EVROPAEVM

The United Nations and Peace-Keeping since the Cold War: success, failure or neither?

MARRACK GOULDING

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
Details of Europaeum activities are given in Annex A at the back of this pamphlet.

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MARRACK GOULDING

Sir Marrack Goulding

Biography to be Inserted Here.

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Introduction

The maintenance of international peace and security is the first purpose given to the United Nations in its Charter. Peace is what the people of the world want the UN to deliver. Time and again the UN has failed to fulfil their hopes. There are several reasons for this.

The most frequent reason is failure by one or more member states to respect the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter a state may use armed force only in two circumstances: in self-defence or when the Security Council has authorized the use of force for a specific purpose approved by the Council. Only too often member states of the UN have failed to comply with the Charter in this respect. They have chosen to use military force rather than try to settle disputes by peaceful means, an objective to which all states commit themselves when they join the United Nations.

A second reason is that most of the conflicts since the United Nations was established in 1945 have been conflicts within a state and not conflicts between states. The Charter does not define a role for the UN with regard to internal conflicts; on the contrary, it says specifically that the UN may not intervene in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, as a civil war obviously is. This is an expression of the principle of state sovereignty which has been the foundation of internal relations for over three hundred years. That principle, fiercely defended by all states, has often blocked well-meaning efforts by the Secretary-General to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

A third reason for the United Nations' limited success in maintaining the peace, and the most frequent reason, has been the inability of the member states of the UN to agree on what should be done when peace is threatened or is violated. This problem was particularly evident during the Cold War, when international relations world-wide were contaminated by the struggle between the East and the West. During those 45 years there was no direct fighting between the two sides. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons prevented that. Instead, the war between East and West was fought indirectly in a series of proxy wars in Africa and Asia and Latin America in which the West supported one side and the East supported the other.

The classic example of these proxy wars was in Central America. Three internal conflicts erupted there in the 1960s – in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The causes of these conflicts were indigenous; they related to racial discrimination, the inequitable distribution of the national wealth, brutal systems of law and order, the impunity of public officials and so on. But Moscow and its allies in Havana took advantage of these civil wars to try to undermine United States hegemony in the Americas; and the Americans fought back, directly by attacking and boycotting Cuba and indirectly by giving military and financial support to the rightist military governments that were fighting Soviet-supported rebels. By the early 1980s, the East had triumphed in Nicaragua but the West still had the upper hand in El Salvador and Guatemala; the US accordingly supported the rebels in Nicaragua and the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, while the Soviets supported the government in Nicaragua and the rebels in the other two countries.

The New Dawn

For the United Nations, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s was a new dawn. The Security Council could at last discuss, in a reasonably impartial way, the action that might be taken to resolve conflicts, beginning with the proxy wars of the Cold War. The then Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, sensed as early as 1986 that the Cold

War was coming to an end and engaged the five Permanent Members in confidential discussions on how the Council could help resolve the six year old war between Iran and Iraq. This was a shrewd move because that war was not a proxy war of the Cold War; it was damaging the interests of both East and West, and this helped Pérez de Cuéllar to persuade all the Permanent Members that the Security Council should take an initiative to end the war. This it did and after two years of intense diplomacy the outlines of a settlement were accepted by the two sides and a cease-fire came into effect.

Soon the Secretary-General and the Council moved on to tackle the proxy wars themselves. Those wars had lost their *raisons d'être* after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in quick succession Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan; agreement was reached on the linked issues of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia; in Central America, the UN facilitated the transfer of power after the Sandinistas were voted out of office in Nicaragua, it mediated a comprehensive peace settlement for El Salvador and it began work on a similar one for Guatemala; settlements were negotiated and began to be put into effect in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and Western Sahara. And in 1990 the Council authorized a coalition led by the United States to use force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the first time the Council had taken such action since its authorization, forty years before, of an American-led coalition to use force in response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea.

Never before had the United Nations done so much to satisfy the hopes that had been raised in 1945 that it would be a real force for peace in the world. The new challenges and opportunities led us in the Secretariat to believe that the future of the UN depended on our ability to seize the moment and show that the Organization we served had the capacity to undertake the tasks envisaged for it forty four years before. Never before had its officials enjoyed such success. Euphoria prevailed.

As early as December 1988, a New York publication called *The Diplomatic World Bulletin* wrote:

'As 1988 wound down, one of the most successful years for the United Nations in its 43-year history, the world body basked in a warm glow of nearly universal esteem and Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar hailed what he termed 'a time of extraordinary hope and promise'. The euphoria infected the New York staff, which, in a stroke of genius, organized the first UN Open House, inviting visitors in off the street to tour the headquarters for free, meet representatives of peace forces and, as USG Marrack Goulding put it, 'share with us the joy and pride at the award of the Nobel Peace Prize'.

But the euphoria was premature. Not all the proxy conflicts could be resolved. In some of them the indigenous causes of the war remained so strong that the removal of the East-West factor was not sufficient to bring them to an end. This was the case in Afghanistan, Angola and Western Sahara.

A greater threat to our hopes came from two new factors. The collapse of the Communist-ruled federations in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led (as the collapse of empires always does) to a number of wars between and within the successor states. Coincidentally Africa was devastated by a rash of wars generated by ethnic conflicts and the extreme weakness of state institutions in that continent. In both categories of war civilian casualties were appallingly high.

So the end of the Cold war led to - or coincided with – an increase in conflict, not a reduction. And it placed on the Security Council and other members of the United Nations tasks which they found it increasingly difficult to fulfil.

Those tasks led to a very rapid growth in peacekeeping. Although I doubt whether it is necessary in this city and this institute, I should perhaps describe briefly what peacekeeping is. A United Nations peacekeeping operation is composed of military personnel, and often police as well, who are made available to the UN by their governments, and of civilians who are provided by the Secretary-General. It is established by the Security Council which places it under the day-to-

day command of the Secretary-General and expects regular reports from him (or, one day let us hope, from her) on how the operation is faring. The operation is deployed with the consent of the parties to the conflict who agree not only to its deployment but also to the tasks that it will perform. It is required to be neutral and impartial between the parties. If the operation includes armed personnel, they are authorized to use their arms only in self-defence. Finally, the costs of the operation are apportioned amongst all the member states of the UN.

In 1988 there were just over 10,000 UN soldiers and police officers in the field, in six peacekeeping operations; the average age of the operations was 21 years. By mid-1993 there were 17 operations in the field, with a complement of about 55,000 troops and police officers; two thirds of them had been in the field for two years or less.

But then the tide turned. Disaster struck in Somalia in October 1993, in Rwanda in April 1994 and repeatedly in Bosnia, culminating in the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. The United Nations was humiliated and its peacekeeping forces were especially criticized for their failure to protect either civilians caught up in war or the humanitarian agencies which were trying to bring them relief. The criticism was unfair, because the peacekeepers' mandates did not at that time include the protection of civilians. But the damage to the UN's standing was severe. Uniformed UN personnel in the field peaked at 78,000 in late 1994 but two years later the total had fallen to barely 20,000.

Peacekeeping, the most conspicuous of the techniques which the UN uses in its efforts to maintain peace and security, had become discredited, especially in Washington, and there was little enthusiasm in the Security Council for the deployment of new operations. The bubble, some said, had burst.

What went wrong? What lessons have been learnt from what went wrong? How is the UN placed today, fifteen years after the new dawn broke and ten years after many declared it to have been a false dawn? These are the questions I will address in the remainder of this lecture.

What went wrong?

The first thing that went wrong was the failure of the United Nations (by which I mean both the Organization itself and its member states, for it is they who determine the Organization's policies) to face up to the problem of sovereignty. As I have already mentioned, sovereignty is a basic principle of international relations. Member states' sovereign right to block international intervention in their domestic affairs means that at any one time only a small minority of the internal conflicts in the world are available for international mediation; in the majority of cases governments are unwilling to permit foreign involvement in their affairs. Even when the conflict is between states, the international mediator has to obtain the consent of both of those states before he or she can begin work. Preventive diplomacy is a technique which has received much attention since the end of the Cold War but it is nearly always blocked because one or both of the hostile parties withholds its consent.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was, as one would expect from a Latin American jurist, a staunch defender of sovereignty. But towards the end of his period of office he publicly expressed doubts about whether sovereignty should invariably prevail. In a speech in Bordeaux, he expressed the view that international law must not stagnate but must keep pace with changes in international life; perhaps, he said, a balance had been established between the rights of states, as confirmed by the Charter, and the rights of individuals, as confirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; did this not call into question the notion that sovereignty was not to be violated in any circumstances?

That was a spark of light. But its effect was limited. We still have to live with the reality that where peacemaking is concerned (and by peacemaking I mean the use of diplomatic means to resolve disputes), sovereignty will, for the indefinite future, remain a major obstacle to third party involvement. The error that was made by the United Nations and its member states in the glory years following the end of the Cold War was their failure to state this reality clearly and publicly and thus

to correct the mistaken expectation that all conflicts are susceptible to third party mediation. Too often the question "why doesn't the UN do something?" did not receive from governments the honest reply "because the warring parties will not let it get involved"; it was more comfortable for governments to let the UN carry the blame.

It would have been more helpful if they had cited Professor William Zartman's theory on the ripeness of conflicts for third party mediation. It states that third party mediators have to wait until a conflict is ripe for their attention and defines the moment of ripeness as "a mutually hurtful stalemate, with a way out", the "way out" being the essential ingredients of a settlement which have been identified in earlier peacemaking efforts. This should have been the basis on which governments persuaded their parliaments, media and public opinion that at any one time only a small minority of conflicts in the world will be available for peacemaking by the UN or anyone else.

The second thing that went wrong was that the Secretariat, including myself, became over-enthusiastic about peacekeeping. The successes in the period from 1988 to 1992 blunted our critical faculties. We became careless. We did not devote enough time to informing ourselves about the conflicts in which peacekeeping seemed to us – and to the member states – a viable option. We also became hopelessly over-stretched. At the end of 1992 I was responsible for the political direction of 13 peacekeeping operations with a total strength of over 50,000 uniformed personnel and several thousand civilians. For this task I had a staff of twelve civilian professionals, nine military advisers and a couple of dozen support staff. This was grossly inadequate. But there was no disposition on the part of member states to increase the strength of my department, other than by providing military officers at their expense. Many of these were undisguisedly in New York to watch over their own countries' interests rather than to contribute to a truly international effort to carry out the tasks entrusted to us by the Security Council.

The third thing that went wrong was that the Security Council itself

became careless or, as many of us felt at the time, irresponsible. This was not a completely new phenomenon; in 1978 the United States had pushed through a resolution setting up a peacekeeping operation in southern Lebanon without allowing the then Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, to consult the PLO. As the PLO were the dominant military power in the zone in which the UN force was supposed to ensure that no hostile activities took place, the PLO could say that it had not been consulted and was not therefore obliged to accept the mandate – or tasks – given to the new force. As a result many lives, including UN lives, were lost and the new force was never able to fulfil its mandate.

Far worse happened in the post-Cold War period. In 1994 in Rwanda extremist Hutus killed some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. When the slaughter began, the commander of the small UN force that was already deployed in Rwanda told Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that if he could have 5,000 well-trained, mobile troops he could bring the killing under control or at least reduce the number of deaths. Boutros-Ghali sought those troops from the Western members of the United Nations, especially those who were on the Security Council. He received not a single offer. The genocide continued.

A year before, the three western Permanent Members, pressed by their electorates to stop the ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Bosnia, dreamt up the idea of declaring six besieged Muslim-majority cities as "safe areas" in which the UN would ensure that civilians were not attacked. The Secretary-General's military advisers, including the force commander of UNPROFOR, the UN force already deployed in Bosnia, said that this concept was not militarily viable. "Never mind", said the Western powers, "do your best". The generals dutifully produced a concept of operations under which sufficient troops would be stationed in the six cities to "deter by strength" any Serb attack; 34,000 additional troops would be required if the deterrence was to work. "That's more than we can afford", said the Western powers; "isn't there a 'light option'?" Boutros-Ghali, conscious of where the power lay, gave in and asked the Security Council for only 7,600 additional troops. Fifteen months later the Serbs attacked Srebrenica, undeterred by the small

UN force deployed there, and several thousand Muslim men and boys were executed in cold blood.

These mistakes by the Security Council inflicted enormous damage on the UN's standing as an institution and, in particular, on the credibility of its peacekeeping role.

The fourth thing that went wrong was an ever-growing gap between supply and demand. It was not only in the Secretariat's peacekeeping department that resources were inadequate. As wars and UN peacekeeping operations proliferated, it became more and more difficult to obtain the required troops and finance. The almost ten-fold increase in the cost of peacekeeping between 1988 and 1993 fell particularly heavily on the developed countries (defined as the member states of the OECD) which, under the scale of assessments at the time, contributed almost 90 per cent of the money the UN needed to fund its peacekeeping operations; that figure has since risen to 93.7 per cent.

Moreover contributions to the UN's costs were not the only burden the developed countries had to bear. If they themselves contributed troops to an operation, they – like other troop contributing nations – received from the UN reimbursement of the costs they were deemed to have incurred. But those reimbursements came at a flat rate of approximately $1,000 per soldier per month, irrespective of the actual costs incurred by the troop-contributing country, which in high-price countries could exceed $4,000 per soldier per month.

This factor had, and continues to have, an effect on the composition of UN peacekeeping operations. When I assumed responsibility for peacekeeping in 1986, almost all the troops in the field came from OECD countries; only in the force in southern Lebanon were there significant contingents from the Third World. As the volume of peacekeeping grew, I made a deliberate effort to widen the pool by bringing in troops and police from countries which had never before contributed to peacekeeping, in the hope that this would enhance the credibility of these operations as enterprises undertaken by the international community as a whole. This worked well and many Third

World countries joined the peacekeeping team. But financial considerations caused a steady decline in participation by the armies of developed countries.

The Lessons Learnt

In the ten years since peacekeeping turned sour, a huge amount of research has been done in the United Nations, by governments, by universities and think tanks, and by other NGOs interested in the prevention and resolution of conflict. There is now, I think, a common understanding of why things went wrong in those crazy years after the end of the Cold War. New doctrines have been developed, especially for peacekeeping, and have been tested in the field, on the whole successfully.

I would like to mention seven positive developments and four negative ones, before evaluating whether the UN's role since the late 1980s has been a success or a failure.

The first positive factor relates to peacemaking. Central America in the first half of the 1990s was a kind of peacemaking laboratory for the UN. The negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala taught us a lot and were carefully recorded, something that does not always happen at the United Nations. It can now be said that there is a UN doctrine on how to mediate the settlement of internal conflicts. The master-mind has been Alvaro de Soto, who led the team in El Salvador and has recently displayed his skills in a determined, but alas failed, effort to settle the long-standing conflict in Cyprus. Sovereignty nevertheless remains a major obstacle in this field.

The second positive factor is that some progress has been made in circumventing the sovereignty obstacle in cases where the issue at stake is the protection of civilians caught up in war. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has boldly taken the lead in arguing that there are situations in which the human suffering is so great that sovereignty cannot be allowed to block international efforts to bring relief to the civilian

victims of the war. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which was appointed by the Canadian government in September 2000, published a year later a magisterial report which sets out very clearly the arguments for international humanitarian intervention – or, as the commissioners preferred to call it, "exercise of the responsibility to protect" - and defines the circumstances in which such action can be justified.

The third positive factor is that it is now recognized that peacekeeping will not function well unless the headquarters staff in New York are numerous enough and well enough informed to provide the necessary direction to the commanders in the field. These points – and many other wise recommendations – are to be found in the report of a panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi which was submitted to Kofi Annan in the year 2000. It has resulted in a considerable strengthening of the peacekeeping department. Many of its other recommendations have not, however, yet been implemented. This is due to two factors: the developed countries think that the recommendations would cost too much; and the developing countries do not favour yet another transfer of resources and political energy to peace and security issues, to the detriment of the UN's other great objective, economic and social development, which they feel has been increasingly neglected since the end of the Cold War.

The fourth positive factor is that there has evolved a new form of peacekeeping which did not occur, with one very small exception, during the Cold War. Almost all operations at that time were what is now classified as "traditional peacekeeping". They were military in composition and their purpose was to create time and space for successful peacemaking. To this end they monitored cease-fires, controlled buffer zones, used their good offices to resolve tensions between the parties and so on. Their main problem was that the peacemakers often failed in their role. When this happened, in the Middle East, for instance, the peacekeeping operations were left high and dry and lost their credibility; in some cases it was even argued that

they actually obstructed the achievement of peace because their presence, in Cyprus for instance, protected the political leaders from the military consequences of their intransigence at the negotiating table.

The post-Cold War innovation was the deployment of a peacekeeping operation after the peacemakers had completed their work. The peacekeepers' task then was to help the parties implement the peace settlement they had signed. Because these settlements often covered a wide range of issues, especially when the conflict had been an internal one, the operations have been headed by a civilian and have included large civilian components, in addition to the usual military one. The civilians' functions have included such activities as the return and resettlement of refugees, the conduct of elections, the verification of human rights, reform of the police and post-war reconstruction. As a result, this new type of peacekeeping has been called "multifunctional peacekeeping". Most of the multifunctional operations have been successful, eg in Namibia, the Central American countries, Cambodia and Mozambique, but others have had to be withdrawn because one or other of the parties failed to honour the peace agreement, in Angola for instance.

The fifth positive factor is the evolution of another new kind of peacekeeping operation which I call "forceful peacekeeping". When I was in charge of peacekeeping, I insisted on respect for the old doctrine: force could not be used except in self-defence; there was no half-way house between consent-based peacekeeping and peace enforcement (by which is meant operations in which the Security Council has authorized governments to use force against a state which has violated the Charter, the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 being the best example). As already mentioned, this doctrine sometimes exposed UN peacekeepers to humiliation and the agony of not being able to stop violations of human rights because they were not mandated to do so.

The new doctrine is based on recognition of the fact that the parties' consent to a peacekeeping operation is often less than perfect. The leaders of the hostile parties may have given their consent but because

of weak chains of command, internal disputes or dishonesty on the part of the leaders, the commander of the UN operation cannot be confident that he can rely on full consent. In these circumstances an operation can now be authorized to use force, if necessary, to achieve objectives that have been agreed by the parties. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the mandate of the present UN operation authorizes it to use force, if necessary, in order to protect humanitarian operations, prevent gross violations of human rights, guard key installations and keep communications open.

But this authorization is subject to the important proviso that force must be used impartially. This is what distinguishes forceful peacekeeping from peace enforcement. In peace enforcement, the use of force is authorized against a named offender. In 1990 it was the government of Iraq which had invaded Kuwait; the Security Council was not impartial between Iraq and Kuwait; Iraq had violated the Charter and had to be driven from Kuwait. But in forceful peacekeeping the use of force is authorized against any individuals who break certain rules, irrespective of which side they are on in the internal conflict. In Somalia, for instance, anyone who interfered with humanitarian operations was vulnerable to attack by the Security Council-authorized force, UNITAF, whatever faction they belonged to; the force thus remained neutral as regards the internal conflict and impartial in its use of force.

The sixth positive factor is another recent innovation which has enlarged the United Nations' capacity to deal with the aftermath of conflict. This is the establishment by the Security Council of a UN transitional administration in a disputed territory. There have been three such cases in recent years. In all of them the dispute has been due to the desire of the people of that territory to secede from the state of which it is part.

Eastern Slavonia seceded from Croatia in 1991 but was restored to that country in 1996 under the agreements which ended the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia. The UN operation had exclusive

executive power for a two year period, after which the Croatian authorities took over.

Kosovo is more complicated. It was and remains a disputed territory. It belongs to Serbia but the majority of its population are Albanians who want to secede from Serbia. The UN assumed responsibility for all civilian administrative functions in 1999, with NATO providing the military presence, and it remains there in 2003, with no clear solution in sight for the political dispute.

The third transitional administration was established in East Timor, a former Portuguese colony that was annexed by Indonesia in 1975. In 1999, after a long armed struggle, the people of the territory voted overwhelmingly for independence. Chaos resulted. The Security Council authorized a military force led by Australia to restore peace and security and then established a UN operation to administer the territory until independence in 2002.

These three transitional administrations have been successful, though uncertainty about the territory's political future overshadows the one in Kosovo. It is also to be noted that all three territories are very small; it would be naïve to think that the UN has the capacity to undertake a similar operation in a country as large as Iraq.

The final positive factor is the UN's recognition of the importance of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding means international action to help countries torn by civil war to identify the root causes of the conflict that has just ended and to find means of eradicating those root causes. This takes time because the roots often turn out to be deep. It also requires a more profound understanding of the country concerned than peacemakers and peacekeepers usually have. It is also very sensitive politically because it touches on issues deep within the domestic jurisdiction of the country concerned. It will not work if it is seen as something which is being imposed on that country by foreigners. The country's civil society and other institutions need to feel that they have ownership of the peacebuilding process. It is not, therefore, an activity

in which foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations should take the lead. That is best entrusted to international NGOs, working closely with their local partners. The positive development is that the United Nations now understands these realities and recognizes that restoring the peace is not just a matter of negotiating a peace settlement and then deploying a peacekeeping operation to help implement it. The commitment has to be longer than that – and less conspicuous.

I come now to the four negative factors.

The first is the problem of resources. As has been mentioned, the OECD countries pay 93.7% of the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. Not withstanding the universal principles set out in the Charter, this financial reality creates the risk that in practice UN peacekeepers will be deployed only where the developed Western democracies think they are needed. On the whole, those countries have been guided by the Charter principles and have not discriminated against the developing world in favour of the developed. The oft-repeated complaint that Africa has not had its fair share of peacekeeping in recent years is not justified. The huge investment of peacekeeping resources in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 did distort the balance but nine peacekeeping operations were deployed in Africa during that period. But the participation of developed countries in peacekeeping continues to decline and this is a cause for concern.

The second negative factor has also been mentioned. It is the division between North and South about the United Nations' priorities. During the Cold War, there was comparatively little opportunity for the Organization to exercise its role in the maintenance of peace and security. As a result, resources and political energy were available for the Organization's activities in the field of economic and social development. When the Cold War ended, most of the constraints on action by the Security Council were removed and the West's emphasis shifted dramatically in favour of peace and security. The impression that development is being short-changed is aggravated by the fact that

there is no institution in the United Nations Organization which has, in the economic and social field, the degree of executive authority entrusted to the Security Council in the peace and security field.

A further contribution to this malaise within the membership is the justified perceptions (a) that the Security Council is not representative of the world as it is at the beginning of the 21st century and (b) that those members who were given the privilege of permanent membership in 1945 were also unfairly given the power to block reform, because the Charter requires that any amendments to it require ratification by all five permanent members of the Security Council.

The third negative factor relates to double standards. The contrast between the West=s refusal in 1994 to do anything to help save 800,000 lives in Rwanda and its readiness in 1999 to spend billions of dollars and violate international law in response to a few thousand murders in Kosovo is a scandal which has undermined Third World confidence in the United Nations. So is the current punitive attack on Iraq, when no action is taken to restrain the excesses of another Middle Eastern state which has weapons of mass destruction, occupies territory belonging to its neighbours and is in continuous violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the rights of the civilian population in territories occupied in war.

This issue of double standards brings us to the fourth negative factor. It relates to what might be called the 'ethical dimension' of the United Nations. The message of its Charter is that, notwithstanding the sovereignty of the UN's member states, their individual national interests should not prevail over the ethical purposes for which the Organization was established in 1945. It is only natural that governments should use the United Nations as a forum for the promotion of their national interests. It would be naïve to expect otherwise. But since the end of the Cold War, national interests seem more and more to prevail over the advancement of the collective interest of all member states of the United Nations in creating a more peaceful, just and prosperous world. This has contributed to a widespread

perception amongst the countries of the Third World that the end of the Cold War has enabled the countries of the West to take over the United Nations and to use it, and other international organizations, to promote the West's interests to the detriment of the interests of the developing countries.

Conclusion

To conclude, has the UN been a success or a failure or neither in the pursuit of its primary purpose since the end of the Cold War? I would vote for "neither", while insisting that the successes have exceeded the failures, that the UN has learnt the lessons of the last 15 years and is now well prepared to fulfil a wide variety of roles in the maintenance of peace and security. The question to which I do not know the answer, on this 21ˢᵗ day of the war against Iraq, is whether the United Nations will again be permitted to perform those roles.

The Europaeum Record

I. Academic Conferences

1993 Oxford: *Are European Elites Losing Touch with their Peoples?*

1994 Oxford: *Europe and America after the Cold War: the end of the West*

1995 Bonn: *The integration of East Central Europe into the European Union*

1996 Geneva: *Defining the Projecting Europe's Identity: Issues and Trade-Offs* at Geneva

1997 Paris I: *Europe and Money*

1998 Leiden: *Human rights, with particular reference to plight of immigrants and immigration policy in Europe*

2000 Bonn: *The Implications of the new Knowledge and Tecnology* at Bonn

2001 Berlin: European Universities: *Borderless Education: Challenges for the new Europe*

2002 Paris: European Universities: *New Times: New Responsibilities*

2003 Bonn: European Universities: *New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks*

II.   Student Summer Schools

1994 Leiden: *Concepts of Europe*

1995 Bologna: *The Problem of Political leadership between History and Social Science*

1996 Bologna: *The Civic Nation and the Ethnic Nation*

1998 Budapest: *Risk Policy Analysis*

1998 Oxford: *Human Rights*

1999 Paris I: *NATO and European Defence*

2000 Bologna: *European Policy and Enlargement*

2000 Oxford: *Church as Politeia: the political self-understanding of Christianity*

2001 Oxford: *Human Rights and the movement of people: Meeting the Challenges of Racism, Migration and Displacement*

2002 Oxford: *The Economics of European Integration*

2003 Prague: *Old and New Ideas of Federalism*

III. Joint Teaching Courses and Programmes

1992 Oxford/Leiden   *European Law* involving joint teaching and study, and student exchanges linking Oxford, Leiden and Sienna.

1999 Paris   *Economics of European Integration* Europaeum module for undergraduates and graduates.

1999 Bologna   *Political Cultures and European Political Systems* joint programme linked to Oxford and Leiden.

2000 Geneva Oxford   *International Refugee Law* joint teaching Programme linked to Oxford.

2003 Leiden/Oxford   *Leadership Programme* in *European Business Cultures Institutions*.

2003 Bologna/Oxford   MA in *European Political Cultures, Institutions and History*.

❑ Cross-Europe academic networks function in Economics, History, Politics and Theology, helping to promote collaborative teaching and mobility of graduate research students. Other initiatives link scholars in Classics, History of Science and Environmental Science.

❑ The Europaeum played the key role in the creation at Oxford of the *Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, the Oxford Institute of European* and *Comparative Law*, plus a number of fellowships, the *Chair in European Thought* and, most recently, the *Bertelsmann Europaeum Visiting Professorship in 20th Century Jewish History and Politics*.

IV. Scholarship Programmes

❑ The **Oxford-Geneva Link Programme** provides annual bursaries for student exchanges between Oxford and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, together with other collaborative activities including joint teaching and Europaeum Lectures.

❑ The **Europaeum Scholarships in Jewish Studies** have provided up to six places each year for Europaeum graduate students to spend a year in Oxford studying for the Diploma in Jewish Studies at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies between 1995 and 2001. Discussions continue to create a new scheme to accompany the upgrading of the Jewish Studies programme to an MA course.

❑ The **Scatcherd European Scholarships** scheme, founded at Oxford, as part of the Europaeum initiative in 1997, offers fully funded places at Oxford for European graduates, including all Europaeum partner institutions; and also places for Oxford graduates at leading European Universities, including Europaeum partner universities.

V. Joint Research Projects and Support

❑ A **Research Directory** of interests of staff involved in European Studies in partner institutions is accessible via the Europaeum internet site to build and encourage academic collaboration.

❑ The **Europaeum Project on the *Future of European Universities***, supported by DaimlerChrysler Services A G, a three-year investigation into the impact of new technology and the Knowledge Revolution was initiated in 2001. International conferences on *Borderless Education: Bridging Europe* (Berlin 2001); *New Times New Responsibilities* (Paris 2002); and *New Partnerships: Opportunities and Risks* (Bonn 2003) have been held.

❑ Past international **Europaeum research projects** have been on *Party System Changes* (1997) and *The origins and aftermath of the Kosovo crisis* (2000).

❑ The ***Europaeum Research Project Groups*** scheme encourages collaborative research across the association. The following groups have been backed so far: The Churches and the Family; European Monetary Integration; The Kosovo Stability Pact; International Intervention; European identity; Unilateral Action; Regulation of E-commerce;

Liberalism in 20th Century Europe; Transmission and Understanding in the Sciences; and Cultural Difference in Europe.

VI. Mobility Schemes

❑ The *Europaeum New Initiatives Scheme* provides seed funding for new, innovative and imaginative forms of academic collaboration within, but not exclusive to, the Europaeum academic community.

More than 20 awards have been made to date, including: Law Staff Exchange on e-commerce; Europaeum Lecture Roundtable, Telecommunications Conference; Theology Summer Lecture Series; Anglo-Czech Historians Project; Classicists Colloquium; Third Way Conference; Russia and Europe; Model European Student debate; Policy Transfer Seminar on EU Regulation and Corruption; Church and Family Workshop; History of Science in 18th & 19th Centuries; Meeting the Other; Russia and Europe; Medieval History Research Conference; Classical Colloquium; Student Model UN Debate; Telecommunications Conference; European Social Indicators; and Church Theology Links.

❑ The *Europaeum Visiting Professors Scheme* supports the movement of academics from one partner institution to another.

❑ **Europaeum Mobility Schemes** aim to support individual academics and students from member institutions participating in selected European events and activities, including conferences, seminars and summer schools.

The Europaeum
Partners & Representatives

❑ OXFORD

The University of Oxford, comprising 39 Colleges and 6 Private Halls, dates its foundation offically to 1249, though teaching at Oxford is known to date back to 1096, the first overseas scholar having arrived in 1190.

Vice-Chancellor: Sir Colin Lucas
Academic Committee: Professor Michael Freeden (Politics)
Professor Mark Freedland (Law)

Management Committee representative:

Mrs Beverly Potts
International Office
University of Oxford
Wellington Square
OXFORD OX1 2JD
Email: Beverly.Potts@admin.ox.ac.uk

❑ LEIDEN

Universiteit Leiden founded in 1575 by the States of Holland, as a reward for the town's brave resistance against the Spanish, at the behest of William of Orange.

Rector: Professor Douwe Breimer
Academic Committee: Professor Henk Dekker (Politics)
Professor Herman Philipse (Philosophy)

Management Committee representative:

Dr Joost van Asten
Director of International Relations
University Office
Universiteit Leiden
Postbus 9500
NL-2300 RA LEIDEN
Email: jja.vanasten@bb.leidenuniv.nl

❑ BOLOGNA

Università degli studi di Bologna officially constituted in 1158 by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, though independent teaching dates back to 1088.

Rector: Professor Pier Ugo Calzolari
Academic Committee: Professor Tiziano Bonazzi (History)
Professor Carlo Guarnieri (Politics)

Management Committee representative:

Dr Giovanna Filippini
Settore Relazioni Internazionali
Università degli studi di Bologna
Via Zamboni 33
I-40125 BOLOGNA
Email: gfilippini@ammc.unibo.it

❑ BONN

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn founded in 1818 by Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm III, preceded by an Academy established in 1777.

Rector: Professor Dr Klaus Borchard
Academic Committee: Professor Dr Wolfram Kinzig (Theology)

Management Committee representative:

Dr. Hartmut Ihne
Managing Director, ZEF/ZEI
Universitat Bonn
Walter-Flex-Str. 3
D-53113 BONN
Email: ihne.cicero@uni-bonn.de

❑ GENEVA

The Graduate Institute of International Studies founded in 1927, associated to, but not part of, the University of Geneva.

Director: *Vacant*
Academic Committee: Professor Pierre du Bois (Politics)
Professor Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Law)

Managemt Committee representative:

Dr Daniel Warner
Deputy Director
Graduate Institute of International Studies
132, Rue de Lausanne
P.O. Box 36
CH-1211 GENEVE 21
Email: heimen@hei.unige.ch*******

❑ PARIS

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne founded in the 12th Century, and formally constituted by Papal Bull in 1215, was briefly suppressed by the French Revolution between 1793 and 1808, and reconstituted in 1890.

Rector: Professor Michel Kaplan
Academic Committee: Professor Hubert Kempf (Economics)
Etienne Picard (Law)

Management Committee representative:

Professor Robert Frank
Institut Pierre Renouvin
1, rue Victor Cousin
F-75005 PARIS
Email: frank@univ-paris1.fr

❑ PRAGUE

Charles University, Prague, founded in 1348, was divided into Czech and German institutions by the Vienna government in 1882. These operated in parallel until 1939, when the Czech institution was closed by Nazi occupation. After 1945, the German institution was abolished and the Czech Charles University revived.

Rector: Professor Ivan Wilhelm
Academic Committee: Professor Luboš Tichy (Law)

Management Committee representative:

       Ms Ivana Halašková
       Director, International Relations Office
       Univerzita Karlova V Praze
       Ovocny trh 3/5
       116 36 PRAHA 1
       Email: Ivana.Halaskova@ruk.cuni.cz

❑ MADRID

The Complutense University of University, one of the oldest and largest in the world, was founded in 1293.   It has about 100,000 students. ********** MORE?

Rector: Sr. D. Rafael Puyol Antolin
Academic Committee: Professor Henk Dekker (Politics)

Management Committee representative:

       Professor Carlos Seoane
       Vice Rector, International Relations
       Universidad Complutense
       Avda. Seneca, 2, Ciudad Universitaria
       28040 MADRID
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Europaeum Lectures

Europaeum Lectures have been a part of the consortium work since its foundation, examining key issues confronting Europe today. Those marked with ***** have been published. Those marked with **+** are available on our website.

Since 2000, this series of pamphlets has included the following:

❑ **October 2000, Prague**
Dr David Robertson of Oxford on *A Common Constitutional Law for Europe: Questions of National Autonomy versus Universal Rights* *** +**

❑ **November 2000, Oxford**
Dr John Temple-Lang of the European Commission on *The Commission and the European Parliament – an uncertain relationship* *** +**

❑ **February 2001, Geneva**
Professor Ian Brownlie CBE QC of Oxford on *International Law and the use of force by states* *** +**

❑ **May 2001, Oxford**
Professor Philippe Burrin of Geneva on *Strands on Nazi Anti-semitism* **+**

❑ **June 2001, Paris**
Professor Raymond Barre on *Quelle Europe pour demain?*

❑ **December 2001, Berlin**
Professor Peter Scott on *The European University - What is its Future?* **+**

❑ **April 2002, Geneva**
Lord Professor (Ralf) Dahrendorf on *Terrorism, Security and Poverty*

❑ **April 2002, Bonn**
Professor Michael Meyer-Blanck on *Tradition - Integration - Qualification: Some Reflections on Religious Education in European Schools*

❑ **June 2002, Bologna**
Professor Tiziano Bonazzi on *Europa, Zeus and Minos: or the labyrinth of Euro-American relations*

❑ **November 2002, Oxford**
Professor Charles Wyplosz on *Fiscal Discipline in the Monetary Union: Rules or Institutions?* *** +**

❑ **November 2002, Oxford**
Professor Robert Frank on *"France and the United Kingdom in the Construction of Europe"*

* To order further copies of these pamphlets which have been published, please contact the Europaeum Secretariat (see address on the back cover). A small charge may be made.

Je vois avec plaisir qu'il se forme dans l'Europe une république immense d'espirts cultivés. La lumière se communique de tous les côtés.

VOLTAIRE
in a letter to Prince Dmitri Alekseevitch Golitsyn
14 August 1767