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The Changing Character of War

Those who use history for their own present-minded purposes, as opposed to those who study history and are practising historians, tell us that we live in a post-Westphalian age. For political scientists, looking for abstractions and generalisations rather than exceptions and contingencies, the peace of Westphalia, which in 1648 closed the Thirty Years War in Europe, brought an end to wars of religion and established the primacy of unitary state power. Civil wars fought between weak kings and mighty nobles (and, in England, gentry) were finished; thereafter absolute monarchs, sustained by a virtuous circle of growing prosperity, a greater taxable base, the cash economy, and an expanding central bureaucracy, were able to raise and equip standing armies, which were maintained in peace as well as in war. When war occurred, so the argument runs, it was no longer the result of domestic division but of the desire for external security or state expansion.

France is a case in point. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, it seemed finally to have emerged from almost forty years of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants. But in 1610 the assassination of Henri IV inaugurated another forty years of religious strife and of noble resistance to strengthened royal authority, culminating in the Fronde in 1648-53. Louis XIII, who ascended the throne as an infant after Henri’s death, mustered an army of at most 120,000 men during the Thirty Years War. But in the second half of the seventeenth century, his son, Louis XIV, could claim that ‘l’état, c’est moi’. Luxuriating in the centralisation of state authority, he was able to raise an army of 420,000 men for the Nine Years War of 1688-97, as he endeavoured to expand France to its ‘natural’ frontiers on the Rhine and the Alps.¹
According to this classification of the past, the international order established in 1648 lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1990. Parenthetically, now that we allegedly live in a post-Westphalian world, we are somehow meant to be alarmed by the passing of a European states system which permitted the Napoleonic Wars, the two world wars, and the Holocaust. Central to the notion that 1990 represents a caesura is the notion that at that point the character of war itself changed. Historians can easily be as sceptical of such claims as they can be of those advanced for the significance of 1648. It is nonsense to aver that religious and civil wars ended in Europe in 1648: Britain confronted both with the Jacobite rising in 1745-6, and in France after 1789 the authority of the Bourbons, so obviously in the ascendant in 1700, collapsed in the face of revolution and counter-revolution, insurrection and domestic terror. But historians can be as smug as political scientists, stressing exceptions to general propositions, and seeking continuities not changes. Neither tendency helps in the identification of real and trend-setting innovation. Nor does the relativism born of historical knowledge relieve us of a moral responsibility for today’s world as opposed to that of the past, of the need to understand our own dilemmas the better to shape their outcomes.

**Meanings of Wars**

If we are to identify whether war is changing, and - if it is - how those changes affect international relations, we need to know first what war is. One of the central challenges confronting international relations today is that we do not really know what is a war and what is not. The consequences of our confusion would seem absurd, were they not so profoundly dangerous. Those of us who have the privilege of living in contemporary Europe should certainly know what we mean by war. The horrors of the Second World War, still within living memory, defined war for the rest of the twentieth century, while the decades which followed, even if they were shaped during the Cold War by the threat

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of the use of force, gave meaning to what we understand by peace. The clarity of both concepts, and the distinction between them, bestowed an aura of stability on international relations. However, since 1989-90, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its rule in Eastern Europe, that order, and by extension its inherited definitions of war and peace, have been contested. Wars have become fuzzy at the edges: they have no clear end and army forces increasingly have to reject the appropriateness of classical definitions of military victory. So-called ‘new wars’, whose characteristics according to Mary Kaldor include ‘the politics of identity, the decentralization of violence, [and] the globalized war economy’, have allegedly replaced the ‘old wars’.

Strikingly, these ‘new wars’, for all that they are explained in terms of ‘globalization’, share one significant feature with the old: their roots, at least intellectually, lie within Europe. Mary Kaldor’s model of a ‘new war’ was derived not from the Middle East or Africa but from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notions of what ‘old wars’ were have come to rest on a set of assumptions derived not just from the peace of Westphalia, but also from the writings of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). According to this conceptualisation, war was inter-state conflict. Clausewitz’s thinking, built in part on the foundations of his own experience in the Napoleonic Wars, found its most forceful expression in his posthumously published and best known book, *Vom Kriege* (1832–4). However, its impact on late twentieth-century strategic studies was mediated more by Michael Howard’s and Peter Paret’s fresh translation into English in 1976: their interpretation of the text gave Clausewitz a currency in mainstream international relations that had previously eluded him, especially in the United States and United Kingdom. Michael Howard himself, lecturing in 1981 and reflecting what have come to be seen as classic Clausewitzian axioms, described war, as, ‘throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups’.
War, in other words, is, or certainly was, a state activity. The intellectual progenitors of this definition were in fact less Clausewitz than Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) was itself the product of the pre-Westphalian order and especially of the British civil wars of 1638-52. Man in a state of nature was, according to Hobbes, given to competition and aggression. He only escaped this spiral of violence through ceding power to the sovereign, who exercised the use of force on behalf of the people over whom he ruled. Order was therefore the product of the state’s monopolisation of war: in Michael Howard’s summation of Hobbes’s view, ‘at the root of all save the most celestial organisations there must be the sanction of force’. Rousseau, on the other hand, refused to accept Hobbes’s contention that man in a state of nature was predisposed to conflict. His ideal man was naturally peace-loving. Rousseau argued that men do not fight wars as individuals but only as members of a state; they are citizens before they are soldiers. Although their departure points were intellectually divergent, the conclusions reached by Hobbes and Rousseau therefore proved congruent in practice. The state was characterised by its monopoly of force and the state was itself defined by war.

Since the French Revolution war has determined who is involved in the political affairs of the state, or at least that became the norm in continental Europe, if not in sea-girt Britain. Those who fight for the state because they are citizens identify with the state and so legitimise it. Far from being associated with peace, nineteenth and twentieth century democracies have flourished through the participation of the people in war. Democratic processes have legitimised the decision to go to war, and democracy has enabled the mobilisation of state power for war, most immediately through the conscription of manpower to create mass armies. The presumption (as well as presumptiveness) of democracy had a direct effect on the manner of waging war not just on land but also at sea and in the air: naval blockade in the First World War...
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and strategic bombing in the Second rested on the assumption that the peoples who were so attacked would not be angered by their attackers but would turn in revolution against their political masters. Thus democracy legitimised the breaching of the just war tradition and its principle of non-combatant immunity. The currently fashionable notion of the ‘democratic peace’, the idea that democracies do not fight one another, leaves far too much of democracy’s historical record and its association with war out of account.

The state’s monopoly of violence nonetheless enabled it to create domestic public order through the application of law. The sanctions at the disposal of the law were those of state power, and it is this order which we call peace. In international terms the state’s role is to protect its citizens from the conflict which is latent in international relations. The state uses its monopoly in the use of armed forces to persuade or dissuade another state from hostile actions. Peace therefore is not some sort of normal condition in human relations, pace Rousseau, but results from the establishment of a legitimate order and that order itself proceeds from war.

States and War

Moreover, many of the states in the world today, and most of the major states, are themselves the product of wars. They evolved in ways that today might well have earned them the titles (according to the classifications made popular by American neo-conservatives) of ‘rogue states’ or ‘failing’ (if not ‘failed’) states. The United States of America rebelled against British rule in the eighteenth century and was defined by civil war in the nineteenth. The United Kingdom was shaped by wars between England on the one hand and Scotland, Wales and Ireland on the other; by its own civil wars in the seventeenth century; and by its triumph as Britain against France in a sequence of eighteenth-century conflicts which ended only at Waterloo in 1815. Although there are nations today which have acquired statehood without war (for example
Norway in 1905), many national identities have been created by war (and Norway itself might see the German invasion of April 1940 as the true moment of national definition).

According to these traditional descriptions of what war is, war is restrained for reasons that are rational and political. Armed forces rest on discipline and hierarchy, and they use force in a purposeful and deliberate way. States have a moral responsibility to seek ways of controlling and managing the use of violence in their relations with each other. The era of nuclear weapons proved to be the acme of those principles. In the aftermath of the Second World War many shrewd observers, beginning with Bernard Brodie, thought the political impact of the atomic bomb would be revolutionary, precisely because that was true of its technology. As Brodie himself recognised, they required the state which possessed them to be even more restrained in its use of violence.\textsuperscript{5} Paradoxically, therefore, rather than overthrow norms about the state’s use of force, the atomic bomb consolidated them. States possessed the monopoly of force and they still used the weapons at their disposal to persuade or to dissuade their opponents, but they achieved those objects ‘less by manipulation of actual forces than by manipulation of risks’.\textsuperscript{6}

The presumption was one of continuity, not change. The first problem for this apparent continuity, shaped by politics and by the understanding that the state has the potential to be both an ethical and a rational actor, was its confrontation not with the advent of nuclear weapons but with their apparent loss of influence after 1989. During the Cold War the effectiveness of deterrence rested on the threat of major war and its catastrophic consequences. Major war remained the normative definition of war more generally. But the avoidance of major war made for an increasingly cavalier attitude to its threat, and since the end of the Cold War deterrence has slipped from the forefront of strategic discourse. Indeed in 1989 itself John Mueller argued that major war
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had been in decline since the losses of the First World War, and that the Second World War was made possible only by the irrational and unpredictable actions of one man, Adolf Hitler. In any event, by the 1990s Mueller and others, such as Michael Mandelbaum, believed that major war was now obsolete, and that as a result inter-state war was no longer possible. In other words, a change in war had ruled out a policy option in international relations.7

This was where Martin van Creveld, John Keegan and Mary Kaldor came in. In The Transformation of War (or On Future War in its UK edition, 1991), van Creveld argued that Clausewitz described a form of war that was now firmly in the past, and that in the future war would be waged by non-state actors, guerrillas and terrorists. The fact that the publication of his book coincided with the first Gulf War, a conflict in which an alliance waged an inter-state war with conventional armed forces, served to provide his more vociferous critics with plenty of readily available ammunition, but by 1997, when John Keegan published A History of Warfare, events in the Balkans, as well as outside Europe, gave van Creveld’s views greater authority. Keegan also took issue with the dominant interpretation of Clausewitz, arguing that that war was not an act of policy, but a product of culture. Returning as Hobbes and Rousseau had done to that fictional individual, man in a state of nature, Keegan saw man as a social being, and believed that societies increasingly denigrated the recourse to violence. ‘Public tolerance of state violence’, he wrote with a prescience even greater than perhaps he realised, ‘has dwindled to a point where it is difficult to see how western governments could win endorsement for war-making, except against a rogue state such as Iraq.’8

Mary Kaldor argued somewhat differently in New and Old Wars, published in 1999. Inter-state war had lost its definition because violence was more likely to be perpetrated at the individual level, and criminal activity had therefore interpenetrated the state’s monopoly on the use
of force. Britain’s long-running struggle in Northern Ireland stood on the cusp of this transformation: the political aims both of the IRA and of Ulster Loyalists he had become fused with the criminal activities needed to sustain the struggle, to the point where the latter was no longer easily distinguishable from the former, and indeed where the former might be no more than the legitimation for the latter. Because war can pay, warlords of the type studied by Kaldor have an interest in continuing war, rather than ending it: through war, they derive money, land, prestige and even sexual rewards.

This list of the returns to be derived from war would not have struck some of the ancient civilisations studied by John Keegan as very surprising, and certainly not very new. Even in the post-Westphalian world, Louis XIV and Napoleon waged war to make money and to control territory, and neither knew when to call it a day by deciding that they had amassed enough of both. Unlike today’s warlords, Louis XIV and Napoleon were heads of state, and so the motivations which drove them were cloaked in political terms. But we tend to forget that until 1806 Napoleon made war pay for France; we have come to think of war as inherently unremunerative, and believe it can only be justified in defence of big political ideas, such as democracy, liberalism, fascism, Bolshevism and international order.

**New Norms, New Actors**

The prevailing norm – that war costs blood and treasure, and causes grief and suffering – prevents us, however laudable our motives, from seeing war with realism, from recognising that its adoption as policy can be the result of a perfectly rational cost-benefit calculation. Instead, the awareness of its evils and its concomitant suffering shapes our understanding and our expectations of its conduct. Take, for example, our attitude to civilian losses in war. At the beginning of the twentieth century about 10 percent of those killed in war were civilians and 90
percent were soldiers. By the end of the century the percentages were reversed. These figures are meant to shock us, implying that the conduct of war is increasingly illegitimate and that its horrors are visited on the innocent. Both propositions may well be true, but they are not necessarily supported by these figures. The comparison between 1900 and 2000 is unlikely to be comparing like with like: we know very little about conflicts and their costs in 1900, particularly outside Europe and compared with those of the year 2000. But even if put that consideration to one side, we still jump to another unjustified conclusion, that those civilians, whether they died in wars fought at the beginning or at end of the century, were victims. In fact many were combatants. The 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Convention recognised that very point by according belligerent status to guerrillas. The significant force multipliers among new technologies are not the monopoly of big states (as the atomic bomb was in the Cold War) but the AK47 rifle and the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), weapons with simple mechanisms that are cheap, easy to maintain, and require minimal training to use. Warlords don’t need standing armies to be able to fight. It is cheaper and easier to mobilise the civilian population for the war effort. Thus child soldiers, who can constitute up to 60 percent of the forces deployed in some African conflicts, should not be seen simply as victims of warlordism (although they are that), but also as combatants.

The issues of who fights and who does not, of who are war’s victims and who its perpetrators, are not themselves definitions of war. They tell us about war’s character: the same could be said of much that has been written on contemporary conflict by Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, Mary Kaldor, and more recently Rupert Smith and Colin Gray. All these authors have identified changes in the identity of war’s fighters, and in why, where and how they fight, but they say rather less about war’s nature, about the phenomenon itself. Getting to the heart of war is both less and more complex: less because the nature of war probably
changes less over time than does its character (a point derived from Clausewitz), more because defining the nature of war is a complicated, inter-disciplinary business. Philosophy is not a bad place to begin: practical ethics can help us with some categorisations that are reasonably tight, suggesting that war has five constituent elements.11

What is War?

First, it involves the use of force. Some might argue that the threat of the use of force, as opposed to its actual use, can be war: Hobbes did, and some views of nuclear deterrence embrace that idea. Those who opposed the possession of nuclear weapons in the Cold War implied that the populations of the west, whose peace was made possible by the imminent threat of massive destruction through an all-out nuclear exchange, were being held hostage to war, however unconscious they were of its imminence as they went about their daily and peaceful business. Secondly, a state of war can exist between two opponents without there being any active fighting. This was a phenomenon which so exercised Clausewitz that he devoted a chapter of Vom Kriege to what he called ‘the suspension of action in war’. ‘Immobility and inactivity’, he wrote in book III (on strategy), chapter 16, ‘are the normal state of armies in war, and action is the exception.’ The effect could be to make war a half-thing, not fully complete in itself, and ‘often …nothing more than armed neutrality, a threatening attitude meant to support negotiations’. So central did these preoccupations become to Clausewitz that they found reflection in his introductory note to Vom Kriege of 10 July 1827, when he described war as being of two kinds, either to overthrow the enemy or ‘merely to occupy some frontier-districts.’12

Second, war rests on contention. War is not a one-sided activity, but assumes resistance. Again Clausewitz is helpful on this point: war, he observed, begins with defence, not attack. The invader might be only
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too pleased to gain his objectives without fighting; it is the defender who resorts to war to oppose the invader’s intentions. Even when the invader uses force, if there is no response, the result will be not a war but a massacre. This element of reciprocity is critical to any definition of war and to all that follows.

Third, war assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting. Frontier skirmishes and isolated clashes between patrols are not necessarily war. India’s and Pakistan’s dispute over Kashmir is today sustained by the use of force without resulting in war. Fourth, those who fight do so not in a private capacity, but as public servants. A personal vendetta is not war: I cannot declare war on you. Fifth, war is not fighting for its own sake: it has an aim, often normatively defined in political terms, but perfectly capable of being more narrowly and militarily defined, for example as the pursuit of victory.

These criteria are easy to apply if we use them in relation to the so-called Westphalian paradigm. Both Clausewitz and his translators, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, would be comfortable with them. But the problem is that they fail to embrace many conflicts that we might wish to see as wars. Moreover there are difficulties even within the definitions. India’s and Pakistan’s differences, however well managed since 1972, boiled over into war before 1972; mercenaries who take part in wars do so for their own private benefit, even if they are being employed to fulfil a wider purpose; and resistance in war has frequently been sustained beyond the point where a sensible or useful outcome can be achieved, a point that applies to both Germany and Japan in 1944-45.

Laws of War

Switching disciplines, from philosophy to law, can help. In international law, a war has to be declared, and once it is declared its belligerents acquire legal rights as well as being subject to legal obligations. For
example, they have the right to kill the enemy and to be treated as prisoners of war if they are captured. In the nineteenth century the resort to war was one of the clearest indicators of national sovereignty (just as the capacity to wage war was also an essential prerequisite for national independence). However, war has become less clearly defined in international law since then, and particularly since 1945.

One reason has been the constraint imposed by the charter of the United Nations, which stipulates that individual states can resort to war only in self-defence. The current tendency is for states not to declare war. War was not declared over the Falkland Islands in 1982 or over Kosovo in 1999. ‘One of the lessons of modern war’, Anthony Cordesman has written, ‘is that war can no longer be called war.’ Another reason has been the rising incidence of civil war or non-international war, a phenomenon evident even before the waning of the Westphalian order. In 1949, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, although resting principally on the model of inter-state war (reasonably enough in the wake of the Second World War), also addressed the humanitarian demands of non-international wars. In 1977, the further pressures generated by the campaigns of decolonisation were reflected in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which accorded belligerent rights to guerrillas fighting for national liberation.

Both trends had the effect of broadening and so loosening the legal definition of war. States can be reluctant to recognise they are at war for fear of conferring belligerent rights on their enemies. Britain never declared war on the IRA in the Northern Ireland campaign, and thus remained free to deal with the members of the IRA as criminals. But it espoused a contradictory policy in relation to the Iran-Iraq War, waged at the same time. In 1985 Iran searched neutral ships, citing the rights accorded belligerents by international law. Britain accepted Iran’s actions but on the basis not of international law but of Iran’s right to self-defence. Nonetheless, Britain then went on to declare itself to be neutral,
despite having implicitly reserved its position on the status of the conflict. If neutrality was meant literally and legally, Britain not only accepted its rights and duties as a neutral in relation to the law of war, but also acknowledged those of the belligerents.\(^{13}\)

The upshot is that *de facto* wars occur which are clearly wars but which are not necessarily governed by the laws of armed conflict, and in which the rights of the belligerents are both contingent on the conflict’s status and possibly themselves determinative of that status. Britain’s conduct of the Northern Ireland campaign lay along this fault line: the conflict was not an international one, and Britain responded by refusing to accord the terrorists of either side, republican or loyalist, the rights of belligerents. But ‘by seeking to beat terrorism within the normal civil law, [Britain]…corrupted the law itself’, conducting trials without jury, suspending normal civil freedoms and so effectively acting as though it were at war.\(^{14}\) The United States’s actions in Afghanistan in 2002 took this process one stage further with the incarceration of captives at Guantanamo Bay: they were denied the normal rights of prisoners of war, including that of release on the war’s termination, but were also not accorded the rights of criminals, including that of trial by jury.

**Interpreting the Iraq War**

The allied invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its messy aftermath, brought all these themes together. The war was begun without a clear United Nations authorisation, and without a formal declaration. And yet, when President Bush stood on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* on 1 May 2003 beneath a banner declaring ‘mission accomplished’ to announce the end of major combat operations, neither he nor anybody else was in any doubt that a war had been fought between the United States and Iraq. Nor did anybody rush to contradict his personal belief that this was tantamount to a victory conventionally defined. The assumption that what had happened between March and April 2003 was a war raises questions as to how to classify the fighting that has
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gone on since May 2003. If the current fighting in Iraq is no longer a war (and as the legal government of Iraq is supported by the coalition, it cannot be an international war), it is presumably peace enforcement at best and civil war at worst, but in that case do the laws of war still apply?

On 7 April 2004, almost a year after Bush’s hubristic announcement, United States forces fired rockets at a mosque in Fallujah, killing forty Iraqis. Mosques, like hospitals, churches, and other culturally significant edifices, are protected under the laws of war. But this was not a war, at least in a legal sense. Those who died were not combatants, but since this was not a war, the combatant/non-combatant distinction was theoretically irrelevant. The paradox was deepened when Brigadier-General Mark Kimmitt spoke to the press about the action on behalf of the US Central Command: ‘It is a holy place, there is no doubt about it. It has a special status under the Geneva Convention that it can’t be attacked. However, when you start using a religious location for military purposes, it loses its protected status.’

Kimmitt seemed to acknowledge that he was in a war even when the United States, at least formally, said it was not. He found himself between a rock and a hard place. In legal terms it suited the United States government for a war not to be a war, but in strategic terms US Central Command is an agency whose business is the planning and conduct of war. Kimmitt’s dilemma brings us to the third analytical approach to the definition of war. Strategic thought may have less disciplinary rigour than either philosophy or law, but it is the intellectual framework which has been developed specifically to enable an understanding of war and is therefore the discipline most appropriate to the task of defining it.

The War on Terror

The so-called war on terror presents strategy with enormous inherent difficulties. Strategy demands clear objectives, and at the very least an
identifiable enemy and probably a specific theatre of operations. The war on terror has neither. It is ‘global’, and it is directed against a means of fighting, terrorism, rather than against a belligerent group. The United States could have declared the attacks of 9/11 a criminal act, as Britain opted to do in the case of IRA terrorism. It did not. Instead it deemed them an act of war, and it identified al-Qaeda with a ‘failed state’, Afghanistan. In other words it conferred a national base and a political identity on an international organisation which possessed neither. The United States could then fight a conflict in Afghanistan which was then normatively a war: what it had defined as an ‘asymmetric’ threat could then be treated ‘symmetrically’.

The problem for the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002 was that he was committed to a conflict which was not adapted to the tools which his Department could make available to him. ‘As you know,’ he acknowledged, ‘you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.’ In 2003, Major-General Robert Scales, responsible between 1995 and 1997 for the US Army’s ‘Army After Next’ project, designed to plan how the army might fight between 2010 and 2025, published the military vision of the future in *Yellow Smoke: the Future Land Warfare for America’s Military*. There was little here about non-state actors or civil wars. His definition of war was couched in traditional inter-state terms: war was defined as ‘the sanctioned use of violence to achieve a legitimate political objective’, and ‘cannot be divorced from political authority’. Scales assumed that the enemy was a tyrant, but that he retained the trappings of state authority, and specifically control of the army and the police, and that both would have to be broken in order to create the conditions for victory.

The Bush administration’s vision of the war it had to fight in 2002-3 bore no relationship to the war its armed forces had prepared themselves to fight. The United States lacked a strategy in 2002-3 because the
political objectives, if they were achievable at all, were incompatible with its military capacities. The government tried to bring the two into harmony by bypassing inconvenient truths and by ignoring the standard American institutions for strategy-formulation, the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic thought, rigorously applied, would have compelled the United States either first to create forces designed for the purpose or, more realistically, to have chosen a different policy.

By deciding on war, it selected a policy option which served its enemies’ purposes better than its own. War enabled them to cohere. Terrorist groups are inherently fissiparous, divided not only by different political agendas but also by different tactics in the use of violence. But war provided a rallying point. Al-Qaeda, the Ford Foundation of terrorism, was given the opportunity to pull groups with different regional and religious identities together. The decision to wage a war on terror elevated the means over the message, and created unlikely bedfellows, rallying different Islamic groups to a common cause, terrorism, and allowing violent criminals to shelter under a form of apparent legitimacy.

By the same token the United States robbed itself of its most sophisticated response, the ability to use differentiated responses against separate targets. Lumping Hamas and Hizbollah, neither of which before the 9/11 attacks directed its efforts primarily against the United States, together with al-Qaeda and the Taleban created a bigger enemy than before. As a result the war which the United States has fashioned for itself is beyond even its resources. There are simply too many ungoverned and ungovernable spaces in the world into which terrorists can move. The military might of the United States has proved itself unable either to track down Osama bin Laden or to stifle his organisation, despite a struggle which now exceeds in length America’s involvement in the Second World War.
Changing War?

As Scales’s book *Yellow Smoke* made clear, in 2001-2 the organisation and doctrine of the United States Army was still predicated on the equivalent of major war. The doctrines of both Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, in 1984 and Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Statt, in 1992 had made it clear that the United States would only fight wars with maximum force, clear political goals and identifiable exit strategies. As a result, its reserves were designed to be fully mobilised to enable the massive but short-term application of military force; what the army was not structured for was a long war of lesser intensity, uncertain duration and messy outcomes. Ironically, therefore, ‘the war on terror’ created as much relative strain on the military’s manpower and resources as the bigger war for which it was actually designed.

Moreover, the consequence of a lack of strategic rigour in the understanding of war has been a weakening of America’s foreign policy. The tool of war has undermined its user. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5, acknowledging the principle of collective self-defence and effectively accepting that war was a proper response to a direct attack on the US. However, at that point, in 2001, the United States treated its allies with indifference, a stance it would come to regret. Although supportive of the war in Afghanistan, by 2002-3 America’s NATO partners were deeply divided over war against Iraq. The United States’ use of war has isolated it, despite the perceived morality of its actions at the outset. Those of America’s allies who believed that war in Iraq was the wrong option have been joined by those whose faith in America’s military strength has been eroded by its failures in the conduct of operations. Instead the United States has found that the war on terror has made it dependent on less congenial partners. The rhetoric of the war has appealed to some whose records on domestic liberty and human rights,
and towards dissident ethnic and religious minorities, is not compatible with ‘the forward strategy of freedom’, in whose name the whole effort is justified.

Confronting the consequences of its own lack of intellectual rigour, western strategic thought battened onto a concept that it falsely presented as novel but which only deepened the dilemmas created by sloppy thinking. It described terrorism as ‘asymmetrical warfare’. Much of the debate about asymmetry in war is historically naïve: all enemies try to get under the other side’s guard by using responses that are unpredictable. At one level therefore ‘asymmetry’ is inherent in strategy. As Edward Luttwak has observed, a power which possesses overwhelming force has less need of strategy as it can proceed directly to its goals without confronting hard choices; by the same token the power whose forces are inferior is forced to think through alternative options. ‘It is those who fight against the odds, outweighed defenders or overambitious attackers, who must try to circumvent enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses by obeying the paradoxical (seemingly contradictory) logic of strategy, as opposed to commonsense ‘linear’ logic.’

In colonial warfare in the nineteenth century big battles suited the disciplined and better equipped forces of the imperial armies and so the cannier warriors of indigenous populations responded ‘asymmetrically’ by avoiding them. Basil Liddell Hart elevated the idea into a universal principle of warfare which he dubbed ‘the indirect approach’, by which he meant the commander’s need to adopt the line of least expectation. At one level, this is what ‘manoeuvrism’ became in NATO military doctrine as it wrestled with the need to meet Soviet conventional superiority in Europe in the 1980s: an endeavour to meet firepower not head on but with flexibility and agility.

Today’s use of the word ‘asymmetry’ also fails to recognise that it is a statement about war’s character, not about its nature: even if we accept that terrorism is an asymmetrical response to the military strength of
the United States, both terrorism and asymmetry remain means of fighting, not descriptions of war itself. Nowhere does this become more evident than if we turn one of the other fads of contemporary strategy, effects-based warfare, back on itself. Effects-based warfare is a form of war planning which begins with the desired outcome and then works in reverse order to create the appropriate force structures and doctrines: logically it might reject military options entirely, especially when it is recognised that the interactive and reciprocal nature of war is likely to produce ‘non-linear’ outcomes. Terrorists have proved better practitioners of effects-based warfare than its progenitors. The weaker power’s aim in using ‘asymmetry’ is to achieve effects comparable with those of the bigger power. In terms of kinetic energy terrorist attacks are not very effective. In some respects the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York may have been comparable with the strategic bombing offensive against German and Japanese cities in the Second World War, but they did much less damage, and they were less effective than the USAF’s bombing of Baghdad. On the other hand, in terms of political and propaganda effects, the 9/11 attacks have been disproportionately successful – thanks not to the direct actions of the terrorists but to the responses of those whom they attacked and of their media-reactive governments.

War is much more imitative than is allowed for by asymmetry. This follows from one key philosophical definition of war, that it is reciprocal. Both the French navy before the First World War and the German navy during it preferred to match Britain’s capital ships rather than adopt cruiser war. Despite the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign in 1917, the inter-war German navy returned to the certainties of surface vessels. Similarly Mao Tse-Tung, for all his success in the use of guerrilla war, saw it as a lesser option: he described a protracted conflict as passing through three stages, the third being the point where guerrilla warfare would be secondary to offensive operations by regular forces.
In all probability, therefore, the forces that use terror do so out of weakness and would use conventional forces if they could.

What asymmetry reveals is a much more fundamental ambiguity in the definition of war. The nineteenth century definition of war as an inter-state activity excluded civil wars, with the possible exception of the American Civil War. In this latter case the decision to adopt the legal norms of inter-state war, and specifically the Lieber code embodied in the general orders issued to the Union army in 1863, accorded belligerent status to the rebels. But fifteen years previously, in 1848, the revolutions which swept through the capital cities of Europe were not treated as wars. Those who manned the barricades in Paris or Berlin were judged by civil law, and when that autumn the armies imposed order in the cities they did so with a brutality that they would not have shown to each other on the battlefield.

Causes of New Wars

The tight concepts inherent in the vocabulary used to describe war, whether legally or in relation to what we would now call non-international war, were eroded in the two world wars. In 1792 war and revolution were fused, and revolutionary principles became integral to the rhetoric and ideology of France’s war effort: the armies of France were politically indoctrinated and they told the subjects of the absolute monarchies whom they conquered that they brought not rape and pillage but liberty, equality and fraternity. One of the fears which drove the peacemakers in 1815 was precisely the intimate link between war and revolution, which they were determined to break. The events of 1830 and 1848 suggested that they were largely successful: revolution within European countries did not lead to war between those states.

The rise of socialism, and of the pretensions of international socialism, before the First World War meant that in 1914 both conservatives and radicals realised that war could once again be the midwife of revolution.
However, they tended to see the latter as the denouement to the former, assuming that if there were revolution it would end the war. From early in the war, however, Germany resolved to use revolution as a means to destabilise its imperial opponents, and particularly Britain. By 1916 Britain too was using revolution to undermine the Ottoman empire, and in 1917 events in Russia confirmed for both sides not only that war could be the agent of revolution but also that revolution could be the means to victory in war. The democratisation of societies meant that popular opinion had become an agent in the struggle. Britain drew a distinction in its propaganda between the elite of Germany, the Kaiser and his circle, whom it saw as its irreconcilable opponents, and the German people, with whom it said it had no long-term differences. It addressed them with the carrot of domestic political reform, while beating them directly with the stick of the naval blockade. The German revolution of November 1918 could be interpreted as the reward for this policy. After the war both sides – Britain and Germany – had an interest in continuing to inflate the revolution as the key factor in having precipitated the German collapse. For Britain, it meant that seapower and economic warfare were the correct instruments for waging war on the continent of Europe; for Germany, if the collapse at home had precipitated the allied victory, the vaunted German army had been – as it claimed to be – undefeated in the field.

Both interpretations shaped strategy in the Second World War. After 1940 Britain was unable to use blockade so effectively, principally because Germany overran so much more of Europe and partly because, as a consequence, Britain itself was blockaded. It resorted to strategic bombing, not least as a substitute. By ‘dehousing’ the people of Germany, the allies hoped to provoke them into rebellion against Hitler in another revolution. By the same token the German army was determined to avoid a repeat of what it now called the ‘stab in the back’, and so its senior officers stressed the army’s solidarity with Hitler and the Nazis,
even when defeat was evident. In 1945 the German people did not turn against Hitler, as it had turned against the Kaiser in 1918. But the point remains that, in targeting public opinion, war was being waged not solely against the state, or its leaders, but also against its people. Nuclear deterrence, whose force derived precisely from its threat to destroy whole cities and their non-combatant populations, and which therefore held them to a form of covert ransom, was the apotheosis of the democratisation of war.

The step from here to what Rupert Smith has called ‘war amongst the people’ is short: in democracies, the opinions of the people can seem to be central to the decision-making processes of their governments. Popular endorsement was immediate for the United States’ decision to attack Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. By March 2003, public opinion was more divided on the invasion of Iraq: political elites led the United States and Britain into war, but opinion polls still endorsed the action once war was under way. The mood changed again as the war lengthened and headed towards failure. The strategic options which remained open were narrowed in part by popular discontent, with the result that by 2007 the latter was at least as influential in governmental thinking as the reports of the situation on the ground. Washington and London should not have been surprised, Their own strategy in March 2003 was itself predicated on a response from the Iraqi people, and assumed that Iraqis would welcome not only the fall of Saddam Hussein but also the invaders who had caused his downfall. As in the First World War, the western liberal powers tried to divide the leader from the led, with mixed results in both cases.

What Mary Kaldor called ‘new wars’ therefore contained elements that were shared by earlier wars: in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries revolutions and civil wars were intra-state conflicts which included ‘non-state’ actors. Crucially, however, jurists, soldiers and even statesmen were determined to keep their definitions of war tight and
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restrictive. In the nineteenth century ‘new wars’ were only rarely dignified with the title ‘war’: they were called revolutions at best and brigandage more often. By dubbing as ‘new wars’ violent crime, piracy or terror-driven extortion, we create an unnecessary existential crisis for military thought. ‘New wars’, when engaged in by states, tend to be fought for political control of the people, for their hearts and minds, not for political control of the territory wherein they reside or of the resources which that territory contains. Today it is the warlords who seek political control of the territory and its economic assets. However, the armies that are deployed to do the states’ jobs go in half-heartedly, their populations uncertain whether the conflicts in which their soldiers are risking their lives is really a war, and their governments consequently unsure about committing sufficient resources. The Balkans in the 1990s, Kaldor’s principal case study, illustrates the point exactly. The implication is that the states whose armies intervene have no right to be there, and the imposition of unrealistically short timetables confirms that impression. Meanwhile the forces themselves are deployed rather than employed, and their brief tends to be reactive, not proactive. The result is confusion, political and doctrinal. When is a new war an old war? Possibly when it is waged to reconstruct a ‘failed state’ in Afghanistan or to eliminate a ‘rogue state’ in Iraq. At first both looked more like ‘old wars’: conventional forces engaged in major combat operations in international conflict. But in both cases elements of ‘new war’ thinking served to muddy the waters in their execution.

The widening definition of war creates an incompatibility with strategy, the tool designed to comprehend it. War in its ideal form rests on overwhelming force, used with vigour and aggression, to achieve victory. In practice, the state’s aim, not only in Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ but increasingly also in Iraq and Afghanistan, is often to employ minimum force and to keep that force in theatre on the basis of consent. Such forces often do not use the full range of their equipment, for example strike aircraft or heavy tanks.
Peacekeeping and Security

In the 1990s the way out of this paradox was to call the commitments in theatres where ‘new wars’ flourished not war but peace-support or peace-keeping operations. However, this created ambiguity in another direction. General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-95, stressed the need for the forces under his control not to cross what he called ‘the consent divide’: in other words, as in the classic UN peace-keeping operations of an earlier generation, the UN forces were to observe a strict neutrality towards both hostile parties. In doing so he revealed two assumptions inherent in peace keeping. First, military force can be used impartially to enforce compliance even without a given enemy. Second, using force in this manner will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict. Thus the aim is negative, to forestall the wrong sort of solution for as long as possible.

The peace-keeping solution to the paradox of war has consequently spawned paradoxes of its own. One is the expectation inherent in the state providing such forces that they will not suffer casualties. This is not only improbable, it has also proved increasingly impracticable as peace-keeping forces have found themselves shifting to peace enforcement, a process which requires them to take sides and so abandon the principle of neutrality. General Sir Rupert Smith, Rose’s successor, described what he did as intervention and used air strikes. If the conflict is active and ongoing, there is really little hope of an early exit strategy for the peace-keepers without enforcement of this sort. But Smith’s responses obviated neither the reluctance to take casualties nor the emphasis on force protection. Ultimately these constraints shaped NATO’s response to the Kososo crisis in 1999.

Over 78 days NATO mounted more than 34,000 sorties against Serb forces and against Belgrade, and yet it was still not formally at war.
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The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, amplifying his remark that ‘This was not, strictly speaking, a war’, called it coercive diplomacy. It was not a war in another sense, that of war as a reciprocal relationship. NATO suffered no combat fatalities, and sorties were flown at 15,000 feet precisely to avoid that risk. As a theatre commander answerable directly to the President, Clark found himself caught in two cross-fires, that between Europe and Washington, and that within Washington, between the President and the Joint Chiefs. The latter, reflecting the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, were opposed to the use of United States forces in the Balkans. Clinton’s PDD-25 of 1994 had said that ‘it is not US policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or US involvement in such operations’. In the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, Kosovo represented a breach of that principle: the armed forces of the United States did war or they did nothing.

Their reactions were understandable. Peace-support operations make the principles of war problematic. War implies a full commitment of national resources, and this was the principle that Weinberger and Powell, smarting from the indignities of Vietnam, were so keen to sustain. Peace support tends to be under-resourced, despite its manpower-intensive demands. Moreover, command is not united, as every military axiom says it should be, but divided and normally multinational. The operational objectives are not clear and focused but seemingly small and frequently irrelevant. To gain them, forces are dispersed and not concentrated, and operations are deliberately or inevitably protracted rather than swift. Manoeuvrability and flexibility can be sacrificed on the altar of force protection. For armed forces trained and taught to believe that major war is their gold standard, peace support and peace keeping are therefore counter-intuitive, and yet for many NATO countries they are increasingly used not just to explain the use of force but to justify the very existence of the armed forces.
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The ambiguities have been played out in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the troops there have had to become hybrids. In the UN ideal of peacekeeping, the troops who patrolled a cease-fire line were a staging post in the transition from peace to war. In Afghanistan after the installation of the Karzai government and in Iraq after the formal end of major combat operations, the coalition forces were similarly overseeing the transition to peace. Their role, as in conventional peace-keeping, was to create sufficient security to allow peace to grow, even when the political complexion of that peace was still uncertain. But if the function of the troops was to enforce peace, they could no longer appear as neutrals. For at least some of the local population they then became part of the problem, and as a result found themselves in extremely dangerous situations where fire was met with fire. In these circumstances, peace-support operations and peace enforcement look to all intents and purposes like war.

This similarity is more than superficial. It is the product as much of peace-keeping’s purpose as of the nature of the fighting in which the peacekeepers find themselves engaged, in other words as much the product of politics as much as of tactics. Peace-support operations are undertaken by states, acting individually or collectively: even the United Nations acts in the name of states. The need for these operations, moreover, is most frequently triggered by the demands of those ethnic or religious groups who seek a separate identity or of the states which aim to suppress such calls for independence. Statehood is therefore very much in fashion, for all the anxieties generated by non-state actors operating within wars. The United Nations originally had 51 members; it now has 189. In most cases where the UN or another body deploys peace-keeping or even peace-enforcing contingents, the objective in the fighting is statehood and the issues surrounding it. The whole vocabulary of ‘failed states’ or ‘rogue states’ implies that states which are not failures or rogues are desirable.
The long-term security projections produced by the Pentagon before the 9/11 attacks and their British equivalents stressed the uncertainties which the world would confront over the next thirty years as a result of such trends as global warming, the competition for resources, migration and the growth of shanty towns. More recently the British government, both in the strategic trends forecast produced by the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre and in the speech delivered to the United Nations Security Council by the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, on 17 April 2007, has returned to this theme. These are undoubtedly issues for global governance and deserve coordinated action. But security concerns are not wars, and many so-called security issues are being or will be resolved without a military dimension. AIDS in Africa, however much it may be spread by the breakdown of government through civil war, does not itself cause war and is more effectively addressed by the efforts of medicine and education. If we imagine that insecurity itself is war, then we are in danger of militarising issues that would be best not militarised, of creating wars where there do not need to be wars, and of taking hammers to drive in screws.

Conclusions

The majority of the wars being waged in the world today are driven by remarkably traditional causes – ethnicity, religion and statehood. Moreover, their specific roots are regional more than they are global. The clash between ‘the forward strategy of freedom’, America’s utopian belief that democratisation will usher in an era of perpetual peace, and fundamentalist Islam, whose revulsion at the decadence and immorality of the capitalist west has itself fostered immorality, has generalised and globalised issues that are at bottom more specific. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are traditional zones of conflict, where tribal and ethnic divisions have competed with declared state identities for most of the last century, if not longer.
Moreover, if we are to understand the changing character of war, we must not fall back solely on war’s causation. The Cold War proved, after all, to be neither a war nor the pre-history of one, but the history of the prevention of a major war. As a result strategic studies focused more on the causes and prevention of war than on war itself. Strategic studies may have become unfairly unfashionable, the victim of the success of security and terrorist studies, but it has left a fraught legacy in at least one respect: we do not possess sufficient understanding of war itself, its nature and its character. Today’s wars can seem ‘new’ because in part we have not been addressing them properly.

At the end of book I, chapter 1 of On War, Clausewitz has a passage, not much more than half a page long in the Howard and Paret translation, in which he introduces what he calls the ‘trinity’. It was not given much serious attention until Raymond Aron did so in 1976, in his wonderful book, Penser la guerre. Clausewitz begins the section by likening war to a chameleon, suggesting that ‘in each concrete case it somewhat changes its nature’. This is a very literal translation of the German and the simile is not entirely clear. The two twentieth-century English translations render the German ‘Natur’ not as nature but as ‘character’ or ‘characteristic’, so implying that war’s underlying nature in fact remains the same. J.J. Graham, responsible for the first English translation, published in 1873, went further: he translated ‘Natur’ as ‘colour’, thus making absolutely clear that a chameleon remains a chameleon regardless of changes in its outward form, and so suggesting that the same is true of war. Clausewitz then goes on to say that war has three elements – passion, the play of probability and chance, and reason. He associates these three particularly (but not invariably) with three groups of actors in war: passion with the people, the play of probability and chance with generals and their armies, and reason with government and the political direction of the war.

The three elements in Clausewitz’s trinity are attributes, not actors; the
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trinity is not made up of the people, the army and the government. However, since 1976 many readings of the text have claimed that it is. They include three important interpretations of contemporary war which have already been highlighted in this essay – Colin Powell’s, which underpinned both the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, and which continued to shape the US armed forces’ perceptions of how they should be used until 2002, and beyond; Martin van Creveld’s in *The Transformation of War*, whose attack on Clausewitz is based both on a wilfully selective reading of the text and a misreading of what he had read; and Mary Kaldor’s, whose straw man of ‘old wars’ hinges on a similar misinterpretation of the Clausewitzian trinity. It is not even entirely clear whether Clausewitz regarded the three elements of war as necessarily linked to each of the three actors or whether they could be reapplied to the other actors, so that the people could be rational and the politicians passionate, and so on.

The more important criticism of the gloss which Powell, van Creveld and Kaldor put on Clausewitz’s trinity is their stress on the state. Powell wished the government, the electorate and the army to be in harmony before they went to war, a condition which in his view had not been met in Vietnam. Van Creveld and Kaldor had a different concern: they saw war as becoming separated from the state. Powell wanted his take on the Clausewitzian trinity to be true; van Creveld and Kaldor thought that it no longer was. By associating one element of the trinity with the government, and privileging it over the other two, they all linked the passage with Clausewitz’s most famous aphorism, that war is a true political instrument, and with the implication that war has a political identity because it is an act of policy.

A state’s policy is unilateral, at least in design, and its use of war as an act of policy is therefore also unilateral. But war itself is not unilateral; it is reciprocal. Seeing the trinity in terms of the state and the state’s coordination of its actions has deflected our attention from the fact that
the trinity in its original formulation is a statement about war’s nature. Clausewitz says war is not only like a chameleon but also like a trinity.

Clausewitz described the three elements of the trinity as three magnetic fields, whose relationship was always in flux. ‘A theory which ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.’18 There is no presumption here that reason – let alone the government or its policy – is necessarily the dominant element in war. It is only one element in a fluid and dynamic relationship with the other two, and war is poised between the magnetic forces of all three.

Clausewitz came from a family of Lutheran pastors, and he must have employed the word ‘trinity’ knowingly. The adjective he uses in conjunction with it is ‘wunderlich’, normally translated as ‘strange’, although Graham came closer to the phrase’s mystical connotations by rendering it as ‘wonderful’. The Christian doctrine of God as three in one implies an overarching unity that is even greater than the sum of its parts. So what is the whole that is the trinity? In this case it is of course not God. The answer is staring us in the face in the title of Clausewitz’s book, which is not called On War for nothing. The overarching ‘one’ in the three in one is not policy but war itself. In this formulation policy is subordinate to war, not vice versa.

The passage on the trinity does not define war. That comes elsewhere. Clausewitz discusses the nature of war at length in books II to V, those which are not often read today, in part because they focus on late Napoleonic warfare as Clausewitz himself had experienced it. But these are the books where Clausewitz developed concepts like friction, fear, courage, moral forces, military genius and chance. Clausewitz likened war to a game of cards. The ‘secondary’ elements of the trinity, the people, the army and the government, are the cards in your own hand. But how you play them depends on how your opponent also plays his.
War itself is the interaction between the two, and its course therefore follows what Alan Beyerchen has called a ‘non-linear’ progression.\textsuperscript{19}

If war remains an adversarial business whose dynamics create their own consequences, which can themselves be unpredictable, its nature cannot change. ‘War’, Clausewitz declared at the very outset of his book, ‘is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’\textsuperscript{20}

There is nothing in this bald statement about policy as integral to war, and indeed elsewhere policy is described as an alien element to war. Policy is thus forced to be more reactive to the elemental nature of war than the norms derived from a selective reading of Clausewitz allow. It has to adapt to the changing character of war, so that its aspirations remain in step with the war itself and with what the war can actually deliver. This is the challenge which both Iraq and Afghanistan pose: to develop a policy for both which is in harmony with war’s true nature.

Too often we make the mistake of identifying a need to change and adapt our policy with a change in the nature of war. The real problem may well be that our policy has failed to recognise war’s true nature, and so has mistaken changing characteristics for something more fundamental than they actually are.
Hew Strachan

References

1 John Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714* (London, 1999), esp 50


8 John Keegan, ‘The end of war?’, *Daily Telegraph*, 4 August 1997

9 Rosemary Righter, ‘St Ethelburga’s: a touchstone of peace and hope’, *The Times*, 13 December 1999, 15


11 What follows relies heavily on the ideas in applied ethics of my colleague in the Oxford Changing Character of War Programme, Dr David Rodin
Character of War


15 *The Herald* (Glasgow), 8 April 2004, p.6


20 Clausewitz, *On War*, p.75
Annexes
Annex A

The Europaeum Record

I. Academic Conferences

1993 Oxford  Are European Elites Losing Touch with their Peoples?
1994 Oxford  Europe and America after the Cold War: the End of the West
1995 Bonn  Integration of East Central Europe into the European Union
1996 Geneva  Defining the Projecting Europe’s Identity: Issues and Trade-Offs
1997 Paris I  Europe and Money
1998 Leiden  Human rights, the plight of immigrants and European immigration policy
2000 Bonn  The Implications of the new Knowledge and Technology
2001 Berlin  European Universities Project: Borderless Education: Bridging Europe
2003 Bonn  European Universities Project: New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks
2004 Leiden  Moving the Frontiers of Europe: Turkey, Risk or Opportunity
2005 Oxford  US-Europe: Americanisation and Europeanisation: Rivals or Synonums
2006 Oxford Diaspora/Homeland relations: Transnationalism and the Reconstruction of Identities in Europe
2007 Helsinki Inside Globalisation: Interpreting the New Order

II. Student Summer Schools

1994 Leiden  Concepts of Europe
1995 Bologna  The Problem of Political Leadership and the Ethnic Nation
1996 Bologna  The Civic Nation and the Ethnic Nation
1998 Budapest  Risk Policy Analysis
1998 Oxford Human Rights
1999 Paris I  NATO and European Defence
2000 Bologna  European Policy and Enlargement
2000 Oxford  Church as Politeia
Annex A

2001 Oxford  Human Rights and the movement of People in Europe
2002 Oxford  The Economics of European Integration
2003 Prague  Old and New Ideas of European Federalism
2004 Leiden  Islam and Europe: Building Bridges
2005 Geneva  Multilateral Governance: Effective Ways Forward?
2006 Krakow  Bridging the Divide: US-Europe Relations after 9/11
2007 Helsinki  Borders of Europe
2008 Bonn  Sacred Buildings in Modern Cities (forthcoming)

III. Teaching, Courses and Study Programmes

1999-01 Economics of European Integration (Paris - BA module option).
1999-01 Political Cultures and European Political Systems MA
         (Bologna, Oxford and Leiden).
2000-1  International Refugee Law (Geneva and Oxford).
2004-5  European Business, Cultures, and Institutions symposium
         (Leiden and Oxford).
2007-8  Connecting Europe through History Seminar Series

The Europaeum played the key role in the creation at Oxford of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law, the European Humanities Research Centre, the Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, plus a number of fellowships, including the Chair in European Thought and, the Bertelsmann Europaeum Visiting Professorship in 20th Century Jewish History and Politics. The Europaeum is also supporting many other projects such as the Leiden University diplomacy training programme.

IV. Linked Scholarship Programmes

☐  The Roy Jenkins Memorial Fund 2004 - Six Europaeum students to
   Oxford and two outgoing Oxford students per annum.
☐  The Oxford-Geneva Bursary Scheme 1997-2008 Annual bursaries for
   student exchanges between Oxford and the HEI.
☐  The Scatcherd European Scholarships 1997 - Fully funded places at
   Oxford for European graduates, and for Oxford graduates at European Universities.
Annex A


- **Henry R Kravis Scholarships 1990s** - Allowed students read an M.Phil or M.Juris in at Oxford;

- **Thyssen Scholarships 1990s** - For study of M.Phil at Oxford.

V. Joint Research and Support Projects

The *Future of European Universities Project (2001-4)*, supported by Daimler-Chrysler Services A G, was a three-year investigation into the impact of new technology and the Knowledge Revolution with international expert conferences on *Borderless Education: Bridging Europe (Berlin 2001); New Times : New Responsibilities (Paris 2002); and New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks (Bonn 2003).*

The *Europaeum Research Project Groups (2001-) scheme* encourages collaborative research across the association, supporting groups looking at such themes such as *Party System Changes; Churches and the Family; European Economic Integration; The Kosovo Stability Pact; European Identity; Regulation of E-commerce; Liberalism in 20th Century Europe; Transmission and Understanding in the Sciences; Cultural Difference in Europe; and Political Concepts in Europe.*

*Islam-in-Europe Programme 2004-8* has supported workshops and other events around this key theme, culminating in an international lecture series and conference.

The *US-Europe Trans-Atlantic Dialogue Programme 2005-8* is supporting workshops and other events around this key theme, culminating in an international workshop and conference.

VI. Mobility Schemes

The *Europaeum New Initiatives Scheme* provides seed funding for innovative and imaginative forms of academic collaboration within, but not exclusive to, the Europaeum academic community.

The *Europaeum Visiting Professors Scheme* supports the movement of professors from one partner institution to another, for periods of up to two weeks for the purposes of lecturing, study, research and project development.

*Europaeum Mobility Schemes* support individual academics and selected graduate students from member institutions participating in selected European events and activities, including conferences, seminars and summer schools.
## Europaeum University Members

### OXFORD
Founded officially in 1249, though teaching is known to date back to 1096.

**Vice-Chancellor:**
Dr John Hood

**Management Committee:**
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### LEIDEN
Founded in 1575 by the States of Holland, at the behest of William of Orange.

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### BOLOGNA
Constituted in 1158 by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, though independent teaching dates back to 1088.

**Rector:**
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### BONN
Founded in 1818 by Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm III, preceded by an Academy established in 1777.

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### KRAKOW
Founded in 1364 by King Casimir the Great. In 1817 the it was renamed Jagiellonian in honour of the Polish kings.

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Annex B

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<tr>
<th>GENEVA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Founded in 1927; associated to, but not part of, the University of Geneva.</td>
<td>Dr Daniel Warner</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Director:</strong></td>
<td>Deputy to the Director, HEI</td>
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<td>Professor Philippe Burrin</td>
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<td><strong>Email:</strong></td>
<td>CH-1211 GENEVE 21</td>
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<td>Professor Farhad Ameli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President:</strong></td>
<td>Universite Paris I-Sorbonne</td>
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<td><strong>Email:</strong></td>
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<td>Founded in 1348, divided into Czech and German institutions in 1882. In 1945 the German section was abolished and Czech revived.</td>
<td>Ms Ivana Halašková</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rector:</strong></td>
<td>Director, International Relations Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor Václav Hampl</td>
<td>Univerzita Karlova V Praze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Email:</strong></td>
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<td>116 36 PRAHA 1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MADRID</th>
<th>Management Committee:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded in 1293, moved to Madrid in 1836.</td>
<td>Dr Juana Amoros Carmona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rector:</strong></td>
<td>Oficina de Relaciones Internacionales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Carlos Berzosa Alonso Martinez</td>
<td>Universidad Complutense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Email:</strong></td>
<td>Ciudad Universitaria, 28040 MADRID</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HELSINKI</th>
<th>Management Committee:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founded in 1640 as the Royal Academy of Turku. In 1917 when Finland became independent, the university was renamed.</td>
<td>Mrs Marie-Louise Hindsberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rector:</strong></td>
<td>PO Box 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Ilkka Niiniluoto</td>
<td>(Yliopistonkatu 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Email:</strong></td>
<td>FI-00014 University of Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Email:**      | marie.hindsberg@helsinki.fi |