas the lands east are always, somehow, in the implied process of becoming. According to the two British historians, Europa as a political or cultural entity did not exist.

Despite the ideas of Smith and Judt, many Europeans discovered in the years after the Cold War that Asia did not start at the River Elbe, as Konrad Adenauer once famously said. The countries of the former Communist bloc in fact had a history
TransAtlantic troubles

and a culture which were closely related to that of the countries of Western Europe. The people of Western and Eastern Europe shared fundamental values, although not all realized this. Former Czech president and writer, Vaclav Havel speaking about common European values and identity to European parliament in 2000, believes that European identity is so obvious only a few realise it exists. ‘My entire background was probably so self-evidently European that it never occurred to me to think of it that way, nor did I deem it important to call it European, or to probe into whether my thoughts are to be associated with the name of a continent’. According to Havel, ‘the same seems to be true of most Europeans: they are intrinsically European, but they are not aware of it.’

For Havel it was clear what the values were which bound the Europeans together: ‘respect for the unique human being, and for humanity’s freedoms, rights and dignity; the principle of solidarity; the rule of law and equality before the law; the protection of minorities of all types; democratic institutions; the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers; a pluralist political system; respect for private ownership and private enterprise, and market economy; and, a furtherance of civil society’.

But was Havel’s definition not just one of the common European values, but those of the entire Western world? One could not deny that not only Europe but also the United States were a product of the Enlightenment. President George W. Bush during a speech at the University of Warsaw on June 16, 2001, stated that Europe and the US were ‘products of the same history, reaching from Jerusalem and Athens to Warsaw and Washington. We share more than an alliance. We share a civilization. Its values are universal, and they pervade our history and our partnership in a unique way.’

It took a long time before the idea of the West emerged, and it took even longer before it was deemed necessary to form a Western alliance. At the end of the 19th century, British politicians realised the desirability of their policy of splendid isolation had come to an end. They started to dream of a transatlantic Anglo-Saxon alliance, which never emerged – with the exception of Cecil Rhodes, who created at Oxford University his famous scholarships to strengthen such transatlantic bonds.

During the First World War, the famous American journalist Walter Lippmann called for the formation of an Atlantic Community but without much success, with the US becoming only an associated but not an allied power on the side of Britain and France. In the 1930s Fascism and National-Socialism challenged the West, but no alliance was formed. Even during the Second World War Franklin Roosevelt preferred to do business with Stalin than with Churchill. Under pressure from the Soviet Treaty, the West formed an alliance: NATO. At the signing of the NATO treaty, the Belgian prime minister Paul-Henri Spaak spoke about ‘an act of faith in the destiny of Western civilization’, while according to the British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, the West had become ‘a cohesive organism, determined to fulfil its great purpose’.

Now the Cold War is over, but still the West is challenged. The process of globalization creates opportunities, but also problems. Those living in a pre-modern world consider the West responsible for poverty, lack of political rights, and the demise of traditional values and way of life. Fundamentalist terror networks want to attack the West for its dominance in the world, its support for Israel and its support for corrupt regimes. Technological developments may empower terrorists with new and more destructive weapons. A new attack in the 9/11 mode with conventional, chemical, biological or (semi) nuclear weapons, only seems to be a matter of time.

In such a world, the United States and Europe cannot live without each other. American military power is enormous, but American political influence in the world rather small. To secure the long-term interests of the US (and the West), to secure the spread of democracy, human rights and the market economy throughout the world, the US needs a partner. The most obvious partner is Europe, which has influence in the world, is economically powerful and shares with the US the Western values.

Europe on its own cannot protect against the dangers of the modern world. To build a Europe on the basis of anti-Americanism as Habermas and Derrida seem willing to do, is not only wrong, since it denies the existence of common Western values, it is also dangerous. President Bush spoke true words in Warsaw, when he declared: ‘When Europe and America are divided, history tends to tragedy. When Europe and America are partners, no trouble or tyranny can stand against us’. It is a pity he did not act accordingly afterwards.

This is an edited version of the inaugural lecture of Professor van den Doel at the occasion of his acceptance of the professorship of Contemporary History at Leiden University on March 12, 2004
In a global age, leading western universities have an ethical duty to reach out and make partnerships to fight for global justice, poverty and the environment argues MARY ROBINSON

I am convinced that if the divides in our world between North and South, rich and poor, religious and secular, us and them, are to be bridged, then we need to give more emphasis to a values-led or ethical approach to national and international policy-making which would draw on the international human rights framework.

I also feel strongly that we need to engage and involve a wider range of constituencies in the work of building bridges of understanding and shared responsibility. There is a clear case for involving universities in a very direct way. After all, the opening words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights describe it as

“...a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms”.

And yet, over 50 years later, the majority of people in our grossly divided world are completely unaware of their rights and in no position to assert them. There is a gap: one which universities can help to fill. The new project I am currently developing – the Ethical Globalization Initiative – seeks to encourage innovative thinking on how to bridge such divides.

The theme of your conference New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks, recalls to mind some of the challenges we faced within the UN as we worked to develop, through the Secretary-General’s UN reform program, deeper engagement and partnership with the private sector and wider civil society to achieve the organization’s objectives. During my time as High Commissioner, I took a number of steps to develop new partnerships for human rights. I worked, for example, with the business sector to promote good corporate citizenship through the UN Global Compact and other initiatives, and I encouraged the World Bank to view the human rights framework as offering valuable tools for empowering grass roots groups to tackle poverty.

We were acutely aware of the potential risks involved in developing public-private partnerships, risks both to the integrity and independence of the UN and to the perception that such partnerships could be seen as shifting established responsibilities for implementing public goods from governments to non-governmental actors. But as I was leaving the UN last September, I felt that these risks could be managed. We had only begun to scratch the surface of where partnerships in support of human rights could be fostered with other “new actors”, such as academic institutions from all regions.

I would like to reflect here on the potential value of multi-stakeholder partnerships in addressing the complex challenges posed by the forces of globalization, forces which have left the majority of the world’s people feeling less secure and less able to control the decisions that impact directly on their lives.

I would also like to offer some thoughts on how universities might contribute to such partnerships, building on their own evolving responsibilities in a global age. For me, the single most important task of the university lies in teaching the skills which students need to be responsible citizens. But there is an added dimension which needs further exploration. To what degree and through what strategies and methods should institutions of higher education be involved in addressing the moral and ethical challenges of our day? Many universities are already doing a great deal and are actively working in collaboration with governments, international organizations and civil society to address problems at home and abroad. But I want to challenge the Europaeum association of universities to do even more in helping to define the role of universities in seeking to make globalization a positive force in the lives of all people.

For a start, having had this three-part discussion among yourselves, as a group of distinguished European universities, would you consider opening a similar dialogue with universities from the south? Just as there are exchange programmes for students in European universities, could more be done to promote exchanges with students from other regions as part of developing links between universities from the north and south?
Cultivating Humanity

Before going any further, I wish to stress how important I believe the contributions of scholars and academic institutions have been historically to the cause of human rights and social justice. For centuries the work of scholarship survived the passing of kings, tyrants, wars and plagues. It did so with difficulty and through the courage of many scholars, some of whom suffered in consequence. That historic commitment to academic freedom has in itself been an enormous contribution. Equally important, academia has shed light on the origins of rights which exist in every society. It has been instrumental in shaping the legal understanding of human rights at national, regional and international level. Perhaps most important of all, academia has provided a space for students to examine their own beliefs, to see the world through the eyes of others and to understand the importance of honoring the inherent dignity of every individual.

Yet despite these achievements, we should ask ourselves is it enough? In a global age, is it enough to teach law, if we are not also concerned with questions of global justice? At a time when different cultural perspectives and interpretations of religious beliefs are locked in ideological battle, is it enough to value the study of philosophy, if it is not informed by current ethical considerations in our divided world? At the start of a new century, is it enough to have amassed more knowledge than at any previous time in human history, without also giving proper attention to how that knowledge will be disseminated and used by and for others, particularly those who have been most excluded from the potential benefits of the technology and knowledge revolutions?

I was particularly interested in learning about the outcomes of your previous conference in which you explored the issues of new responsibilities for universities in a new age. The recommendations that emerged from your conference in Paris this past September were noteworthy in their attention to the underlying role of universities in preparing students for responsible citizenship. As Ben Okri put it in his presentation, a primary responsibility for universities is to set their students up for the “act of self discovery”. I have also heard this notion described as the role of the university in helping students acquire the “skills of freedom”.

Participants at your Paris meeting focused as well on “education for governance”, a helpful concept which underlines the need to prepare students for responsible citizenship and their role in promoting democratic values, human rights and good governance. These central duties of every university are summed up well by University of Chicago Professor Martha Nussbaum in the title of her book, Cultivating Humanity, where she highlights the growing difficulties of providing students with ethical and citizenship skills at a time when “marketable” skills are most in demand.

As you all know well, we find ourselves under pressure from an increasingly market oriented approach to higher education, with all its attendant dangers. A growing number of leading universities today receive sizeable portions of their annual income from non governmental sources. And in order to ensure that the fruits of scientific research can be optimally developed and distributed, universities have entered into new partnerships with multinational companies. I do not mean to suggest that these changes are inherently dangerous, but they are moving into uncharted territory and raise a range of ethical concerns which need to be addressed.

Changes in the global economy have pushed these developments forward. Universities face intense competition for the best students, for scarce resources and for international recognition. Universities recognize that these students are largely focused on pursuing subjects which they believe will be the most useful degrees for them as they seek employment after their studies, such as business, law and medicine.

According to research done in the US by James Engell and Anthony Dangerfield, fields of study such as computer and information services, health professions and business management increased in enrollment up to three fold between 1979 and 1994, while courses in the “humanities” such as philosophy, religion, history and languages all experienced steep declines in new students.

How will universities in Europe and around the world be able to “cultivate humanity” in their students, which you have identified as being a fundamental responsibility of the university, when the fields of study most dedicated to teaching these themes...
are rapidly losing ground to other disciplines? How will you be able to ensure that every student is exposed to what Professor Nussbaum has proposed as the basic skills needed for citizenship: first, an education that inculcates “the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s tradition for living what, following Socrates, we may call the examined life;”; second, a curriculum that provides students with a greater “knowledge of non-Western cultures, of minorities within their own, of differences of gender and sexuality”; and third, the cultivation of narrative imagination, or “the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story.”

The importance of preparing students to be responsible citizens is all the more important today given that the very concept of citizenship, of what it means to belong to a community and to be a responsible member of it, is being transformed by the forces of global communications, technology, markets and transportation.

These are difficult issues. They go to the heart of the university’s role in promoting respect for human rights. Fortunately, I believe students themselves are also beginning to recognize that there is a need for a renewed focus within the curriculum on issues of ethics and responsible citizenship. What has been encouraging for me as I have spoken with a wide range of students over the past eight months, mainly at universities in the US, is the growing awareness that professional courses are desperately in need of grounding in ethics and values, in the “skills of freedom”.

The Aspen Institute, one of the partners in the Ethical Globalization Initiative, has recently completed a report titled Where Will They Lead? MBA Student Attitudes about Business & Society 2003. This survey of student views in leading business schools in the US and Europe shows that ethical conduct in the workplace has become increasingly important to students. But many are concerned that their courses of study may either not address these issues adequately or worse yet, teach questionable values that may later contribute to mismanagement and failure to counter corporate fraud.

How can universities do more to engage their increasingly diverse students in questions of political and public life? How can these issues be not only debated in the classroom but also linked to solving real world problems facing the countries from which your students come? I believe part of the answer lies in drawing on common values, a common framework that applies to all people and a common set of tools that all academic disciplines can use as a guide in addressing these challenges.

Human Rights

That common framework to which I refer is the body of international human rights standards that have been agreed by governments over the past 55 years, starting with the adoption by the UN of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Some of you will rightly remind me that your institutions already have faculties of law, history, political science, philosophy and anthropology with impressive records in teaching and research on the theory and practice of human rights. And you will likely point out that many of your universities have already taken steps to support students in other countries who are interested in benefiting from your programs.

But I would challenge you to consider whether the subject of human rights has perhaps remained for too long solely the domain of a committed but still relatively small group of lawyers, activists and academics. I would urge you to give thought to the further utility of human rights not only as expressions of shared values or as international legal standards, but also as policy making tools which could assist those charged with making complex decisions about global issues – whether in the areas of trade, development, the environment, security or public health, to name but a few.

This still relatively new concept of taking human rights outside their traditional academic home and applying them to other fields, particularly development and economics, is known as a “rights-based approach”. But to date it has been more rhetoric than reality, lacking in conceptual clarity, practical impacts and academic rigor. Many academics and practitioners remain to be convinced of the relevance of human rights approaches within other policy frameworks.

The new project I am developing – the Ethical Globalization Initiative – seeks to work with others in moving forward rights based approaches to policy making at the national and international level. Our aim is to be a promoter of good practices or model projects of how human rights approaches can produce results. We also plan to be a “chorus leader,” linking local activists and networks with academics and policy development, which together can produce the analysis and recommendations needed to influence decision makers at different levels in government, international organizations, the business sector and civil society.

To give an example, one of the issues to be tackled from a human rights perspective is health, access to life saving treatments and HIV/AIDS. One of the first projects we are
developing, in cooperation with leading African Aids bodies is to reduce women’s vulnerability and to combat stigma in the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. We hope to build greater understanding among African leaders and AIDS experts that the disease could be more effectively addressed by emphasizing the extent to which it is also a women’s rights issue both from the perspective of women as victims of the disease as well as primary caregivers for the sick and orphaned. As one slogan has put it: “The best investment in an AIDS vaccine is an investment in protecting women’s rights.”

To give another example, we are co-developing a new Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights. It aims to involve senior business leaders from multi-national corporations in a consultative process with different stake holder groups to define better the extent of business responsibilities for human rights, particularly in countries facing problems of extreme poverty and deficient governance. We plan to involve academics in this initiative with the aim of supporting businesses committed to promoting human rights and avoiding practices which may lead to rights violations, while recognizing – indeed emphasizing - that the primary responsibility for human rights protection remains with governments.

ESCR-Net, an international network on economic, social and cultural rights, which has brought together social movements and non governmental organizations working in human rights, development and the environment world wide. As it develops, it would benefit from a partnership with universities committed to bridging the divides and seeking to connect concrete local struggles for social justice with and mechanisms for advancing their rights.

Each of the constituencies EGI seeks to influence, from government leaders to business executives, from activists to academics, will need to see the issues we plan to address presented in a way that they recognize. Each will need to understand how human rights standards can be used to help make ethical decisions.

Principle Partnerships

The key to the success will be in shaping principled partnerships which can bring together groups which may have diverging views but which are committed to using human rights as a shared framework for solving real world dilemmas.

I was interested to read about the new partnership recently launched by two of the founding universities in the Europaeum association Leiden and Oxford, which aims to provide future leaders in industry and government with the tools to operate more effectively in the politically, legally and culturally complex system of Europe. This new initiative exemplifies the role universities can and should play in helping business and government leaders work more effectively together.

I conclude by stressing again that despite the risks, partnerships are in my view the only way that global challenges such as HIV/AIDS, extreme poverty and environmental change, to name only three, will be effectively addressed. In many respects, the future of governance lies in making partnerships work.

Universities have a central role to play in making sure that partnerships are not only effective but based on sound principles. You are well placed to be an objective mediator of political and economic disagreements. You can ensure that decisions about complex issues are made on the basis of sound analysis. And you can help see to it that the viewpoints and concerns of those who have been marginalized are heard when decisions are being made which impact their lives.

I would welcome the involvement of the Europaeum association of universities in the development of the Ethical Globalization Initiative and I look forward to hearing your views on how the ‘doing’ of human rights can contribute to the success of principled partnerships.

This is an edited version of a lecture delivered at a Europaeum conference on the Future of European Universities, New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks, at the University of Bonn, Germany on 20 June, 2003.
European Universities must reach out and help to safeguard democracy and bridge the divides that mark our new age of globalisation, alongside the more traditional roles in imparting knowledge and skills preparing people for work, and carrying out research. This was a key message that emerged from the third international Experts Conference of the Europaeum Project on the Future of European Universities, held at Bonn University on June 20th–21st, 2003, under the title New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks.

A number of significant new challenges from European Universities were put before the 50 experts drawn from a wide range of organisations and institutions, including the European Commission, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Higher Education Policy Institute, UK, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the 25 graduate students drawn from the eight Europaeum partner universities.

The FEU project is supported by Daimler Chrysler AG Services based in Berlin. The Bonn event was the third and final conference following events in Berlin (2001) and Paris-Sorbonne (2002). A full report is in preparation.

**Critical thinking**

The first challenge, set one of Europe’s leading business figures, Herr Gerd Schulte-Hillen, then Chairman of the Supervisory Board Bertelsmann, who also sat on its Foundation, asked universities to produce students that ‘were obviously well trained, that were international and mobile, but who were also critical thinkers’. This matched the ambitions of senior university and student representatives. Interestingly, though, this diverged from the more utilitarian aims expressed by government representatives. For example, in the words of Dr Uwe Thomas of the German Federal Government, universities must aim to produce ‘more trained people with the right skills that met the demands of society and government’.

**Advocacy**

A second democratic challenge placed on top European universities was to serve as the ‘home of unpopular causes’, and to play a key role of advocacy on behalf of civil society. In the words of Dr Avi Primor, now Vice-President at Tel-Aviv University, a former Israeli Ambassador, universities today, more than ever, have a critical role in advocacy, a role essential to modern democratic life. Universities are at the forefront of civil society, and must do what others don’t do, and we must do it very boldly,” he said. “We must put the counter arguments, the difficult arguments, the unpopular arguments and we must produce space for this to happen. The media can’t be relied on to do that. Political parties can’t be relied on to do that. Dissident individuals can do it, but they need the space.”

**North-South Bridge**

The third challenge was for universities to reach out and ‘bridge the divide’ between the top universities in the West and those struggling in the developing world. As Mary Robinson, former UN Commissioner for Refugees, told the conference: “You’re comfortable; you have the resources. You must reach out particularly to the South, particularly to the less developed universities. Make fresh partnerships.”

**Education Community**

Finally, top universities were also urged to reach out to local schools and challenged to work with other, less-advantaged universities with potential, to aid them to improve and raise standards. “If the schools get it wrong, or are ill-equipped, or under-funded, or do not attract the right level of teachers because of lack of prestige, then it makes the work of universities very much more difficult”, Lord (Claus) Moser, a Government education advisor and a former Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, told the Conference. Participants agreed that every university should consider adopting some schools. This was easy to do, as the schools are nearby, and some current students will have come from there. So professors and teachers would be able to go ‘back and forth’ between schools and universities.

For more information please see [www.europaeum.org/projects](http://www.europaeum.org/projects) or contact the Europaeum’s Secretary General, see page 35
Facing up to these tough challenges, the gathering of experts and graduate students used the conference to deliberate on the challenges and produced a number of core recommendations and suggestions:

**Nurturing a Laptop Culture**
Leading universities need to promote awareness and use of websites and laptops to enhance teaching and learning, which could be summarised as every student a laptop, every professor a website to match the prevailing culture of most American universities. The recent Europaeum Survey of ICT Usage in Universities confirmed that professors themselves wished for more training to help them make better use of the benefits of the Internet. Universities must continue to work hard to build up facilities of the kind that students expect. This would involve using websites to provide details of lectures, causes, notes – as well as web discussion groups on specific research themes, and providing lists of experts. However, universities must also recognise the differences and demands of ICT in different disciplines, and must strive to develop an integrated approach of both traditional and electronic methods and instruments of teaching, research and publishing.

**Transparency in Fundraising**
The Conference committed itself to work for tax benefits (on a European level) for donors to higher education, following US examples. Participants recognised the paramount need today to raise external funding and incentives should be built into the system. Universities should also, however, ensure ethical scrutiny of their fundraising activities. Universities should aim for diversity in their resources, so that they have the clear ability to say no if required.

**Respecting Cultures**
Universities have a duty to respect all cultures – as it was agreed that is what a university ethos is all about. But they must promote none specifically. However, neither culture cannot be taught in a relative vacuum. This must be done critically, contextually, positively, carefully. This involves a return to the spirit of the Medieval universities, where much time was spent pondering or disputing the spiritual-cultural, the religio, as they referred to it, a core modern universities seem to have sidelined, neglected or even ignored.

**Promoting University Pride**
Universities were urged to work harder to tell the government that they were great and significant institutions. The conference agreed universities needed to defend themselves and to forego polite arguments following some 20 years during which they have been undervalued and underfunded by governments across Europe. Universities today were playing their full role in the new society, they were critical to economic development especially in the era of globalisation, and to improve the quality of life. Successful societies are those which have successful thriving universities. Universities must make their case for more funding to allow governments to prioritise their case over other worthy cases. In short, Universities, today must, more than ever, in the words of Bob Marley, ‘Stand up for their Rights’.

**Building the New Europe**
Universities must play their full role in the new Europe. They must build bridges, develop culture and ideas across frontiers, and provide leading young scholars and professionals, who will be tomorrow’s leaders, with a deep sense of and commitment to Europe. The Europaeum is well-equipped to do that. The conference noted that there was strong support for the aims and ambitions of the Europaeum from the European Commission. Dr Guy Haug of European Commission Higher Education Directorate revealed plans for a new EC Erasmus Mundus programme, which would provide support particularly to reach out to leading international universities and to develop productive exchange programmes.
MARIE CHARPENTIER, was a student participant in the Future of European Universities Project. Students still believe the future is promising, she explains.

Along with two dozen other students, I had the pleasure of participating in the last two Europaeum conferences on the future of European universities, which took place at the Sorbonne in Paris and at the Rheinische Friedrich-Whilhelms-Universität in Bonn. Every university in the Europaeum network sent approximately two students, and I was representing the Sorbonne. Non-student participants in the conferences included academics, government representatives, representatives from majors firms, and other experts. The presence of students was meant to give a more practical tone to the debates. We were asked to share our experiences, give concrete proposals and generally to “bring down to earth” those teachers and experts who became too abstract or theoretical. Indeed, I think at times we managed to impress these types with some very basic remarks, despite the fact that they were looking for much more elaborate solutions.

The debates centered around the following main themes: globalisation, funding, knowledge transfer and the use of ICTs (Information and Communications Technologies), all in relation to European universities. Apart from the major public sessions, we also attended special student sessions in which we developed specific themes. For this article, I want to summarise the main points that were emphasized by students around these conferences.

First, we all agreed on the fact that the very “essence” of the university should be maintained. Universities are only one element of higher education and their concerns are far different from other academic institutions such as polytechnics or private schools. Despite their diversity, universities have a common aim: to provide students not only with knowledge but also with the capacities necessary for problem-solving and critical thinking. One could say that they create free-thinking human beings before they create doctors, lawyers or teachers. This characteristic is even more valuable at a time when knowledge is widely accessible in libraries and on the Internet.

This leads us to ICTs, one of the main themes of the conferences. We all agreed on the necessity to develop the use of ICTs in teaching and research. We would be especially glad to see our universities develop their websites so that we could access easily administrative and practical information (such as course listings, timetables, university organisational charts and maps, telephone and e-mail directories, etc). In spite of the fact that students can handle perfectly the use of a computer without any training, we all agreed that computer training should be made accessible by universities. This could be very useful for students individually, but especially for science and doctoral students as it could facilitate the sharing of information and research results. ICTs have demonstrated their effectiveness as tools for creating education and research networks; why not ensure a university environment where the benefits from these tools are maximized?

Another point we focused on was funding. Money cannot be, in any way, a selection criterion. To our mind, funding must originate first from the state, second from the students themselves and third, from private firms. For us, the largest part of university funding must derive from the state, which excludes any
all their students

US-type (characterised by enormous tuition fees) student funding. It is evident that corporate funding is becoming inevitable. Yet we were all adamant that, whatever the source of funding, universities must keep their freedom and independence from economic interests. This is indispensable, especially for as research is concerned: results must be influenced by the firms who finance the research. This is why corporate funding should be tightly controlled. There should be strong and transparent rules regarding what the company is allowed and not allowed to do within the parameters of its role as a source of funds.

In particular, students proposed that governments provide universities with a model “good funding” contract. Some students also pointed out that certain subjects would not be as easily sponsored by firms as others. Most firms will be more willing to fund targeted research, which offers better financial spin-offs in the short-term than broader “blue-sky” type research. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that there are two ways for firms to fund education and research: by paying nominal tuition fees for certain students selected in advance, and/or by funding education or research programmes. We accepted both possibilities.

Another proposal we made was that universities should spend their money more effectively. Some students came up with the idea that, in order to save money, universities could pool their research schemes so that several different laboratories were not working on the same problem. This proposal was dismissed in the public session on the ground that competition between laboratories and departments from different universities is always positive. But it could, perhaps, be examined, at least for certain subjects.

As for globalisation, it appeared to us that this phenomenon is not as much a problem for European universities as it is for universities in other parts of the world: there has always been some form of student exchange between European universities, at least on an individual basis. We were confident that the European Credit Transfer Scheme (ECTS) would greatly help exchanges, and we also appreciated the fact that many joint-courses were being set up between universities. European diversity, for us, as reflected in different cultures, languages and teaching traditions, is a strength for the future, not a weakness – especially compared to the United States.

Studying in a foreign country allows one to confront ideas, methodologies and ways of thinking. It is always highly enriching, both on an individual and collective level. Stakeholders (students, universities, government and other decision-makers) should build upon this strength to construct the future of European universities.

By the end of the conferences, it was clear that the future of European universities was presented with more opportunities than risks. The challenge will be to develop the opportunities and to avoid the risks, having identified them.

As for the other side of the event - the less formal one, we were all happy to exchange ideas and experiences with teachers and experts all along the debates, breaks and lunches. Other very pleasant activities included visiting local open-air inns, salsa dancing in Latino bars and having a candle-lit picnic on the banks of the Rhine river – an unforgettable experience!

Speaking for the students, I must say that we had a wonderful time in and around the conferences. In truth, all of us are still developing the themes of globalisation, networks and ICTs in a simple way: by sending frequent e-mails to each other!

Mme. Charpentier received her doctorate on the problems of digital broadcasting and regulation in the UK, in November 2003.
The fight against terrorism must not break the process of development, argues RALF DAHRENDORF. Here he outlines his vision of a smart development policy

The attempt to explain dramatic, specific events, in general terms, may be tempting. It is also difficult, and, in some ways it is always dubious. At a conference in Germany there were at least two dozen explanations of what happened in that school, when a boy ran amok and killed many pupils and teachers in 2002. In Erfurt I disappointed a large audience by saying that little can be said about such an event by way of explanation. It is in the first instance, horrible, but is also an event for which there may be no particular explanation beyond the motives of the individuals involved. It may be very misleading to argue that saying this is all about relations between parents and children, or about changes in the curriculum and about schools or about the anxieties of a whole generation. Even the term ‘running amok’ is, after all, rather older than this particular event.

Now terrorism, as a rule, is not about the actions of one individual. Terrorism is a more organised form of violence, and it involves groups. A degree of caution is needed as we try to explain the 11th of September 2001, or indeed, terrorism in a more general sense. For one thing there are many different kinds of terrorism. Consider for example the Red Army Faction or Baader-Meinhof terrorism in Germany in the 1870s. It was intended to shake the institutions of the country. But it was most definitely not intended to lead the terrorists themselves into the Government of the time. The intent was to shake the institutions without actually taking them over. For that reason it was intrinsically hopeless, and intrinsically suicidal, in the sense that for those who perpetrated the acts of terrorism, the end result could only be their own end.

There are other examples. In the dreadful years in Northern Ireland, there was a different kind of terrorism—almost rational, if that word is permissible in connection with such acts of violence. Quite clearly, the Irish Republican Army intended, and still intends, for Northern Ireland to join the south in a state, which in the end, comprises the whole island of Ireland. And so as Ulster, was left out of the initial terrorism-based independence of the Republic of Ireland, they are trying to destabilise the region, to make it non-viable, and then to create a new unified country.

Palestine, in a curious way, is somewhere in between. Most Palestinian terrorists know full well that whatever they do they are not likely to gain control of the whole region. There are not only the suicide bombings, but there is a general kind of terrorism which again is intrinsically suicidal. The objective is to mobilise the world community to support the creation of a state of Palestine. At the same time, they will destabilise Israel. It is an interesting and still unresolved question where this kind of picture belongs in relation to the 11th of September. Certainly the actual acts of terrorism belong to the intrinsically suicidal side of terrorism, rather than a category of clear, definable, objectives.

Now I mention all this not to dwell on it, much less to offer some general explanation of all these types of terrorism. We must reflect on the set of conditions which exists in many places, that gives rise to active resentment and lends itself to the ruthless mobilisation of people by leaders whose main interest may well be their own power. Following September 11th, the brilliant journalist and author, Michael Ignatieff said:

“One of the unacknowledged underlying causes of the September 11 events was the coincidence of globalised prosperity in the Imperial world with distant aggression in the states that achieved independence from the colonial empires of Europe in the 1960s. The collapse of state institutions has been exacerbated by urbanisation, by the relentless growth of lawless shanty towns, that collect populations of unemployed or underemployed men who can see the promise of globalised prosperity on the TV and in every café, but cannot enjoy it themselves. In states like Pakistan, where the state no longer provides basic services to the poorest people, Islamic parties, funded from Saudi Arabia, step into the breach, providing clinics, schools, and orphanages, where the poor receive protection at the price of indoctrination in hatred.”

This is a very thoughtful and complex statement with strong implications. The phenomenon which Ignatieff describes, is, of course, not confined to Pakistan. There is the extraordinary story of the British so-called “shoe bomber”, Richard Reid, a story which is very close to what Ignatieff describes in more general terms. The young man born in South London to poor parents who, split up the mother remarrying, and the father spending more time in prison than out. The young man grew up on the streets of London and therefore grew almost automatically into a career of petty crime, and on to serious crime. Initially, he is sent to youth institutions until he ends up for longer terms in prisons, where nobody cares about him. In prison there is a Muslim cleric who looks after some of these lost criminal souls, and persuades many of them that the particular religious faith which he has to offer will be inclusive. He does this not just by words, but also by looking after their physical needs and their well-being generally. It is very interesting that in the prisons of London, the priests of other denominations are virtually absent. It is only the Muslims who...
look after prisoners, and so it is perhaps not surprising that many of them come out feeling that they have at last found a community. This was the case of Richard Reid. For a while he was a regular attendee at a particular Mosque, had many friends, and seemed to be going straight. But when that world appeared insufficiently radical, he drifted to the violent end of the group which he had joined, and from that violent end, into the organisation of which we now know that he was a minor, but potentially quite effective, member. In the life of one individual, it is the story which Ignatieff describes as characteristic of people in quite a number of countries. Behind this, is, in my view, a systematic social phenomenon to which we have not paid enough attention.

When Kenneth Galbraith had ended his time as Ambassador to India, he gave a brilliant series of lectures about the nature of poverty. In these he presented an argument which is as valid today as it was then. He said the traditional cycle of poverty (among people who have less than one dollar a day to spend) was also viable in India. People have grown used to living in this way — they do live in it. It may not have been much of a life, but it has become viable for a very long time. And then he describes, very impressively, a dramatic change. Suddenly, a few youngsters decide not to drink or use the goat’s milk but to take it to the nearest market place and sell it. Suddenly people begin to sell some of the food which they were traditionally eating, and two things happen: the food balance in the village is disturbed with quite considerable effects; and the money they get, though it isn’t much, is used in Galbraith’s case — to buy a transistor radio. In other words, they become part of the modern world where images and words of hope are introduced into what seemed an eternal cycle of poverty. The next step is somehow to be a part of this American world, of the modern world where images and words of hope are introduced into what seemed an eternal cycle of poverty. That is the story that it is the return of some deep historical antagonism.

What we are faced with now, in this new type of security problem, is not the return of history. It is our own world at a point of development at which people have very little resistance to the Muslim priest in Richard Reid’s prison, or to others who mobilise the vulnerable.

Explanations are not excuses. Nor would I ever claim that what I am describing here is inevitable. I am a Liberal and therefore not a Hegelian. There is no historical necessity which must lead to a period of terrorism. That is perhaps the central issue in connection with the subject of Third World poverty, terrorism, and sustainable development. How do we get people through the valley of tears without their running the risk, and the rest of us running the risk, of being mobilised by evil leaders?

We talk too easily about development because in fact it leads through a phase of extreme vulnerability: the vulnerability of individuals who have lost a traditional way of life and not gained a new one, the vulnerability of societies, and the vulnerability of the entire environment.

Suddenly one remembers, in the case of Britain, the economic history books about the early 19th Century, in what two great Economic historians called “the bleak age”, one remembers Dickens, and the description of England at the time of extreme vulnerability. The villages were no longer there and the cities did not have the sustaining character, nor structures which last and which one can live with over a long period. In this phase of extreme vulnerability, people are psychologically exposed. It is a phase in which it is very tempting for ruthless leaders to come and mobilise those who are lost. It is a specific modern phenomenon. That is also an important point to underline: Ernest Gellner always emphasised that if you look at violence in the world today, do not fall for the story that it is the return of some deep historical antagonism. He always insisted it was a specifically modern form of mobilisation of vulnerable people by ruthless leaders. What we are faced with now, in this new type of security problem, is not the return of history. It is our own world
In order to create conditions in which the vulnerability is minimised, we have to rethink our attitude to development. It is clear that terrorism has to be fought. But as a second line of action, it is necessary not to aggravate the risks that are involved in the process of development, and if possible, to create conditions which make terrorism unlikely. Security nowadays requires a new combination of military action and socio-economic action, and this new combination will well be one of the great themes of our time. In this case, we need social and economic development if we are to be able to cope with this period of extreme vulnerability.

Chris Patten, the European Commissioner, recently described this with an analogy to ‘smart bombs’ by saying we need a ‘smart development’ policy. We need an approach to the socio-economic development in the poorer countries of the world which is more thoughtful than it has often been in the past, and which above all, does not believe that once you have dislocated people, everything else will happen by itself.

What is a smart development policy? Let me make five points here. The first of these is that a Smart Development Policy is most definitely not just about money, and it is therefore never enough to pour money into situations in which we want to see effective development. We should really stop talking about Marshall plans for the poor countries which are at the threshold of development. The Marshall Plan was a very special plan, achieved with an effort after the Second World War, and it was most successful in countries in which you had a combination of a widespread and an unchallenged motivation to make the effort oneself to move forward, the memory of an infrastructure that had been destroyed by the war, and some sort of model which one was aspiring to achieve. The Marshall Plan in Europe was only a modest success – and of course one extreme example of the modesty of the success was post-war Britain, and all the problems which contemporary Britain in the 1960s and 70s had inherited from the class system. The infrastructure was old but not destroyed, and there was no strong motivation to achieve a particular model. So pouring money into these situations, let alone calling it the Marshall Plan, does not solve the problem of motivating and training people to move forward to a modern economy and society. Much more careful targeting is necessary.

Secondly, the major task of any smart development policy is institution building. This is not a new idea any more. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international organisations, are well aware of this. Recent papers on strategic planning often include actions to deal with the social and economic causes of problems as part of the plan. This is not yet realised everywhere, but it is in quite a few places. A favourite blueprint for institution building is the book by Amartya Sen, ‘Development as Freedom’. The Nobel Laureate in Economics actually spells out the conditions which have to be guaranteed if we want to make progress and minimise vulnerability. Sen emphasises particularly the importance of political freedoms for a sustainable process of development. He has become famous for his thesis that it is very rare for there to be a true and long-term famine in areas in which there is full freedom of the press, which seemed a sort of strange thesis to us, and yet, it’s confirmed wherever one goes. If you look at Mali and the Kongo today there is no reporting of what goes on. In countries where people are literally starving or dying of diseases following on hunger, there is often a significant export of foodstuffs which benefits a small number in the ruling elite. Political freedoms are part of this institution-building process. They are what Sen calls economic facilities, infrastructure, social opportunities, education and transparency guarantees. Particular emphasis should be placed on a rule of law. I now believe that of all the institutions that have to be built, a non-corrupt, trusted legal system is possibly the most important, and it is one of the necessary conditions of smart development. Educating judges and giving them a position in which they command respect is certainly perhaps one of our first tasks. It occurs to me how important the contributions of Alexander Hamilton to the Federalist Papers of America were. He asked, not how many

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How do we get people through the valley of tears without their running the risk of being mobilised by evil leaders?

Prosperity will remove the lure of terrorism
divisions has the Pope but how many divisions do the judges have? What is their power? Why should anybody do what they say? How can we create good judges?

Thirdly, also following Sen, a smart social policy is needed for development. Sen calls it ‘protective security’ but he means ‘social security’. It is necessary, he says, to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. Now that is easier said than done, and it is little less than the demand for a welfare state in developing countries which, in all probability, they cannot afford. But an element of protective security, of not letting people fall through all nets, could quite easily become one of the key concerns of international organisations whether governmental or non-governmental. Certainly fixed institutional arrangements which achieve this and which build the care for the vulnerable into the system itself from an early point is part of the Smart Development Policy.

The fourth point is in some ways the simplest. We need examples of success, so that we can gain support, both at home and abroad, both among the rich and the poor, for a Smart Development Policy. Where do these examples of success come from? I have been involved in intensive discussions with Paddy Ashdown, now Lord Ashdown, who has taken on the job of High Representative for Bosnia, with very careful thought about how and whether Bosnia can be turned into a success story. The answer is, by establishing the rule of law. In my view, the critical country, if one looks at this from the European angle, is Turkey. If Turkey can become a success story, that will have a signal effect on many others in the region and beyond. Of course, Turkey and its history, over the last century, had a few good starts: it did have, precisely, the insistence on the rule of law in the Attaturk days, but we have left Turkey out of our European home. It is the most important single country in our vicinity if we want to show where it is possible to move forward to a sustainable, developed state, and move forward for a country with a large active Muslim element.

The fifth element of a smart development policy has to do with Europe. The record of the European Union in its development policy is mixed. It is, in some cases, a success story; it is, in other cases, a continuation of traditional relationships of member states with countries in the Third World. I believe the Europaeum Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten has the right attitude to things, for I am one of those who believes that there will not be a European military capability to hold its own with the United States for quite a long time to come. The relationship with the US and, indeed, the whole notion of the West is crucial for both the present and the future of freedom. A certain amount of division of labour is emerging. We all know that many leading Americans are impatient when it gets to the other side of the process of guaranteeing security, impatient, where we come to nation building, and perhaps even more impatient when we get to the socio-economic structures of institutions which have been talked about.

It would be quite helpful for many, and quite appropriate, if we in Europe consciously developed the ability to have and practise the Smart Development Policy, particularly addressed to the period of vulnerability. Will this do the trick? I started with a few sceptical comments about explanations, and I am bound to end with a sceptical comment about our ability to solve problems. There may be success stories and I hope there will be. There will also be other answers to the periods of vulnerability where we have a very special responsibility. One consequence of a period of vulnerability has always been migration. That is to say, people decide it takes too long for me to wait until my own country offers me the life chances which, if I go somewhere else, I can have, immediately or tomorrow. We must take migration seriously as a great compliment to us – as it was a great compliment to the United States when so many Europeans went in the nineteenth century. We would therefore make a dreadful mistake if we tried to stop it. We need an attitude to development which is conscious of the strains, of the frustrations, and of the possible consequences of this process.

Without such an attitude, we will simply not get the international security which we need, and want, and so it is worth much more thought, and much more hard work than we have given it: a Smart Development Policy that influences international security.
Why Europe needs a Constitution

Europe is poised to adopt a Constitution. KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS and STEPHEN WEATHERILL explain what this means and why the debate must continue.

It is plainly correct to diagnose a certain confusion about what to “do” with the EU, now that it has broken its bonds as a machine for the delivery of economic integration and has gradually accumulated state-like constitutional and institutional features, while performing ever wider functions. Fundamental questions about the nature, purpose and location of democratic legitimacy are attracting different types of response designed to cope with and, perhaps, restrict, halt or even reverse of power to European level. Several contributions to this collection emphasise the complexity of the current arrangements and, illuminatingly, express reservations not merely about whether that complexity can be dispelled, but also about whether it should be dispelled. Pragmatic simplification and piecemeal institutional reform may not now be treated as a sufficient outcome to the current process precisely because expectations have been pitched at constitutionally more exalted level, yet truly radical recasting of the nature of the system seems precluded by absence of a sufficiently explosive constitutional moment and an (associated) inadequate demand for such alteration among citizens and political elites. In tracking what might lie and what should lie between these extremes, our overwhelming anxiety is to emphasise the perils that lurk in a borrowing of State models that pays inadequate regard to the distinct needs and aspirations of the building of a European Union. It is this perceived risk is that to which our Conference project was explicitly directed – that the question floated in the Laeken Declaration whether “simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union” might be answered in tones and terms that too readily adopt existing models found in (some) States as the appropriate route to a new – but in fact old – constitutional Future for Europe. Were that to occur, the institutional and constitutional novelties that have served the European Union so well for so long would be quelled. And the compelling logic of the entity that is not itself a State, nor ambitious to become one, yet which transforms itself into a State, nor ambitious to become one, yet which transforms and improves the conduct and, indeed, the nature of its participating States would be shattered.

To offer a concrete example, if we ask whether the Commission, or at least its President, should be elected – and, if so, by whom – then we should proceed to think carefully about just what function we envisage for the Commission. The case for election is strong if one assumes the need for the Commission, or at least its President, to be validated according to some variant of the democratic processes normal in European States. However, the case is far less strong if one conceives of the Commission as responsible for performing defined tasks of management and administration, in which case it should be answerable for its ability to do the job effectively. Indeed requiring it to seek periodic popular support (in some forum or other) might divert it from doing its properly on behalf of the whole Union and lure it instead to satisfy powerful private or public interest groups. As a minimum the argument is in favour of wariness about arguments that assume the Union should be inevitably legitimated in the same way as States are legitimated: but so too in favour of wariness about arguments that assume that the fact that the Union is not a State is enough to dispose tout court of the need for elements of accountability. We can do much more in the terrain lying between these poles. And, after all, it is only the provisional that lasts.

But this cannot be permitted to regress to an argument by political and intellectual elites that we should proceed with “business as usual” in the European Union, however successful the prosecution of that business might have proved to be since the 1950s. None of our contributors make that case. Even where appreciative of the current arrangements and critical of both the feasibility and desirability of radical alteration, they seek active engagement with the pattern of the debate in the belief that the shaping of the Union cannot foreclose deliberation. This is where we have tried to make a contribution, in Oxford in late April 2003, and in this collection. In general we have tried to draw on national experience and expectation, as well as on national apprehensions and reluctance, but to do so overtly – to track what informs the debate about constitutional futures without making ill-judged or even unconscious assumptions rooted in national practice. It is probably inevitable that we shall borrow from national patterns, yet we must strive to borrow...
while thinking hard about the consequences of taking on loan models, concepts, symbols and even language that frequently should play distinct roles when transplanted from States to the EU. The Convention on the Future of Europe itself was deliberately and ambitiously constituted of interest groups reflecting a plurality of “Europees”. That vision of wider engagement deserves fulfilment.

Reflection on the nature, purpose and contested existence of a constitutional moment and, broader still, of a foundational myth cannot help but provoke. There might have been a period in which the reunification of Europe could have constituted a vibrant foundational myth (or, more accurately, a re-foundational myth).

Indeed we may have had a constitutional-moment in the making since fall the of the Berlin Wall, but, if so, it has indubitably run out of steam in the interim. Perhaps, however, all is not lost! As Bronislav Geremek remarked, since constitutional moments are constructed, along with the myths to which they give rise, why can they not be reconstructed post facto? An attempt to answer to this question leads to another question: who is this constitution for? Who have the stakeholders of constitutional moments been in the past? And would this diagnosis be relevant?

A first answer to the question “who is this constitution for?”: it is for the citizens of Europe. Historians astutely remind us that most constitutional moments have not been politically correct in this sense. Constitutions were usually written by the elite for the elite. This might tell us something about the risk of exaggerating the connections between State-building, constitutions and the existence of popular support when we survey the past. We cannot lightly take this route today. But we can reflect on the ‘demos problem’ in this context. An absence of a European demos is damaging to … what, exactly? To be sure it is damaging (but in a historical perspective not necessarily fatal) to a project that conceives of constitution-making in the EU as an exercise in building a (new and big) State on the conventional Western model. But it is less obviously damaging to projects that conceive of the EU as a framework within which to shape mutually reinforcing systems of governance, backed at European, State and regional level by varying (but potentially shifting) types of allegiance. This line of thinking may be enriched by portrayal of a European sense of identity rooted not in the traditional trappings of nationhood but instead in more diffuse notions such as respect for human rights, political accountability, solidarity and equality. And, more radical again, the absence of a European demos may be taken to deserve celebration and to clear the way to the elaboration of a more welcoming attitude to plural identities.

Second answer: the constitution is for the weak. Let us take the EU project to be a complement rather than a replica of its component nation state projects. Activists in transnational social movements join cosmopolitan lawyers in the belief that the rule of law in general and, even more so, Constitutions should be meant and designed above all for the protection of the weak. This may be seen as part of a fundamental insight about EU: that its most valued function may increasingly be that of empowerment. This means empowerment of those individuals who have a muffled voice domestically, of regions that have historically been crushed on the altar of the nation, of smaller or new Member States who for so many centuries have fallen prey to the European concert of nations. Accordingly, this new Europe proclaimed by a new constitution ought to be focused on social and civic inclusion within the Union and, from beyond current borders, on enlargement. And it should be seen as a process of addressing how best to secure effective and fair exercise of power in Europe, and not as a zero-sum game of distributing and re-distributing parcels of power to self-interested rival actors.

Third answer: it is for the rest of the world. This perspective would regard the constitution as asserting a collective European identity against, or at least vis-a-vis, the other. The other might be the United States. This is dangerously sharp-edged, and attracted inter alia Polish and British anxieties in our discussions: and yet perhaps, looking from West to East instead of East to West, Europe is already becoming America’s other. The other might be Islam. This was treated as chilling. The other might be Europe’s bloody past. Or the other might be globalisation, or at least the global power of multinational enterprises.

Whichever answer one prefers, and they are not mutually exclusive, the European constitutional process may come closer to its national precursors than many would have hoped or expected. In spite of the uniqueness of the Convention method, the Convention plainly fell far short of full and active engagement with the broader political and civic body of interested European citizens. From the perspective of promoting social inclusion and broader opportunities for empowerment, there were fine words but an increasing impression of the reassertion of the power of the big countries. And, on the external plane (beyond enlargement), the Convention felt introverted.

Nevertheless, the Convention stands for a freshness in constitutional modelling. There is still a chance that its influence may endure and tip the process into one of a truly historic magnitude as the post-Convention process develops. A Europe-wide debate may be entered – or, at least, one may anticipate the horizontal interpenetration of national debates. Philippe Schmitter’s advocacy of ratification of the new text across Europe on the same day offers one example of a concrete idea motivated by this ambition. By the end of the Convention this proposal had become a favourite among many Conventionists. There are, to be sure, many possible fresh and imaginative ideas that may use the Convention as a model and an encouragement to break the prevalence of the alienating closed-doors intergovernmental conference. And perhaps constitutional moments and foundational myths are after all best adorned and duly celebrated with hindsight.
The Iraq war exposed deep political divisions over the use of force. ADAM ROBERTS reviews the arguments and argues that the UN must still have a key role.

In the period since the Kosovo intervention in 1999, differences over the legitimacy of certain uses of force, and over doctrines related thereto, have been even more problematic than usual in international relations. The differences affect all regions of the world. Although the East-West divide largely closed with the end of the Cold War, Russian suspicion of what is perceived as US dominance and willingness to use force abroad remains, and is shared by many other states. The divide between North and South persists, and issues relating to the legitimacy of the use of force have become a major focus of contention.

Within the EU and NATO, the differences over the use of force are not just differences between governments that are supposed to be partners, they also have a strong societal aspect. The Iraq crisis of 2002–2003 exposed this dramatically. In both France and Germany, the official criticisms of the use of force were popular, and indeed in the German case appear to have been the result of Chancellor Schroeder’s electoral calculations. All this does not mean that Europeans are pacifists: as recently as 1999 European states had supported the NATO war over Kosovo, even though that did not have authorization from the UN Security Council. What it does mean is that Europeans are nervous about a war that appears to be a “war of choice” rather than a response to an urgent and ongoing crisis; are anxious about a use of force when the legal basis for it appears to be thin; and are generally distrustful of the judgement of the US government. Irrespective of the rights and wrongs of Iraq, there is a need for Europeans to conduct an honest debate about the legitimacy of the use of force in support of international principles and UN resolutions, and also about Europe’s response generally to the fact of US power.

It is improbable that the solution lies in a simple rejection of the US approach to the use of force. Indeed, the element of Gaullism in the French policy over Iraq may have encouraged, at least temporarily, a super-Gaullism in the United States: a belief that the state, at least in its US incarnation, is the supreme and enduring entity in international politics, that the United States now has a unique capacity to wage war effectively, and that international law and organization are of limited importance. The absence of a plausible and appealing concept of how Europe could unite to create an effective military rival to the United States confirms that rejectionism leads into a blind alley, undermining the multilateralism it is supposed to protect.

Any common European position will have to avoid two extremes: a policy of slavish support for whatever the US decides to do will not work, but nor will a view of Europe as a separate pole existing in rivalry to the US. Instead, a European position will have to encompass a firm but realistic emphasis on working through multilateral institutions, including the UN: multilateralism rather than multipolarity.

Any European position, if it is to command respect in the USA and elsewhere, will also have to encompass a clear recognition that there can be a place for the use of force in support of international principles and purposes, including in controlling the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. There are some signs of European willingness to unite around such principles. However, it is not so evident that European states could agree collectively that there can be occasions, such as Kosovo in 1999, when force may have to be used even...
the UN, the US and Iraq

without explicit UN Security Council support; and there is little sign of willingness to increase defence budgets.

Beyond the modest movement towards a common European position on security issues, can there be formal legal agreement, in Europe and also more generally, on the circumstances in which intervention is legitimate? Here, the indications are not propitious. Hard cases notoriously make bad law. They also make a bad basis for asserting that there is no law. The issues of humanitarian intervention and of pre-emption, and the prolonged crisis over Iraq, have all revolved around cases that are “hard” in the sense that they raise the question of whether force can be used in circumstances that go beyond self-defence and in which there may be no recent and specific authorization by the UN Security Council.

That the answers to this question have been messy, in the sense that they have failed to command universal assent, does not mean that international law and organization are dead. There is no prospect of general agreement to a new set of black-letter rules regarding the circumstances in which the use of force may be legitimate, nor regarding new institutions that might authorize force. However, this conclusion does not mean that there has been no clear direction to the events since the end of the Cold War, nor does it mean that there are no useful guidelines to be deduced from these events.

In a series of crises since the end of the Cold War, there has been some expansion of the rationales seen as justifying the use of force. The UN Security Council has authorized force in more situations than it did in the UN’s first forty-five years, and this has been largely accepted as within the Security Council’s competence.

An important, if more contentious, innovation has been the claim, made principally by the US and UK, that there can be a “continuing authority” from the Security Council to use force, and that, following the 1991 cease-fire, this provided the legal basis for major uses of force in Iraq up to and including the 2003 war. The concept has not been widely accepted. Some states have simply viewed the US-led military action in Iraq as unlawful. In addition, many respected international lawyers are sceptical about the concept. The opposition to any idea or practice of “continuing authority” has been strengthened by the fact that the particular application of this concept in the Iraq crisis in March 2003 was highly problematical, especially because it was based on doubtful intelligence and an absence of serious planning. Yet despite all this opposition, I have not yet seen a detailed and thorough critique of the concept of “continuing authority” as it has been advanced in the Iraq crisis.

As regards uses of force not specifically authorized by the Security Council, there has also been a degree of cautious advancement of the interlinked ideas that force may be used to implement the ends willed by the Security Council even if it could not agree on the means, and that it may on occasion be permissible to protect threatened people in urgent humanitarian crises. Regarding the law on self-defence, there has been recognition that actions by non-state entities can fall within the concept of “armed attack,” that a regime’s responsibility was engaged for its failure to prevent and punish acts of terrorism by a movement operating on its soil, and therefore an attack on that regime itself might in exceptional circumstances be permissible.

This expansion of rationales has been heavily dependent on particular contexts, and attempts to turn its innovative aspects into general doctrine have been strongly contested. Hence the conspicuous lack of support from states for either the doctrine of humanitarian intervention or the Bush doctrine of pre-emption. In both cases, these doctrinal innovations were often presented in a manner that paid insufficient attention to the continued value of the non-intervention norm. This norm remains fundamental to the conduct of international relations, and only in very exceptional combinations of circumstances may it have to yield to other norms and considerations.

The well-known weaknesses of the UN decision-making procedure relating to the use of force have remained serious in the post-Cold War era. They were already evident in the Kosovo crisis in March 1999, when the prospect of a Russian veto led the United States and allies to avoid even putting a resolution authorizing force before the Security Council. The weaknesses were even more evident in March 2003, when France indicated that it would veto a resolution authorizing force against Iraq. Never before has a major power, seeking to act militarily with the claimed purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions, faced the openly advertised prospect of veto by an ally. The crisis confirmed the conclusion that, if the UN is valuable in many of its roles, it can fail conspicuously in others.
Institutions outside the UN may on occasion be able to act, more or less convincingly, as validating authorities for decisions on the use of force. However, no other body commands the same degree of international legitimacy.

Any proposal for a union of democracies would run up against the objection that the Iraq crisis has exposed huge differences among democracies. Alliances and regional organizations such as NATO and the European Union have also been deeply divided over Iraq. Furthermore, their tradition of operating by consensus means that they are procedurally even less well equipped than the UN Security Council to take controversial decisions.

The UN therefore remains damaged but not destroyed, as one vehicle for reaching decisions on the use of force. However, no other body commands the same degree of international legitimacy. Any proposal for a union of democracies would run up against the objection that the Iraq crisis has exposed huge differences among democracies. Alliances and regional organizations such as NATO and the European Union have also been deeply divided over Iraq. Furthermore, their tradition of operating by consensus means that they are procedurally even less well equipped than the UN Security Council to take controversial decisions.

The debate over the rights and wrongs of the war continues, as does distrust of US decision-making and trepidation about involvement in a very difficult situation.

The continued significance of the UN as the pre-eminent vehicle for approving and coordinating international action, including certain uses of force, was indicated in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war by the passage of Security Council Resolution 1483, which resolved that the UN “should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance,” provided for the ending of sanctions, and recognized the role of the UK and the United States as occupying powers.

Thus, as in Kosovo in 1999, the UN, although it had earlier been unable to agree on a use of force amounting to war, could nonetheless agree on some main outlines of post-war policy, including through legitimation of current and future roles of external armed forces. In neither Kosovo nor Iraq did the post-war Security Council resolution proclaim the earlier military action to have been legal, but it did begin the long process of bringing the consequences of such action within an international legal framework. However, it is far from certain that the reconstruction of Iraq will provide an opportunity to overcome the schism between the US and many European states.

The debate over the rights and wrongs of the war continues, as does distrust of US decision-making and trepidation about involvement in a very difficult situation. What is clear is that if the schisms over Iraq, and over the use of force more generally, are to be overcome, the UN with all its limitations will have to be part of the process.
Federalism is the summer feature for student debate

Prague, the charming capital of the Czech Republic, hosted the Europaeum’s annual Summer School during the first week of September 2003. Five days of seminars, lectures and tutorials based on the theme of *Old and New Ideas of European Federalism* were held at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University.

Thanks to the engagement and passion of the Europaeum’s Secretary-General, Dr Paul Flather, the assistance of the Summer School Co-ordinator, Katya Kocourek (University College London) and a group of Czech-and-Oxford-based scholars (plus the support of generous sponsors) university graduate students from more than 20 faculties of history, law, economics and political science, had the opportunity to work together with an outstanding array of specialists.

The Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, Robert J.W. Evans, delivered the introductory lecture with an overview of the core themes of Central European (con)federalism in historical perspective.

Keynote lectures were delivered at the start of each day by Jaroslav Panek (Charles University) on models of integration in the Bohemian Crown and the Habsburg Monarchy; Professor Pierre du Bois on the Swiss model and the HEI EU; Professor Jiri Vykoukal on federation and territory in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Professor Piet Jan Slot (Faculty of Law, Leiden University) on the division of competences in European as compared to American states; and, finally, Professor Lenka Rovna on the European Constitution and Central Europe.

Seminar and special case-study papers were delivered by the young scholars: Masatake Wasa (Brasenose College, Oxford University), Larissa Douglass (St Antony’s College, Oxford University), Marius Turda (University College London), Vladimir Bilčík (Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava), and Michal Kopeck (Institute for Contemporary History, Prague).

Each keynote/special lecture and seminar paper was chaired and introduced by leading experts of European history and politics.

Highly thought provoking was the round-table closing statement of the former Czech Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Pavel Seifter. His contribution, inspired to some degree by his cosmopolitan background, focused on outlining the main characteristics of a European identity.

Dr Seifter affirmed that a European feeling, inspiring a European type of patriotism, can indeed take root with all nationalities. People who feel European do not lose their national identity. On the contrary, it becomes stronger: ‘People strengthen their own inward identity leaving aside or out what is written in a passport or established by cultural heritages of the past’, he said.

The diverse international team of students concluded Summer School proceedings with a lively debate about whether the European Constitution reaffirms the end of the European nation-state. The two sides were laid out by Monica Stricht from Bonn and Patrick Reichenmiller from Geneva. There were passionate interventions from everyone, encouraged by our chair Dr Flather, including a guest appearance from a ‘Vaclav Klaus’ and a telling statement about the overwhelming power of consumerism about how popular culture which has no regard for national frontiers.

The sceptics and the undecided were victorious, confirming perhaps that Charles de Gaulle’s *Europe des parties* is still a valid idea. Indeed participants were then delighted to attend a special reception held at the residence of Her Excellency, British Ambassador to the Czech Republic, Anne Pringle. Her Excellency thanked participants for their devotion and enthusiasm concerning the future of the EU.

Apart from enjoying drinks and hors d’oeuvres, the participants were able to enjoy the garden of the residence, situated at Count Thun’s Palace in the beautiful area Malofranska.

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**The Europaeum clan - academics and students gathers for a final hurrah in Prague**


**NEW PROGRAMME FOR FUTURE DIPLOMATS**

Leiden University has won the public tender for training newly recruited diplomats by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs – with full Europaeum support. Professors from Oxford and the HEI, Geneva will assist in the development of the teaching programme, which is aimed at young diplomats working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with experience in the Hague and Dutch embassies abroad.

They will participate in an intensive post-academic programme run by Leiden University’s Campus Den Haag, providing more than three months of knowledge and skills training.

The programme will consist of three phases – first, familiarity with the basic principles and policy areas such as international, political, legal, administrative, economic and social aspects. Second, there will be explorations of international order: peace, security and stability, European integration, enduring poverty reduction, bilateral relations, with visits to the European Community, Dutch embassies, and NATO in Brussels. Third will involve practical case studies, preparing an essay in teams, to be presented to a jury of academics and ministry officials.

Then, six months after completion, participants will return for a week of master classes which will be organised with Europaeum lecturers, probably from Oxford and the Graduate Institute for International Relations, Geneva. These will focus on current foreign policy issues.

“The new course will involve teaching full time over 13 weeks. The new diplomats will prepare classes at home, write papers, read specific literature and prepare presentations. A tutor will guide the individual learning process of each participant,” explained Professor Wim van den Doel, professor of history, who is leading the project.

“The programme will involve plenary sessions, where knowledge is transferred by academics and practitioners, and sessions where the participants work in small groups.”

For more information about the programme, please contact Charlotte Staats at cstaats@campusdenhaag.nl

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**SPREADING SCIENCE THROUGH CULTURE**

The long-standing collaboration in the history of science between Oxford and Bologna has been pursued since April 2002.

The cycle of international conferences linking the universities of Oxford, Bologna and Paris, around the theme of transmission and understanding in the sciences launched in Spring 2002 is coming to it send.

The most recent meeting was held in Bologna last November on *Science and Cultural Frontiers*, organised again under the auspices of the Europaeum, this time in association with the Euxin project among others – which links the Universities of Bologna, Heidelberg, Louvain la Nueve, Montpellier and Salamanca. It is sponsored by the Coimbra Group and financed by the EU.

At Bologna, Professors Robert Fox, John Heilbron, and Ian MacLean, from Oxford, all discussed the historiography of science and medicine over the last century, concentrating on national traditions and styles of investigation in the context of the history of institutions, modes of publication and role of learned societies.

Giuliano Pannaldi from Bologna concluded the proceedings with a paper linking the issues raised with the Euxin project. An unusual channel for communicating science awareness is theatre, and on this theme, Robert Friedman (Oslo) and Raffaella Simila (Bologna) provided accounts of successful dramatic ventures based on episodes in the history of science.

The meeting reinforced the conviction of participants from six European counties that the history of science has a crucial role to play in defining, amid all its diversity, our continents shared intellectual heritage. The founding of the European Society of the History of Science - with Robert Fox as its first president - bears witness to a will to pursue further European-wide scholarly initiatives and to foster public awareness of science and its social, economic and cultural implications.
The forthcoming two-day conference on History and the Public Understanding of Science to be held at Oxford, on 28 and 29 May 2004, is conceived in this spirit. This will conclude this current cycle of meetings which has been supported by many partners led by the Europaeum, the Maison Francaise at Oxford, and Bologna.

CHRIS PATTEN ELECTED AT OXFORD

The European Union Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris Patten, was elected as the new Chancellor for Oxford University following a distinguished political career including holding serious high office in Northern Ireland and Hong Kong.

He succeeded Lord (Roy) Jenkins of Hillhead, (who once attended no less than 73 university ceremonies in a single year), the former president of the European Commission.

In the Public Oration for the election, it was stated that Mr Patten had succeeded in “serving the Community as a whole, while remaining mindful of his own country, and, so brilliantly, that, not even those who dread the name Euro, have ever regarded him as absolutely impartial”.

In his own speech, Chris Patten spoke of his concerns in the UK which had led to an inability to distinguish between value and price with regard to higher education. “All of our universities have suffered from two decades of public parsimony” he said. “Lately, it has been accompanied by growing interference, less money, more strings.” Being the first in his family to attend university, he pledged his commitment to improving access.

He then looked to the challenge facing all universities, not just Oxford: “We must balance our role as custodians of tradition with our task as the drivers of change. We need to know what to hold onto and what to alter, because if we don’t change ourselves, events or outsiders will forcibly impose their own changes upon us.”

A leading analysis of security by Chris Patten was featured in the last issue of the Review, and he has already expressed his keenness to support the vision and activities of the association in his new role.

HOW DEMOCRACIES FACE UP TO AGEING

What is the impact on society as we Europeans live longer thanks to better nutrition, better health care, and better technology? Policymakers are all too aware of what is termed the “ageing time-bomb”, but are European liberal-democratic welfare states really coping with the strains?

This is the broad theme for a planned two-day Europaeum policy forum on ageing, democracy and technology, to follow the usual and successful Europaeum format, bringing together leading Europaeum academics, policymakers, government advisors, politicians, and business figures, for discussions aimed at producing fresh approaches and clear recommendations on these problems.

“It is not clear how well equipped our democracies are for tackling these complex, long-term inter-related issues fuelled by strained family units, declining birth rates and stricter codes on working hours creating “unproductive labour”. There has been support from across the Europaeum with such a focus,” explained Dr Paul Flather, the association’s secretary-general.

The forum will focus on a range of key questions including how can we best deliver health and care?, What are optimum population sizes? How do we adequately fund pensions? How can we ensure and maintain equity and access in treatment? How can we best harness new technology to meet health and ageing-related challenges?

Underlying all this will remain an underlying question for politicians on how European polities can and will cope with the inter-related questions of equity, ethics and access linked to these economic, medical and biological themes.

Sponsorship for the event is currently being sought. Key note speakers being lined up include Dr Gro Harlem Bruntland, former head of the WHO; Sir Crispin Tickell, a strategist on population and demographic issues and Andrew Smith MP, UK Cabinet Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.

Ageing poses real challenges
**EUROPEAN HUMANITIES LOOK TO THE FUTURE**

A major International conference exploring the *Future of Europaeum Humanities* will be held at Oxford in March, supported by the Europaeum, to examine the role of the Humanities in the 21st Century, with reference to their relations with other disciplines and also with new media and new technology.

It is being organised by the European Humanities Research Centre, and backed by the Modern Humanities Research Association of the UK, whose 50th anniversary conference in 1968 led to a key publication, entitled *The Future of the Modern Humanities*.

The conference will bring together faculty from a range of leading European universities, including several Europaeum partner institutions. The event will include a special session on Humanities and Technology with presentations of successful projects based on technology.

The Europaeum plans a series on *Cultural Studies and New Technology*, supported by APEX ePublishing Data services, a leading US software company, that has backed many significant humanities research projects including the Electronic Enlightenment Project being run at the Voltaire Foundation, Oxford.

The aim will be to pool ideas and information on successful humanities projects which have utilised the very latest that new technology can offer; to discuss the general applications of new technology to further humanities research; to solicit research funding, and to discuss how humanities research has been changed by the introduction of new technology methods.

Professor Martin McLaughlin, Professor of Italian Studies at Magdalen College, Oxford, said: “We believe this conference will give us an opportunity to take stock of where humanities research is going and where it should be going. Humanities have a crucial role to play in society and we must make sure they deliver to their potential.”

**PUTTING THEOLOGY IN CONTEXT**

Theologians from Bonn, Prague and Warsaw, gathered at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität last September for a week-long symposium to put theological research in context, and to examine the situation of the church after the end of communism.

The seminar, backed under the Europaeum’s *New Initiatives Scheme*, also marked the 25th anniversary of the partnership between the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Bonn and the Christian Academy at Warsaw.

The event helped to strengthen and extend partnerships, as well as throw fresh light on the different theological and ecclesiastical and social situations of the three countries involving an equal number of professors, lecturers and doctoral students from each.

The talks from Poland focused on the minority position of Protestant Theology and the style of the German-Polish dialogue among church historians. Here, for example, Professor Januszmaciusko from Warsaw argued that history should not nurture injury and pain, but should be reconstructed through dialogue and teamwork.

Another lecture argued that protestants needed to develop a dialogue with the dominant Catholic church rather than to withdraw. Other themes were the development of children’s bibles and religious education, which allowed parallels to be drawn from the position of the Czechs and the Poles.

Further lectures examined the reactions of theological theory to new political and social developments, one on relations between church and welfare systems which are increasingly structured on a business basis and therefore conflict with Christian standards. Another lecture examined the introduction of management, slang and jargon into the Church.

Czech participants, including Professor Martin Prudky, professor for the Old Testament at Charles University, focused on elements and contexts of the Old Testament generally and also on the work of Barthes.

The symposium was coordinated by Professor Michael Meyer-Blanck, Faculty of Evangelical Theology, with a wide-range of participation from Bonn.
NEW PAMELLETS ON WAR AND ON PEACE

Four more Europaeum Lectures, covering international relations, international law, ideology and European Economics have been published in our pamphlet series.

These include:

- International Law and the Use of Military Force: The United Nations, the United States and Iraq, by Professor Sir Adam Roberts of Balliol College, Oxford, delivered in Leiden in 2003, which explores the build-up to the Iraq war and questions the legal background of the US-UK rationale.

- Fiscal Discipline in the Monetary Union: Rules or Instructions? by Professor Charles Wyplosz of the HEI, Geneva which also features contributions from three discussants, Professor Ray Barrell of the National Institute for Economic & Social Research, London; Professor Giorgio Basevi from the University of Bologna and Professor David Vines of Balliol College, Oxford.

- The United Nations and Peace since the Cold War: success, failure or neither? by Sir Marrack Goulding, Warden of St Antony’s College, Oxford, which provides a comprehensive review of the UN’s role in peacekeeping, revealing the difficult background against which the UN has to work.

- Strands on Nazi Anti-Semitism, by Professor Phillip Burrin of the HEI, Geneva, analyses the many contributing factors including church, folk lore, and myth that helped contribute to the rise of Hitler. This pamphlet includes a lively roundtable discussion which features Peter Longerich, of Royal Holloway College, London, Wolfram Kinzig of Bonn University, Mark Roseman of Southampton University and Nicholas Stargardt of Magdalen College, Oxford. A full list of pamphlets can be found on the website.

CLASSICISTS TACKLE TACITUS IN OXFORD

The third EUROPAEUM Classics Graduate Colloquium took place this autumn at Oxford over a long weekend (November 20-22), with representatives from Bonn, Leiden, Geneva, Bologna, and Madrid.

The event kicked off with Claudia Strobel speaking about The Lexicographer and his Tasks in the Second Sophistic; followed by a Classics Drinks Party at Corpus Christi; a relaxed and friendly gathering at which the visitors mingled with Senior Members of the Classics faculty.

This year, graduate students presented papers, rather than Faculty members as at the last two EUROPAEUM events, on ‘Methods and Traditions of Graduate Research: Approaches to Herodotus and Tacitus’ Annals’.

The theme was designed to engender a comparative approach of research methods used in the different classics departments, and to showcase the differences and similarities in the opening chapters of the works of two important ancient historians – one Greek, one Roman.

Nine papers, some jointly presented, explored a wide spectrum of topics—from oracles, historie, and Solon’s life statistics in Herodotus, to Tacitus’ reception by Syme and parallels in 16th and 17th century Spanish writers – and were informed by a diverse range of theory and practice (narratology, linguistic analysis, reader-response theory, Fortleben, etc).

Senior Oxford faculty members Christina Kraus and Oswyn Murray led the concluding discussion, summarizing the papers as well as indicating further questions raised in colloquium. General consensus was that it had been a most interesting and productive day followed by dinner, partying at Magdalen’s Wild West Bop and a troupe of belly dancers.
CHECKING OUT EUROPEANNESS

The first in a planned series of one-day seminars exploring theoretical and historical perspectives on cultural differences in Europe, supported by the Europaeum, was held in Prague last November - appropriately enough with a focus on the Czech culture.

The main speakers and discussants came from Charles University, Warsaw, Oxford and Taiwan, plus a cross section of leading figures from Czech culture and society. This allowed for both ‘internal’ and external views of Europeaness.

Jan Sokol, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at Charles University, argued in his paper that culture must be created – and recreated – for every generation, and different aspects are accepted, rejected or misinterpreted, and this affects political culture. He went on to argue that an extreme individualism has been the outcome of dictatorship. Thus Czech citizens today accept a culture of caring only for one self and regarding others as “scoundrels”.

Jiri Pehe, Director of New York University in Prague, tracked the various discontinuities in the history of Czech culture since the 17th Century that had resulted in a mutual distrust between civil society and politics, via the rise and fall of the Hapsburge Empire, the Czechoslovak state and Communist rule. The hope from membership of the EU is for a stable democratic context which, at last, can united Czech cultural talents with a coherent and effective political life.

In another paper, Pawel Lukow, Department of Philosophy, Warsaw University, argued against any concept of cultural identity defined by a set of properties. ‘Those considering themselves to be Europeans have to decide the principles according to which they wish to live and must embody these principles in institutions. The result, can then be seen as European identity. “We were all delighted by an extremely stimulating discussion, and following the enthusiastic response, we now plan to proceed with further seminars in this series at other European university basis - and we very much to keep the project linked to the Europaeum network,” explained Dr Nicholas Bunnin of Oxford University, co-director of the project with Professor Reinhard Dubel of Tamkang University, Taiwan. For more information contact Nicholas.bunnin@chinese.ox.ac.uk

There are chapters on regulation by the European Community, applicable rules of contract law, the problem of digital signatures, intellectual property, private international law and the potential liability of third parties, such as hosts and conduits.

Underlying was the question to what extent can the law content itself that what holds good ‘off-line’ also applies ‘on-line’? “For all the technological wizardry of the Internet, our general conclusion was that existing legal rules are in general adequately apt to address the issues that are raised by the advance of electronic commerce”, explained Professor Stephen Weatherill, co-editor of the Volume, from IECL and Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. The other co-editor is Professor Henk Snijders, the seminar coordinator on the Leiden side.

But despite the general consensus on this, there are a series of special circumstances that arise out of operating within an information technology environment and these are the issues tackled in this volume.

The workshop and publication is another sign of the continuing links between lawyers from both universities – which has for a number of years involved staff exchanges, research workshops, and until recently even shared an appointment in European law. Both are committed to developing further endeavours. More information from Stephen.weatherill@somerville.ox.ac.uk

LAWYERS PUBLISH ESSAYS ON E-COMMERCE

As more and more of us turn to electronic commerce, so the rights and wrongs of doing it on the net become more significant. In May 2002 a two-day joint seminar linking the Oxford and Leiden Law Faculties, and supported by the Europaeum, was held in Leiden to examine the legal aspects of e-commerce.

Now a volume of papers which capture the rapidly changing field of e-commerce and legal regulation, entitled E-Commerce Law: National and Transnational Topics and Prospectives, has been published (Kluwer Law International, 2003, 144 pages).

Regulating keyboard profits?
LINKING BURSERIES TO GOVERNMENT
Senior management and government cannot function effectively without understanding the political, social, cultural, historical and economic context of the markets in which they operate.

This is the premise behind seminars and programmes being developed jointly by Leiden and Oxford under the auspices of the Europaeum, as part of a growing partnership between the two leading Europaeum universities. The aim will be to provide future leaders in industry, culture and government, with the tools to operate more effectively in the politically, legally and culturally complex system of Europe.

These ideas were unveiled in front of some 70 business representatives at a gala reception in London last Summer, hosted by the Netherlands Ambassador to the UK, Count Jan de Marchant et d’Ansembourg. The principles were also set out at an earlier dinner for top Dutch business figures hosted by the Rector of Leiden, Professor Doewe Breimer last year, in the presence of Prince Constantigne, a former Europaeum alumnus.

Among modules being considered are the process of European integration, the effects of national diversity and complexity, Europe’s contrast with the US and Asia in terms of governance and mindset, and the underlying structural historic, cultural and philosophical trends that formed Europe as we know it today.

Sir Colin Lucas, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford, who Chairs the Europaeum, praised the new collaboration. “The variety in backgrounds both of our leading guests lecturers from politics and business and of proposed participants from different nations and industries, will make such programmes an exciting breeding ground of truly European leaders.”

MR MORRIS TABAKSBLAT, former Chairman and CEO of Unilever plc, who is advising on the new proposals, said: “We want to try and bring together the worlds of business and government; at the moment they do not talk to each other nearly enough, or don’t even know how to talk to each other, for that matter, which worries me”.

The new partnership aims to produce a range of initiatives including workshops, short seminars and taught modules. It is hoped a first event will coincide with the Dutch Presidency of the EU which begins in July. Other Europaeum partner institutions could be involved in due course.

UNIVERSITIES URGED TO AID DEMOCRATS
Plans to create a global democracy visitors programme and a network of universities committed to promoting support, advice and information in the fight for democracy, were discussed at a recent international conference in Durban.

The plan of action was launched at a special workshop held at the third international assembly of the World Movement for Democracy, attended by some 700 democracy and human rights activities from almost 90 countries. The WMD serves to bring together activists to pool experience, knowledge and ideas aimed at promoting human rights and opposing oppression and authoritarianism around the world.

The idea for a new network of universities to help promote democracy was conceived at a workshop coordinated by Dr Paul Flather, Secretary-General of the Europaeum network. He argued, in his paper, that universities today, especially leading institutions in the West, had a duty to become engaged with civil society - not only in their community and country but also by supporting other universities working in transitional societies and emergent democracies.

The WMD has already established a successful network of democracy institutes, with more than 25 active members which collects articles, survey material and other documentation on democracy to share with activists via the internet.

The workshop with representatives from Asia, Africa and Latin America, endorsed proposals to create an inventory of current university activities in the field, a registry of interest for individuals and departments to offer services and advise which may be pro bono; the creation of a democracy visitors programme. There was also discussion about creating a ‘global classroom’ for democracy training.
A new room of one’s own

JASMINE CHAMPENOIS has just spent six months in Oxford on a Europaeum Oxford-Geneva bursary. She shares impressions here.

The Hallways at HEI were quiet that day. No one was around, only that looking for a place where I could drink my coffee without being caught by my boss.

The board of advertisements and notices provided me a good excuse for standing there while reading with palpable interest. Believe it or not, one notice seemed to be crying out for me: “last call for the Europaeum programme of exchanges to Oxford.” There were short deadlines and a long list of paperwork. From that very morning on, coffee breaks always give me a source of expectation and excitement!

Why I decided to fill out these forms instead of going back to work is another personal story. With the support of enthusiastic supervisors, Pr. Djalili and Mme Regard, and helpful advice from secretaries, sceptical family and considerate friends, all helped to overcome any initial hesitations.

But the intrigue was only starting. My PhD project was only two months old, and I did not expect any supervisor in Oxford to be too thrilled by the prospect of my coming. Moreover, I had to find a professor sensible enough to accept a project thesis on film festivals. As I looked eagerly through the Oxford University web pages, I realised to my surprise that none other that the Professors in International Relations at St Antony’s College had a special interest in festivals. Convinced that films have a role in the international realm after all, I turned to another department: the sisterhood of The International Gender Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House.

There, I had found the key – directors, professors, tutors and colleagues – all were eager to welcome me as a Visiting Fellow. A six-month expedition to the city of the Dreaming Spires was therefore awaiting me.

And so I left Geneva with baggage and lots of hopes and I settled down in a small room. As the days passed and opened my eyes, I was seeing libraries everywhere, in colleges, in churches, on the market street, behind closed doors. Libraries for all, libraries for a select few, books everywhere. I was meeting professors everywhere – in the streets, in the pubs, in the libraries. Then a most fearful event happened, as I learned I was to follow the infamous tutorial sessions: once a week, I had to write an essay and talk about it to my tutor. It was only when I met her (Dr Paula Heinonen) that I knew how it all worked.

Since then the curiosity and will to go deeper into my subject has never left me. Nor have the doubts since then. I ask myself if this is “real” life? What are we all running for? One can see running students in Oxford everywhere. In the splendid parks, from colleges to colleges, from pubs to pubs. But at some places, one can actually see them simply sitting and chatting.

I have encountered the most varied characters here. Dinner was shared between Praveen, Alberto, Ida, Genius, Siti, Cynthia, Carlos, Tony and Illimar – that is to say India, Spain, Italy, China, Malaysia, the United States, Brazil, South Korea and Estonia were constantly in our talks. Lunchtime would rarely go by without a never-ending quarrel on British secret intelligence, Indian phone companies, or any of the hot topics from the newspaper. Top-up fees for university? Learn to give a straightforward opinion or your dinner will last forever. The World Summit in Mumbai? Why not go next year? A conference in Amsterdam? I certainly will attend.

The world never seemed so real than around this dinner table. And international diplomacy was becoming a practical tool for daily survival. One can never imagine that there would be so many ways to cook rice, so many ways to party. So many ways to exchange personal lives and thoughts. Postmodernism might have not been so flawed after all. I learned to enjoy and celebrate differences (except when dealing with French wine).

It seems life would have been fairly enjoyable if it were not for the actual research work. I did not really know what reading lists meant before I had to follow the mass of Oxford seminars and lectures that were all available to me. On Monday International Relations, followed by a Tuesday Anthropology, and Wednesday computer learning. Discussions on gender in films, gender in photography, women in war, research on Archaeology, History and Ideology, the British Empire and so forth. Too wide ranging I may hear you say. But this is the fabulous thing with this University. All subjects become related, they all have enriched my research in different and clear ways.

In fact, they all united around a single issue: learn how to learn and make sure you understand it. Never have I felt this so clearly as when I finally understood the Bodleian Library system of stack request. I really did belong.

The Europaeum has offered me a unique opportunity: a room of my own at the heart of a warm and stimulating intellectual community. Surely Virginia Woolf was right: it really changes one’s life forever.

Ms Champenois is continuing her doctorate on film festivals at the Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva.
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EVROPAEVM
Diary

March 2004

Europaeum Review
Next issue published.

International Conference
19th - 20th: Future of the Humanities Conference at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, run by European Humanities Research Centre, with Europaeum support, to include special session on Humanities and New Technologies - first in the Europaeum’s new Cultural Studies seminar series.

Europaeum Lecture
25th: Sir Alan Budd, Provost, Queen’s College Oxford on A Tale of Two Economies at the HEI, Geneva.

Academic Committee
26th: Annual Meeting at the HEI, Geneva to review new teaching and research programmes.

April 2004

Europaeum Annual Report
To be published.

Research Workshop
Economics of European Integration Europaeum research project group to meet at Charles University, Prague, led by Professors Hubert Kempf and Frantisek Turnovec.

Joint Teaching Initiatives
Steering group to meet to review new courses, linking universities.

May 2004

Europaeum Essentials
New edition of summary guide to the association, to be published.

Europaeum Visiting Professor
Europaeum Bertelsmann Visiting Professor of 20th Century Jewish History and Politics, due to start lecture series in Oxford.

Research Workshop
28th-29th: History and Transmission of Sciences Europaeum Research Project Group, final international colloquium at Maison Francaise, Oxford.

Management Committee
Audio meeting to be arranged.

June 2004

Europaeum Council
25th: Annual Meeting to be held at Charles University, Prague.

Europaeum Lecture
25th: at Charles University, Prague, (details t.b.c.).

July 2004

Europaeum Leadership Course
European Cultures, Institutions and Business programme, due to start at Leiden University

Policy Forum
Aging, Democracy and Technology, to be held in Oxford looking at problems of new technology and equity, with keynote speaker Gro Brundtland Harlem, former head of World Health Organisation. (details t.b.c.).

October 2004

Launch of Europaeum MA
The proposed MA in European Political Cultures, Institution and History is due to be launched from Leiden University.

International Colloquium
History and Statecraft colloquium on the uses and teaching of History, supporting the Club of Three, to be held in Potsdam.

Jenkins Scholars
New European Scholarship scheme unveiled, with first Jenkins Scholars in honour of Lord (Roy) Jenkins expected due to arrive in Oxford from Europaeum Partner institutions.

November 2004

Classics Colloquium
Two research students from Europaeum partner institutions will meet for the third in the series to review a topical issue - university venue to be confirmed.

Academic Committee
Audio Meeting to be arranged to review new policy initiatives.

Europaeum Lecture
Geneva Professor to speak at Oxford, as part of Oxford-Geneva Link Programme (details t.b.c.).

March 2005

Research Workshop
Appropriations, Misappropriations and Adaptations of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Central Europe, Second Workshop - Europaeum Research Project Group to be led by Professors Michael Freeden, Jan Werner Müller (both Oxford) and Paolo Pombeni (Bologna).

Applications for the Europaeum’s Small Grants Schemes are accepted at any time.

For updated diary see
http://www.europaeum.org